"DESCENDED FROM IMMIGRANTS AND REVOLUTIONISTS": HOW FAMILY HISTORY SHAPES IMMIGRATION POLICY MAKING*

James Feigenbaum
Maxwell Palmer
Benjamin Schneer

Does family history matter for policy making in democracies? Linking members of Congress (MCs) to the census, we observe countries of birth for members, their parents, and their grandparents, allowing us to measure ancestry for the politicians in office when U.S. immigration policy changed dramatically, from closing the border in the 1920s to reshaping admittance criteria in the 1960s. We find that legislators descended from immigrant parents or grandparents support more permissive immigration legislation. They are also less likely to speak negatively about immigration in speeches before Congress. A regression discontinuity design analyzing close elections, which addresses district-level selection and holds district composition constant, confirms our results on roll call voting and speech. Efforts to account for selection into immigration—such as comparing international immigrants to domestic migrants and exploiting variation in restrictive legislation targeting specific regions of origin—further confirm the relationship between family immigration experience and more permissive stances on immigration policy. We then explore mechanisms, finding support for in-group identity in connecting family history with policy making. MCs name their children in ways that express immigrant identity, and immigrant-descended MCs discuss immigration

* Title quote from Franklin Delano Roosevelt's Speech to the Daughters of the American Revolution, April 21, 1938. We thank the editor, Stefanie Stantcheva, the anonymous referees, Ran Abramitzky, Chris Avery, Matthew Baum, Sam Bazzi, Richard Bensel, Leah Boustan, Daniel Carpenter, Devin Caughey, Dara Cohen, Katherine Einstein, Ray Fisman, Martin Fiszbein, Bernard Fraga, Claudia Goldin, Tarek Hassan, Robert Margo, Benjamin Marx, Daniel Moskowitz, Noah Nathan, Bruce Oppenheimer, Daniele Paserman, Spencer Piston, Luisa Godinez Puig, Tobias Resch, Eric Schickler, Deborah Schildkraut, Hanna Schwank, Maya Sen, Marco Tabellini, Randy Walsh, Christopher Warshaw, and Ariel White, as well as participants at SPSA, the Congress and History Conference, the First Annual Historical Political Economy Conference, MPSA, APSA, the University of Pittsburgh, and the Harvard Kennedy School for helpful comments and suggestions. We thank Grant Goehring and Danielle Graves for outstanding research assistance.

The Quarterly Journal of Economics (2025), 1–77. https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjaf017.
Advance Access publication on March 12, 2025.

using more personal frames, emphasizing family over economic considerations. Our findings illustrate the important role of personal background in legislative behavior in democratic societies, even on major and controversial topics like immigration, and suggest how experiences transmitted from previous generations can inform lawmakers' views. *JEL codes:* D7, F22, H7, J15, N32, N42.

> The whole debate we are now undertaking over immigration and the Dreamers has become somewhat personal for me because it has reminded me, in a very strong way, that I and my brother are first-generation Americans. We are the sons of an immigrant who came to this country at the age of 17 without a nickel in his pocket.
> ——Senator Bernie Sanders, speech on Senate Floor, February 14, 2018

I. Introduction

Since the Naturalization Act of 1790, immigration and citizenship questions have been among the most fraught domains of political contestation in the United States. Public support for restrictive immigration legislation has been common (Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014), with the arrival of immigrants often triggering intense political backlash and demands for immigration restrictions (Alsan, Eriksson, and Niemesh 2020; Tabellini 2020; Alesina and Tabellini 2024).[1] Although U.S. immigration policy has oscillated between expansive and restrictive regimes (Tichenor 2002), at least rhetorically the United States is a "nation of immigrants." One reason the long- and short-run reactions to immigration could diverge (Giuliano and Tabellini 2020) is that many U.S. citizens, including members of Congress (MCs), have personal or family stories of immigration; even several generations back, an immigrant family history might anchor permissive attitudes toward immigration. Though only a small share of MCs are or were immigrants themselves (historically or today, see Figure I), a significant number have foreign-born parents or grandparents. For example, in the 115th Congress (serving 2017–2019), 11 representatives (2.5%) and a single senator were immigrants, and 11.8% of representatives and 14.6% of senators had

1. The political effects of immigration are not always homogeneous; for example, Mayda, Peri, and Steingress (2022) show that low-skilled immigration decreased Republican vote share, while high-skilled immigration had the opposite effect.



FIGURE I

Foreign-Born Members of Congress, 1789–2018

This figure illustrates the percentage of foreign-born members in the U.S. House of Representatives (solid black line) and in the U.S. Senate (dashed red line). MC birthplace is drawn from the Biographical Directory of the United States Congress. The period studied in this article is denoted with a gray box. While MC birthplace is relatively simple to collect for this period, tracing foreign-born family history requires additional sources like linking to the complete count censuses. With some notable exceptions (e.g., in the 1850s) the House has tended to have a larger share of foreign-born members than the Senate. From the 1870s to the 1930s, both chambers of Congress reached or surpassed 5% of all members as foreign born. Since then, both chambers have seen sustained declines.

at least one foreign-born parent. In the first half of the twentieth century, the share of representatives with at least one foreign-born parent reached as high as 30% of the chamber and even more had at least one foreign-born grandparent.

In this article, we ask if electing legislators with family histories of immigration matters for setting national policy. Though MCs often cite their personal or family history when discussing immigration (Swarns 2006; Burden 2007, 18), does having a Congress composed of lawmakers with an immigrant background ever meaningfully alter policy decisions in areas of fierce political conflict? MCs might support permissive immigration policy for many reasons, but two central explanations are: (i) because it aligns with their electoral incentives, or (ii) because of their own preferences. Senator Edward Kennedy's role in formulating and passing the U.S. Diversity Visa lottery serves as a distillation of these concepts and the challenges in distinguishing between them empirically. Kennedy pushed for the policy change because of his own family connection to immigration and because his constituents included a large share of people with family histories of

immigration (Law 2002).[2] Our empirical approach allows us to estimate the relationship between family history and legislative behavior holding electoral districts and other important background characteristics constant and to distinguish between explanations based on personal preference and electoral incentives in a variety of ways.

To understand the behavior of legislators with immigrant family backgrounds, we turn to the most consequential period of immigration lawmaking in U.S. history and study lawmakers in the U.S. House and Senate from the 51st to 91st Congresses (1889–1971). Our sample period includes the exclusion of Chinese immigrants in the late nineteenth century, the closing of the border in the 1920s, and the reshaping of immigration in 1965 by the Immigration and Nationality Act, policy choices that affected millions of people over multiple generations. Our period also allows us to work with direct measures of legislator family backgrounds. We link lawmakers to the historical complete count census data from 1880 to 1940 to observe their family histories (Ruggles et al. 2020). This census match allows us to examine the countries of origin of the lawmakers, their parents, and, in most cases, their grandparents. We estimate the differences between MCs with and without a family history of immigration on two canonical forms of legislative behavior for MCs: legislative voting and speeches on the floor of Congress.

We find that having a recent family history of immigration is associated with legislators supporting more permissive immigration policy. MCs with family histories of immigration cast pro-immigration votes—against restrictive bills or in favor of expanding immigration—at higher rates during this period. Our results hold for both landmark immigration bills and for all immigration bills with final passage votes. Moreover, the relationship holds whether we measure the immigration history of MCs' parents or grandparents or a weighted combination.

2. While most Americans (with the exception of Native Americans and descendants of enslaved Africans) are descended from immigrants (as Franklin Roosevelt stated in the full quotation we use in the title, "Remember always that all of us, and you and I especially, are descended from immigrants and revolutionists") we focus on more recent family history of immigration for two reasons. First, we are constrained to the family history we can observe in the U.S. census, where we are limited to the parents and grandparents of MCs. Second, this more recent history is more likely to be tied to immigrant identity than immigration experiences many generations in the past and out of living memory.

These results could reflect the ideological effects of family background, district-level electoral incentives, district-level selection, or selection into immigration. Districts that prefer more expansive immigration policy might be more likely to elect MCs with a family history of immigration, or individuals who decide to immigrate and their descendants might differ from nonimmigrants in their personal characteristics. We distinguish between the possible explanations in four ways. First, all of our results on the relationship between immigration history and roll call voting hold with a rich set of controls for the composition of and views on immigrants in an MC's district (and crucially, constituent immigrant ancestry). Second, MC personal background has a stronger association with immigration voting patterns than does district composition, suggesting that district-level electoral incentives may not be the primary factor when MCs take immigration votes. Third, we use a regression discontinuity in congressional elections to compare districts just barely or barely not represented by immigrant-background MCs. This approach holds constant the district-level electorate and its level of demand for immigrant-descended candidates, helping eliminate some concerns over why districts elect representatives with (or without) immigrant family histories (e.g., district-level selection), and it confirms our main finding: congressional seats quasi-randomly assigned to MCs with family histories of immigration favored expansive immigration policies at higher rates. Finally, to account for selection into migration of people and ancestors, we hold characteristics associated with an immigrant background constant while allowing key experiences to vary. Immigrant ancestors were self-selected and might vary on dimensions including entrepreneurship, grit or determination, risk-taking, or openness to new settings. Domestic migrants and their descendants might also be self-selected on similar characteristics, so we isolate the role of international immigration specifically by comparing to a history of domestic migration. MCs with family histories of international immigration, not those with family histories of domestic migration, appear to drive the support for more open immigration policies. Furthermore, holding immigration history fixed, MCs with immigrant heritage targeted specifically by restrictive immigration bills were increasingly likely to oppose such bills. Our story, we argue, is particularly about immigration and the response to policies targeting it, rather than other traits that could be common to all migrants (e.g., domestic and foreign).

Do MCs with immigrant family backgrounds also give more voice to the issue of immigration? We distinguish between the quantity and quality of speeches on immigration. Drawing on newly scored speech data from Card et al. (2022), we show that MCs with immigrant ancestry are more likely to have a positive tone about immigration and immigrants when speaking in Congress. These correlations with MC ancestry are relatively large compared with correlations of tone with district composition or party. These results for tone of immigration speech also hold in a parallel regression discontinuity design (RDD) analysis: in districts with close elections between candidates with different immigration histories, immigrant-descended MCs speak with a more positive tone about immigration. This change in tone appears to be driven by a reduction in the number of negative speeches about immigration among MCs with immigrant family histories, rather than an increase in positive speeches. Overall, the RDD suggests that MCs with immigrant family histories give slightly less voice to the question of immigration, but the speeches they avoid making are the negative ones. This strategic approach to immigration policy could allow MCs to support an immigration agenda through votes without drawing attention from constituents or fellow MCs to their position or appearing to advocate for narrow interests (Cormack 2016).

Why do elected officials with immigrant backgrounds take more permissive stances on immigration policy? We explore three possible mechanisms: in-group identity, information about immigration, and correlated preferences. Although we cannot distinguish between these possibilities fully, we find the most support for a theory about in-group identity. MCs with immigrant family histories exhibit a heightened sense of a connection to group identity based on source country even before entering Congress, as demonstrated by choices of culturally specific first names for their children. Once in Congress, when immigrant-descended MCs speak about the topic of immigration, they do so in more personal terms, referring to family more frequently and making economic arguments less often compared with MCs without immigrant family history. Levels of support for permissive immigration policy can break down along narrower lines of source country or ethnic or racial identity. Meaningful group boundaries may form at the level of a specific nation of origin (e.g, Italian immigrants, Irish immigrants), pan-ethnic groups, or for an American national identity in which immigration is valued (Masuoka 2006;

Schildkraut 2014). Indeed, when faced with legislation restricting immigration based on national origin, we find that MCs with family histories rooted in nations unaffected by the restriction opposed it at lower rates than did colleagues with family origins in targeted countries. Thus, while MCs with family histories of immigration share a common tendency toward permissive immigration policy, narrower group identity based on nation of origin subsumes it under some conditions.

A second possible mechanism could be information about immigration. Information particular to an MC with a family history of immigration might include an understanding of the plight of new immigrants, the efficiency gains from immigration, the perils of zero-sum thinking, or the potential upward mobility of immigrant populations. This knowledge could lead an MC to support more immigration. Although it is difficult to reject this explanation fully, we show that MCs who could more easily observe the relatively higher upward mobility among immigrants (based on district-level variation in intergenerational mobility; Abramitzky et al. 2021b) do exhibit increased support for immigration, but this tendency does not differ between descendants of immigrants and other MCs.

Third, MCs could support more immigration for ideologically strategic reasons. Potential immigrants—who might shape a future electorate—may have political leanings aligned with MCs with immigrant family histories. Support for an expanded welfare state among immigrants, as in Giuliano and Tabellini (2020), could be one possibility. For this correlated-preferences mechanism to be at work, immigrant family history would need to matter for many policy domains beyond immigration and at a magnitude similar to what we observe for immigration. However, placebo tests show roll call voting in other areas generally does not change with MC immigration history. In areas where we do observe some changes, the magnitudes are not as large as for immigration. And, when assessing the sensitivity of district-level roll call voting to changes in immigrant family history induced by members dying in office, no topic area other than immigration approaches statistical significance. These findings make it unlikely that MCs support immigration primarily to shape the demographics of future constituents because of correlated ideological preferences.

Based on our findings, this article makes four distinct contributions. Our first contribution is to the literature on the political

economy of immigration. Previous work on the determinants of immigration policy has emphasized the initial backlash effects of immigration on the views of the U.S.-born (Alesina and Tabellini 2024); misperceptions about immigrants (Alesina, Miano, and Stantcheva 2023); institutional conditions in Congress (Tichenor 2002); political, economic, and social conditions in the United States (Goldin 1994; Timmer and Williamson 1996); or international events (Zolberg 2009). Looking at migration policy internationally, Facchini and Mayda (2009, p. 2) note that, given such high levels of opposition to immigrants, "it is a puzzle that migration is allowed to take place at all" and turn to an interest group model as explanation. We posit that the fact that legislatures are composed of lawmakers with family histories of immigration plays an important and underappreciated role in immigration policy. Although legislator background is hardly the only force relevant to this policy area, little attention has been paid to its role in debates over immigration policy in Congress and in other legislatures.

This perspective speaks directly to some long-standing themes in the political economy literature. There is considerable evidence of direct competition between new and prior immigrants (Abramitzky et al. 2023). However, we show that districts with greater foreign-born population shares and, independently, a lawmaker's personal connection to immigration, both are associated with increased support for permissive immigration policies. These results imply that on average, people in immigrant-heavy districts may have placed more weight on new immigrants seeking opportunity than on any potential labor-market harms from these populations.

Second, we contribute to the understanding of what factors influence how legislators vote, along the lines of Mian, Sufi, and Trebbi (2010), including views shaped by individual experience and background. When considering legislative decisions, MCs weigh some combination of their personal and constituency views along with the preferences of the political party (Lee, Moretti, and Butler 2004) and their "economic interest" in getting reelected (Stigler 1971; Kalt and Zupan 1984).[3] Our main finding—MCs with immigrant family backgrounds support more open immigra-

3. A legislator's own views sometimes appear to outweigh these other considerations, with some estimates suggesting that a senator's personal ideology holds more weight than any other factor in a legislator's decision function (Levitt 1996).

tion policy—holds when controlling for party and constituency, and when applying a regression discontinuity that generates quasi-random assignment of MCs to districts. When we standardize the measures of background and constituency to compare magnitudes, background is more important than both district and party. Approaches designed to account for self-selection into migration point to similar conclusions. Thus, we find that legislators' own views matter and that those views are explained by their backgrounds and experiences. Past work has shown that lawmaker race (Canon 1999), gender (Fridkin and Kenney 2014), economic class (Carnes 2012), prior political experience (Keena and Knight-Finley 2017) and the gender of their children (Washington 2009) also play significant roles in legislative behavior.[4] Background can matter specifically for controversial and hotly debated policies: McGuirk, Hilger, and Miller (2023) show that having draft-age sons pushes lawmaker parents to vote against conscription. However, we are the first to rigorously study lawmaker immigrant background, a central feature of U.S. identity in popular discourse, through this lens.

Third, we contribute to the study of immigration during the twentieth century. A growing literature exploits changes in policy to estimate the effects of immigration on labor markets (Clemens, Lewis, and Postel 2018; Jaeger, Ruist, and Stuhler 2018; Tabellini 2020; Abramitzky et al. 2023), growth (Ager and Brückner 2013), innovation (Moser and San 2020), investment (Burchardi, Chaney, and Hassan 2019), and health (Ager et al. 2024). In addition to deepening our understanding of the political economy forces that shaped legislation during this era, our study points to a potential longer-term effect of immigration that plays out over multiple generations. Where Giuliano and Tabellini (2020) highlight contact theory and cultural transmission from immigrants to the U.S.-born in shaping long-run preferences for the welfare state (horizontal transmission), our results point to the potential influence of individuals' family histories on public opinion and political preferences (vertical transmission, over generations); the personal histories of the descendants

4. The role of personal background in decision making extends beyond just legislators (Glynn and Sen 2015). Immigrant history matters for nonpoliticians as well. In survey experiments, priming on family history (Williamson et al. 2021) or a history of forced displacement (Dinas, Fouka, and Schläpfer 2021) increased sympathy for immigrant outgroups and refugees, respectively.

of immigrants predict how legislators wield political power and could similarly matter for everyone in daily economic and social interactions. Through this channel, immigration policy is multigenerational and potentially persistent.

Finally, we contribute to the "identity on the job" literature in a new context. Ethnic divisions induce some workers to discriminate against colleagues (Hjort 2014), biased managers to harm the performance of their supervisees (Glover, Pallais, and Pariente 2017), and job seekers to decline offers of employment (Oh 2023). However, in-group bias could also reflect better information (Fisman, Paravisini, and Vig 2017), and it may fade over time (Ghosh 2022). New in our context is that the job in question is as a politician, and congressional votes and speeches represent salient outcomes about immigration policy, a topic closely related to the identity we study.

II. Data

We focus on immigration legislation from 1889 to 1971, corresponding to the Congresses where we can match the most members to the 1880 through 1940 censuses to collect family immigration histories. In this section, we describe the history of immigration legislation in this period, the specific bills we analyze, and our congressional speech data. We conclude by documenting our process for matching lawmakers to the complete count historical censuses.

The size and scope of immigration to the United States has been determined by three main factors historically: the costs of migration, the benefits to the migrants, and U.S. policy (Abramitzky and Boustan 2017). As these three factors have changed over time, total flows and the selection of immigrants has changed. The age of mass migration—dating from the late nineteenth century to the immigration restriction acts of 1917, 1921, and 1924—was made possible by falling costs of transatlantic transportation, relatively open border policies, and the industrializing and urbanizing U.S. economy (Abramitzky and Boustan 2017). This historical moment coincided with an increase in the number of immigrants and a significant shift in their source countries. In 1850, more than 90% of the foreign born in the United States came from Northern and Western Europe, mostly Great Britain, Ireland, and Germany. Seventy years later, the foreign-born population in the United States was split between old and

new Europe, as 45% came from "old" sending countries and 41% from "new" sending countries in Eastern and Southern Europe.

II.A. Legislative Outcome: Roll Call Votes on Landmark Immigration Bills

To assess legislative behavior related to immigration policy, we identified key immigration bills in the 1889–1971 period (the 51st–91st Congresses) using Stathis's (2014) compilation of landmark legislation and key bills identified by Tichenor (2002). We selected this time period for two reasons: (i) this period spans many major immigration bills of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries; and (ii) members serving in this period were likely to be identifiable in the 1880–1940 censuses.[5] We begin by focusing on landmark immigration legislation because these bills had high stakes and directly determined the key parameters of immigration policy during our time period; importantly, any member casting a vote understood it directly affected the fate of immigrants. Table I lists the 12 bills in our analysis, and Online Appendix B.1 describes the legislation in detail. These bills represented major changes to U.S. immigration policy. Nine bills restricted immigration, and three increased immigration or reduced restrictions. We identified the final roll call vote in each chamber for each landmark bill—either the vote on final passage or on the conference vote—using the VoteView database (Lewis et al. 2017). Several potential landmark bills were dropped because final votes on the bill were not recorded.

II.B. Legislative Outcome: Roll Call Votes on All Immigration Bills

Although landmark bills represent the most salient and historically notable immigration votes from the 51st–91st Congresses, we also collected data tracking the full set of final passage votes on immigration legislation considered during our period. This wider set of votes supplements the landmark legislation in three important ways. First, these votes are included in

5. Goldin (1994) also studies the political economy of immigration restriction, focusing in particular on the anti-immigrant literacy test bills passed by Congress from 1897 to 1917 but ultimately vetoed by presidents of both parties. She finds that districts with slower wage growth or fewer immigrants were more likely to vote against immigration. Goldin's analysis, however, does not extend to the characteristics of the MCs.

TABLE I
LANDMARK IMMIGRATION BILLS

Congress	Bill		Roll call no.	Pro-immigrant	Yea	Nay
52	HR 6185	Geary Chinese Exclusion Act				
		House	96	Nay	188	27
		Senate	42	Nay	30	16
52		Gresham-Yang Treaty				
		Senate	447	Nay	51	25
57	HR 12199	Immigration Act of 1903				
		House	170	Nay	140	68
59	S 4403	Immigration Act of 1907				
		House	110	Nay	194	101
		Senate	110	Nay	15	30
64	HR 10384	Immigration Act of 1917				
		House	121	Nay	309	117
		Senate	324	Nay	65	22
67	HR 4075	Immigration Quota Act (1921)				
		House	21	Nay	285	41
		Senate	21	Nay	90	2
68	HR 7995	Immigration Act of 1924 (Johnson-Reed Act)				
		House	90	Nay	319	72
		Senate	126	Nay	72	11
80	S 2242	Displaced Persons Act of 1948				
		House	N/A (no final roll-call vote)			
		Senate	198	Yea	75	17
81	HR 9490	McCarran Internal Security Act (1950)				
	S 4037	House	264	Nay	302	56
		Senate	444	Nay	77	12
82	HR 5678	McCarran-Walter Immigration and Nationality Act (1952)				
		House	165	Nay	284	116
		Senate	298	Nay	60	31
83	HR 6481	Refugee Relief Act of 1953				
		House	64	Yea	225	189
		Senate	82	Yea	63	30
89	HR 2580	Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965				
		House	177	Yea	330	79
		Senate	232	Yea	80	20

Notes. This table reports landmark immigration legislation. We coded each piece of legislation based on whether a yea or nay vote aligned with a more permissive (more pro-immigrant) stance, indicated in the Pro-Immigrant column of the table. The totals for yeas and nays include announced votes and paired votes. There is no bill number for the Gresham-Yang Treaty. We use the veto override votes for the Immigration Act of 1917, the McCarran Internal Security Act, and the McCarran-Walter Immigration and Nationality Act.

the sample regardless of their outcome; this contrasts with landmark bills, some of which gained historical importance precisely because they had important legislative effects ex post. Second, a wider set of votes helps illustrate whether the relationships we observe still hold for votes less visible than landmark legislation. Third, this full set of bills allows us to use methods, such as regression discontinuity, that require a large amount of data to estimate the relationship between electing immigrant-descended MCs and vote choice.

To construct this sample of immigration votes, we relied on categorizations from Lewis et al. (2017). Specifically, we started with all bills categorized as "immigration/naturalization," and we again identified whether a vote occurred for the final passage of an immigration bill.[6] We filtered out any roll call votes that, based on reading contemporaneous descriptions, were not related to immigration or were simply amendments to landmark immigration bills in the same session as the bill's passage.

II.C. Legislative Outcome: Congressional Speech

Our other primary outcome is congressional speeches for the 51st–91st Congresses. We focus on the count, tone, and content of members' speeches about immigration. We draw on speeches recorded in the *Congressional Record*, which are processed and assembled in Gentzkow, Shapiro, and Taddy (2019) and Card et al. (2022). Both sources allow us to count speeches about immigration by MC and Congress: Gentzkow, Shapiro, and Taddy (2019) constructed keywords to identify speeches on 22 substantive topics including immigration, while Card et al. (2022) trained a machine learning classifier to identify speeches on the subject of immigration in Congress. Of course, speech can be positive or negative; to study this dimension of speech, we use a measure of tone from Card et al. (2022) where a different machine learning classifier identifies the sentiment of speeches, allowing for member-level measures of speech tone and tallies of positive and

6. To determine whether a roll call vote was for final passage, we check for final passage labels in Crespin and Rohde (2018), Roberts, Rohde, and Crespin (2018), or in the description field in the VoteView data. If no final passage votes were recorded, we checked for a vote for a final amendment to the legislation, and if not, a final recorded roll call vote.

negative speeches.[7] Finally, to help us understand mechanisms—why exactly MCs with an immigrant family history might be more likely to support pro-immigration legislation—we use a set of "frames" capturing different qualitative elements of speech (Card et al. 2022), measures of the emotionality of speech (Gennaro and Ash 2022), and the unstructured text of speeches on immigration, which allows us to analyze member speeches without relying on preestablished frames. See Online Appendix C.5 for more details on the Card et al. (2022) data.

II.D. Identifying Immigration Background

To estimate the relationship between family immigration background and MC vote choice, we use individual-level data from historical U.S. censuses. We begin by constructing a linked sample, locating MCs in the 1880, 1900, 1910, 1920, 1930, and 1940 federal censuses, based on the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) complete counts (Ruggles et al. 2020). In this subsection, we detail the complete count census data and the congressional data, we document the machine learning approach to census linking, and we summarize what the census data says about MCs.

To start, we identify all MCs serving between 1889 and 1971. We extract their full names, dates of birth, and states of birth from the *Biographical Directory of the United States Congress*.[8] We link all members to their census records in 1880, 1900, 1910, 1920, 1930, or 1940 with the linking method described in Feigenbaum (2018).[9] Linking historical records is complicated by the lack of unique identifiers. Instead, we rely on variables like name, place of birth, and date of birth, which should not change over time.[10] We apply a machine learning approach, training an algorithm to learn to make matches based on a smaller sample of

7. For both the relevance (is this speech about immigration?) and tone (is this speech positive, neutral, or negative?) classifiers, Card et al. (2022) start with a RoBERTa neural language model and fine-tune it with several thousand annotations.

8. For members born abroad, we search for their family backgrounds manually and record their ancestry directly. Members born abroad to at least one U.S. citizen parent are not considered immigrants, as they are citizens from birth.

9. See Online Appendix C.1 for a full description of this approach to census linking.

10. Our use of last names in the linking complicates matching women who might be expected—particularly in the early twentieth century—to change names

carefully hand-linked data. A priori, the costs of discrepancies in record features are unknown, so the approach makes the implicit rules used by a human linker explicit.

Overall, we link 88.5% of the MCs in our study sample to at least one of the six decennial censuses. Our match rates into the censuses—limited to MCs alive in a given census year—are all above 63%, peaking at 68.6% matching into the 1930 census. The true positive rate is 91% in cross-validation: this suggests that the linking algorithm is very efficient, able to identify nearly all of the matches that a human trainer would have made, but doing so at scale and with defined linking rules. In addition, our cross-validation implies that the linking algorithm makes the same choice as a careful and well-trained hand linker 85.4% of the time based on our precision or positive predictive value.[11]

Census questions vary slightly year to year, but they provide a wealth of information for each person we can link. For studying family immigration history, we focus on questions asked about birthplace. All people enumerated in 1880, 1900, 1910, 1920, and 1930 were asked their place of birth and their mother's and father's places of birth.[12] Because members of the same households are linked in the enumeration, when we observe MCs as children, we also observe all their grandparents' birthplaces, using their mothers' and fathers' answers to their own parents' places of birth questions.

We present three examples of MCs from the linked data in Online Appendix Table C.1. Former Speaker of the House Carl Albert was born in Oklahoma in 1908, to a mother from Texas and a father from Missouri. All four of his grandparents were born in the United States as well. Clinton Anderson, a former

upon marriage. However, during this time period, very few women served in Congress.

11. Consistent with the machine learning procedure, our match rates replicate the match rates of our human trainer in each census. Our match rates are generally higher than common census-to-census linking attempts for three reasons. First, we start with congressional biographical data with accurate names, including middle names, and exact dates of birth. Abramitzky et al. (2021a) documents the gains from middle initials and names in linking. Second, MCs are a selected population—majority male, white, and high-status—in ways that have historically increased match rates. Finally, we search for fixed characteristics (place of birth and parents' place of birth) in multiple censuses, allowing us to include MCs even if we cannot match them in every census.

12. In 1940, parents' birthplace was a sample line question, asked only of 2 people on each 40 person census page.

MC, senator, and secretary of Agriculture, was born in 1895 in South Dakota, to a mother from South Dakota and a father who immigrated from Sweden. His maternal grandmother was born in Illinois, his maternal grandfather in Wisconsin. His father's census records report that Anderson's paternal grandparents were both born in Sweden as well. Finally, former Boston mayor, Massachusetts governor, and MC James Michael Curley was born in Massachusetts in 1874 to Irish immigrant parents. In 1900, his mother reported that her parents were both born in Ireland; though his Irish immigrant father died in 1884, we assume Curley's paternal grandparents were born in Ireland as well. These examples highlight the diversity of MC family histories. While all three are white men who served in Congress in the 1940s, their immigration backgrounds vary substantially.

Our primary measures of immigration history are counts of foreign-born parents and foreign-born grandparents. As Online Appendix Table C.2 reports, the average MC in our sample had 0.4 foreign-born parents and 1.6 foreign-born grandparents; 16% had both parents foreign born and 32% had all grandparents foreign born.[13] We observe little difference in immigration histories across party in our sample.

Overall, we observe the number of foreign-born parents for 89.6% of voting members and the number of foreign-born grandparents for 60.0% of voting members. Successfully measuring grandparent nativity is more difficult because we only record it when we observe an MC's parents; this missingness occurs most frequently in the early years of our sample, particularly among older MCs who were not living with their parents during the 1880 or 1900 censuses.[14] For those MCs without missing data, we also

13. We focus on the foreign-born status of MCs' parents and grandparents rather than the MCs themselves for two reasons. First, only 4% of the MCs in our sample are foreign-born. Second, most immigrants to the United States do not become naturalized citizens and are therefore ineligible to serve in Congress. Online Appendix Table A.1 displays summary statistics for MCs who cast landmark immigration votes and who cast any immigration votes, respectively. We exclude MCs who were foreign born as citizens (such as those born to ambassadors or military personnel abroad). We code foreign-born noncitizen MCs as having foreign-born parents and grandparents.

14. Grandparent nativity is recovered from questions about mother and father's place of birth asked of the MC's mother and father. Thus, we can only record an MC's grandparents' birthplace if we observe an MC in a household with the MC's parents who then answer the census question on where their parents were born. If the nativity of one grandparent was missing, we made the assumption

construct an immigration index summarizing immigration history with a weighted average over places of own birth, parents' birth, and grandparents' birth:

$$\begin{aligned}\text{Immigration Index} = 1 \cdot (\text{Foreign-Born MC}) \\ + \frac{\text{\# Foreign-Born Parents}}{2} \\ + \frac{\text{\# Foreign-Born Grandparents}}{4},\end{aligned} \tag{1}$$

ranging from zero (all grandparents, parents, and MC U.S.-born) to three (MC and all ancestors foreign born).

We also construct name-based proxies for family immigration history. We focus on two methods, a relatively simple surname score and the f-index based on Abramitzky, Boustan, and Eriksson (2020); both are constructed from the 90–140 million people enumerated in each decennial census. For the surname scores, we calculate the share foreign born, mean number of foreign-born parents, mean number of foreign-born grandparents, and average immigration index among each enumerated person with that surname. The f-index, meanwhile, is a likelihood ratio. We construct a different index for each generation as:

$$\text{ForeignnessIndex}_{\text{name}} = 100 \cdot \frac{\frac{\text{\# foreign born}_{\text{name}}}{\text{total \# foreign born}}}{\frac{\text{\# foreign born}_{\text{name}}}{\text{total \# foreign born}} + \frac{\text{\# non-foreign born}_{\text{name}}}{\text{total \# non-foreign born}}}, \tag{2}$$

where *# foreign born*$_{name}$ counts the number of foreign-born people with a given surname or the number of foreign-born parents with children with a given surname or the number of foreign-born grandparents with children with a given surname; and *total # foreign born* counts the total number of foreign-born people or the total number of foreign-born parents or the total number of foreign-born grandparents. We built an analogous immigration index by summing the self, parent, and grandparent based f-indices.

We performed each surname calculation nationally and by census region. We prefer the regional measures because the same surname can denote meaningfully different immigration histories depending on region of the country, but (as we will show)

that the missing grandparent had the same odds as the nonmissing grandparents of being foreign-born.

our results are robust to both measures.[15] We matched an individual's surname to the surname scores calculated for the census preceding their election to Congress and the relevant region (see Online Appendix C.2). We also built name scores and f-indices based on first names and full names, which we use for robustness checks.

III. Roll Call Vote Analysis

Family immigration background could be related to legislative behavior. To test this, we evaluate the relationship between an MC's immigration history and vote choice on landmark nineteenth- and twentieth-century immigration votes and all immigration bills from the 51st to 91st Congresses. We use a model of the form

$$y_{ib} = \alpha + \delta \cdot \text{Immigration History}_i + X \cdot \beta + \gamma_b + \epsilon_{ib}, \tag{3}$$

where i indexes individual MCs and b indexes bills. X is a matrix of covariates including a key control for the log foreign-born population in a district because, of course, districts with a large number of foreign-born residents could both prefer representatives with immigrant backgrounds and offer in-office MCs strong electoral incentives to support permissive immigration policies.[16] We include indicators for chamber, party, and census region, as

15. We prefer surname scores within census region because names might have different levels of immigrant ancestry signal in different regions of the country. For example, in 1910, 41% of nearly 1,300 people with the surname of Champagne were foreign-born in the Northeast, while only 1% of the 840 Champagnes in the South were foreign-born, reflecting the regions' different immigration histories. The Champagnes in the South likely descended from eighteenth-century French colonists in Louisiana; Champagnes in the Northeast were more likely to be recent immigrants from French Canada.

16. We use census data to calculate the foreign-born population in a district or state. County-level data are mapped to congressional districts using the shapefiles from Lewis et al. (2013) and crosswalks from Ferrara, Testa, and Zhou (2024). The foreign-born population in a district correlates very highly with measures of the number of residents who have foreign-born parents or foreign-born grandparents and with the average immigration index of a district (the correlations across counties between foreign-born share and ancestry-based shares are are all greater than 0.935). Thus, we consider foreign-born population to be a more general proxy for constituencies where the residents have their own family histories of immigration. For robustness, we show in Online Appendix Tables A.3–A.5 that our results hold when we construct district-level controls for foreign-born population with a census-linking based procedure like we used to measure MC ancestry.

well as controls for age and tenure, district (log) total population, and district (log) black population. Our main specification pools across bills and therefore includes γ_b, a bill fixed effect.

For each bill listed in Table I and for the broader set of immigration bills, we determined whether a "yea" or "nay" vote best aligned with a political position generally favoring a less restrictive immigration policy.[17] We coded MCs who cast pro-immigrant votes in this direction with a one and those who did not with a zero. We excluded MCs who abstained from the sample.[18]

We find a strong relationship between immigration history—measured either by the number of foreign-born parents, the number of foreign-born grandparents, or our summary immigration index—and pro-immigration votes, as we report in Table II. We see this relationship for landmark bills (Panel A) and all immigration bills (Panel B). We focus first on landmark bills. We start with a parsimonious specification where the only controls we include are bill and chamber fixed effects and controls for the foreign-born population and total population of a district in columns (1), (4), and (7). We find that having one foreign-born parent is associated with a nearly 8 percentage point increase in casting a pro vote and having one foreign-born grandparent is associated with a 3.7 percentage point increase. In each case, the coefficients are substantively and statistically significant.

As we show in the second and third specifications of Table II, we continue to find a strong relationship between immigration history and pro-immigration votes when we include a host of additional control variables at both the congressional district (CD) and MC level. In columns (2), (5), and (8), we add census region fixed effects and a control for the black population in the CD. The coefficients are quite stable, suggesting that foreign-born ancestry and total population, which we always include, are the key

17. Yeas and nays in the regression analyses include announced votes and paired votes. To determine whether members cast votes in favor of or against permissive immigration policies, two researchers manually coded each vote as either pro-immigration or anti-immigration based on the text of the bill along with the contemporaneous newspaper coverage of the legislation and discussion of the legislation on the floor of Congress. In the few cases where coders disagreed, we conducted additional research until we had enough information to resolve how to code the vote. A list of all bills included in the sample and their pro- or anti-immigration coding is included in the replication data.

18. In this era, missed votes occurred frequently and were due more to travel and scheduling limitations than strategic absences.

TABLE II
IMMIGRATION HISTORY AND MC VOTE CHOICE

	MC immigrant ancestry measured as:								
	Parents foreign born			Grandparents foreign born			Immigration index		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Panel A: Pro-immigration vote in landmark bill sample									
MC immigrant ancestry	0.078***	0.075***	0.053***	0.037***	0.037***	0.026***	0.065***	0.065***	0.047***
	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Log foreign-born population in congressional district	0.056***	0.046***	0.048***	0.082***	0.052***	0.053***	0.085***	0.053***	0.054***
	(0.005)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.007)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Observations	3,901	3,901	3,901	2,714	2,714	2,714	2,714	2,714	2,714
Adjusted R^2	0.28	0.31	0.36	0.35	0.38	0.42	0.35	0.38	0.42
Panel B: Pro-immigration vote in all immigration bill sample									
MC immigrant ancestry	0.045***	0.045***	0.033***	0.022***	0.023***	0.016***	0.040***	0.041***	0.030***
	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Log foreign-born population in congressional district	0.038***	0.038***	0.039***	0.044***	0.037***	0.039***	0.046***	0.038***	0.039***
	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.004)
Observations	19,390	19,390	19,390	14,119	14,119	14,119	14,119	14,119	14,119
Adjusted R^2	0.34	0.35	0.37	0.35	0.36	0.37	0.35	0.36	0.37

TABLE II
CONTINUED

	MC immigrant ancestry measured as:								
	Parents foreign born			Grandparents foreign born			Immigration index		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Log total population	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Other CD controls	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Other MC controls	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Bill fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Chamber fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes. This table reports results from regressing an indicator for pro-immigration roll call votes on family immigration history, congressional district (CD) foreign-born population, congressional district total population, and other covariates. We measure MC immigrant ancestry in three ways with the measure indicated in the column header. In columns (1)–(3), parents foreign born ranges between 0 and 2 and counts the number of foreign-born parents. In columns (4)–(6), grandparents foreign born ranges between 0 and 4 and counts the number of foreign-born grandparents. In columns (7)–(9), immigration index ranges between 0 and 3 with each generation (self, parents, and grandparents) contributing one-third of the weight to the index. Each column includes bill fixed effects and a variable indicating whether the member was in the House or in the Senate. In Panel A, the sample includes votes on the key immigration legislation listed in Table I. In Panel B, the sample includes votes on all immigration legislation. Other CD controls include census-region fixed effects and log Black population. Other MC controls include party fixed effects and quadratics in age and tenure. Standard errors clustered at the MC level are reported in parentheses. * $p < .1$; ** $p < .05$; *** $p < .01$.

district-level correlates of MC voting on immigration roll calls. In columns (3), (6), and (9), we add controls at the MC level including party fixed effects and quadratics in age and tenure. Since party strongly predicts vote across many domains, we particularly want to know if immigration history explains variation in vote choice conditional on party. However, an MC's immigration history may influence choice of party, so conditioning on this choice may induce bias. Although the coefficients of interest drop slightly when we move to our third specification, adding the controls for party drives this change.[19]

When we turn to all immigration bills in Table II, Panel B, we find similar results. Though the magnitudes of the associations between family immigration history and voting shrink, we continue to find that MCs with more recent immigrant background are more supportive of pro-immigration legislation. Again, including controls for party and other CD- or MC-level covariates does not eliminate the associations.

Across all models in Table II, we find a positive and statistically significant relationship between immigration experience and voting in favor of immigration in Congress.[20] The coefficients decline by roughly half with each preceding generation's immigration history, but recall that our measures of MC immigrant ancestry are counts: MCs could have zero, one, or two foreign-born parents and zero to four foreign-born grandparents. Thus, the association of immigration background with voting is similar for a U.S.-born MC with two immigrant parents and a U.S.-born MC with four immigrant grandparents, while the association is smaller for an MC with one immigrant grandparent compared with one immigrant parent.

The most obvious confounding factors vary at the level of an electoral constituency. Moving beyond the controls in Table II, we examine the sensitivity of the relationship between family history and immigration votes to a variety of additional controls accounting for various forms of district heterogeneity. Figure II documents that the main coefficients on MC immigrant ancestry remain robust to a rich and wide-ranging set of controls. Specifi-

19. Though our results are stronger for Democrats than Republicans, the patterns generally hold when we analyze within party, as we show in Online Appendix Tables A.10 and A.11.

20. When we exclude foreign-born MCs from the sample, we find nearly identical results in Online Appendix Table A.2 to those in Table II.



FIGURE II

Robustness of Immigration History and MC Vote Choice

This figure reports results from regressing an indicator for pro-immigration roll call votes on family immigration history. We report the coefficient on the MC immigration history variable with 95% confidence intervals. The black points indicate models using the landmark immigration legislation listed in Table I and white points indicate models using all immigration bills. In the first row (baseline), the estimates include bill fixed effects and a variable indicating whether the member was in the House or in the Senate, as well as congressional district foreign-born population, total population, Black population, MC party, census region, and quadratics in age and tenure. The baseline controls are included in all results. In the second row, we include three controls for the log of the foreign-born population from New Europe, Old Europe, and non-Europe in each district. In the third row, we include controls for the log of the urban population in each district. In the fourth row, we include a control for the size of the foreign-born voting-age population. Next we include a control for the vote share for the Democratic candidate in the most recent presidential election to control for district political preferences (along with controls for presidential turnout). Then we include controls in the first and second dimensions of DW-nominate scores for MCs. We include state fixed effects; local time trends by interacting state fixed effects with year; region by party and state by party fixed effects; state by party fixed effects interacted with year trends (which help control for base or primary constituency); and congressional district fixed effects on their own and interacted with year trends. We show that our results are robust to controlling for local economic conditions like the employment rate, income per capita and per worker, and inequality, all using data from Fulford, Petkov, and Schiantarelli (2020).We show that our results are robust to controlling for local ethnic fractionalization and then local ethnic population shares. Finally, we include a specification controlling for all substantive covariates used in previous rows (e.g., variables other than fixed effects and time trends). Standard errors are always clustered at the MC level. See Table II notes for more on MC immigrant ancestry definitions.

cally, our story remains intact when we include (i) three controls for the log of the foreign-born population from New Europe, Old Europe, and non-Europe in each district to more precisely control for immigrant composition; (ii) controls for the log of the urban population in each district; (iii) a control for the size of the foreign-born voting-age population; (iv) a control for the vote share for the Democratic candidate in the most recent presidential election to control for district political preferences (along with controls for presidential turnout); and (v) controls in the first and second dimensions of DW-nominate scores for MCs. Our results are also robust to a variety of fixed effects including state fixed effects (see also Online Appendix Table A.12), local time trends by interacting state fixed effects with year, region by party and state by party fixed effects, state by party fixed effects interacted with year trends, and congressional district fixed effects on their own and interacted with year trends. The state by party fixed effects, along with a version interacted with year trends, help account for varying base constituencies in particular.

We show that our results are robust to controlling for local economic conditions like the employment rate, income per capita and per worker, and inequality, as the relationship between these local conditions and support (or opposition) to immigration is well established (Goldin 1994).[21] We see that our results are robust to controlling for local ethnic fractionalization and controls for the ancestry of constituents.[22] Finally, we show in the last row of Figure II that our results remain robust when controlling for all substantive covariates considered in the figures simultaneously. The bottom row excludes the more than 1,000 different fixed effects and year trends since, when including so many right-side

21. Specifically we draw on data from Fulford, Petkov, and Schiantarelli (2020), which measured the economic performance of U.S. counties from 1850 to 2010. The authors construct measures of county-level employment rates, income per capita, and income per worker, as well as a Gini coefficient based on occupation scores to measure local inequality. We crosswalk this to our CD-level data to control for local economic conditions.

22. To study this, we draw on ancestry data constructed by Fulford, Petkov, and Schiantarelli (2020) reporting county-level share of ancestry from various sending countries. Because different groups might be differentially politically engaged or have different views on future immigration, this control should capture some dimensions of constituent preferences. Online Appendix Figure A.1 controls for each source country on its own and all together, illustrating that the correlation between MC ancestry and roll call voting remains robust to these ancestry controls.

variables in one regression in conjunction with the relatively limited number of votes on landmark bills, we lack the statistical power to make conclusions about any explanatory variables.

Since an MC's role as a representative of the electorate may explain immigration-related legislative behavior, it is particularly important that we consider additional ways to measure the electorate's preferences regarding immigration. To this end, we show that our estimated coefficients on MC immigrant ancestry are robust to two different methods of measuring local attitudes about immigration. First, we extend a strategy from Fouka, Mazumder, and Tabellini (2022) to use newspaper content as a method to uncover local sentiment.[23] To do this, we collected data from Newspapers.com for our entire sample period and measure at the district-by-year level the usage of various terms. To identify key terms that might signal local interest or preferences over immigration, we follow Fouka, Mazumder, and Tabellini (2022). We have: general interest in immigration topics (words like *immigration*, *immigrant*, etc); terms about immigration restriction; terms about various prominent ethnicities and religions of immigrants; and finally, ethnic slurs (ethnophaulisms) based on Allen (1983), which proxy for the most severe anti-immigrant sentiment, and KKK-related terms measuring nativist sentiment. Because the Newspapers.com database changes over time (Beach and Hanlon 2023), we normalize by counts of the word *January*, following the historical newspaper literature (Gentzkow, Glaeser, and Goldin 2006). As seen in Online Appendix Figure A.2, the primary coefficients of interest on MC ancestry remain extremely stable when accounting for local attitudes using newspaper content.

Second, we document the robustness of our main results to historical constituency preferences. Because we lack rich contemporaneous polling data and samples of the polls that do exist are small, we use multilevel regression with poststratification (MRP) to estimate the opinions of constituencies from the polling data that exist. MRP combines constituency-level characteristics and individual-level characteristics to estimate the outcome variable (responses to a specific poll question) even when only a handful of observations for each constituency are available in the original data. We draw data from the Roper iPoll

23. Fouka, Mazumder, and Tabellini (2022) show that after inflows of African American migrants during the Great Migration, newspaper mentions related to immigrants and immigration decline.

Gallup archive for eight polls conducted between 1951 and 1965 with questions about immigration.[24] With complete count census data, our measurement of the demographics of each constituency are precise and we include several individual traits in our predictions (sex, race, education, occupation, and age). As shown in Online Appendix Figure A.3, our main finding is robust to controlling for these MRP-based estimates of local attitudes.

Our main results are also generally robust to the double or debiased machine learning procedure (Chernozhukov et al. 2018), as Online Appendix Table A.8 illustrates. In short, we "learn" very flexible mappings from our set of control variables to our variable of interest (MC immigrant ancestry) and to our roll call outcomes with a random forest model. We do this for a feature set including just the baseline controls in Table II and for an extended set of controls. We find positive point estimates for all measures in the landmark and all-bills samples and only 3 of our 28 specifications include zero in their confidence intervals.

Our core findings withstand inclusion of an extensive set of controls, but we can also test how much additional explanatory power any other unobserved confounders would need to have to push our coefficients of interest on family immigration history to zero, following Cinelli and Hazlett (2020). We report these results in Online Appendix Table A.9. Rather than imagine how strong a hypothetical confounder would have to be, the method proposed by Cinelli and Hazlett (2020) suggests comparing unobserved confounders to important covariates we do observe (and that we control for). We focus on our key measure of local demographics—the log of the foreign-born population in the district—as our initial point of comparison. Because of demands for descriptive representation, foreign-born population correlates very strongly with MC ancestry; because it may also proxy for district preferences about immigration, it should correlate strongly with our outcome, roll call voting on immigration legislation. Considering our specifications with CD and MC controls, we find

24. For full details of our MRP analysis, see Online Appendix C.4. We follow best practices from Hanretty (2020) in constructing our MRP estimates of immigration attitudes. Though the specific poll questions vary (see the full text in Online Appendix Table C.3), we are able to code each from least to most supportive of future immigration. Because the polling only starts in 1951, our MRP measures are an imperfect control, especially when we look farther back in time. However, we expect these estimates to be a reasonable proxy for local attitudes.

in Online Appendix Table A.9 that an unobserved confounder would have to be at least 1.9 times and often 3 or more times as strong as foreign-born population (that is, as highly correlated with both our covariates of interest and our outcome variable) to attenuate the estimates fully. We can benchmark unobserved confounders against party fixed effects: for that case, an unobserved confounder would have to be at least twice as strong as party fixed effects. Given the wide set of observables we have tested for, are other confounders with explanatory power double the size of party plausible? We think such scenarios appear unlikely, especially given the extensive robustness checks in Figure II.

Also consistent with our findings thus far, in Online Appendix A.2 we show that family history of immigration helps explain ideologically surprising or "miscast" votes on immigration issues. Foreign-born parents or grandparents predict a reduced rate of diverging from preexisting ideology when an MC is predicted to vote in favor of immigration and an increased rate of diverging when an MC's preexisting ideology predicts a vote against permissive immigration policy.

The results in Table II, supported by this extensive battery of robustness checks, suggest that our estimates for family background do not just reflect MC electoral incentives for roll call voting on immigration policy. Even though electorates with large shares of immigrants (and their descendants) might prefer more lenient immigration policy and representatives are incentivized to be responsive to these preferences, the relationship between MC ancestry and policy survives a wide set of district-level controls. In the next subsection, we continue to probe this relationship in analyses examining the importance of family background relative to constituency and other key factors.

III.A. Relative Importance of Family Immigration History

What is the relative explanatory power of MC personal background versus district composition? By standardizing our independent and dependent variables in Online Appendix Table A.6, we can provide a quantitative answer. In Panel A, the outcome is roll call voting on landmark bills. We see that family history is three to five times as important as district composition (measured by foreign-born population; columns (1), (3), and (5)) and also two to three times as important as party identification (columns

(2), (4), and (6)). These results generally hold for all bills as well (Panel B).

The results in Online Appendix Table A.6 imply that the relative explanatory power of immigrant family background is substantially larger than district composition or party. But our measures of MC ancestry and district ancestry are not exactly the same; for MCs we measure ancestry back to grandparents, whereas for districts we have simply used foreign-born population as a proxy. However, as we show in Online Appendix Table A.7, when we use district composition measures that correspond exactly to our MC measures—foreign-born parents, foreign-born grandparents, and immigration index based on census linking—the results remain unchanged.[25]

To offer an additional angle on the relative importance of family history compared with other key variables, we build ridge regression prediction models and benchmark family history's importance for prediction against other variables. Online Appendix E describes our methodology, the details of the predictive models, their performance in and out of sample, and the details of the results summarized here.

First, we directly evaluate variable importance with a standard machine learning approach (Fisher, Rudin, and Dominici 2019), permuting each predictor to be random and then calculating the loss in predictive power when assessing model predictions. Applying this variable-importance approach to an extensive set of covariates, we find that family history ranks in the top 5 variables of more than 30 assessed and has predictive power comparable to canonical variables in legislative studies such as political party.

Second, we study how much changes in the composition of Congress could have mattered for whether legislation passed. For example, consider the set of restrictive immigration bills that passed in our time period: for such legislation, a one standard deviation increase in immigrant family history would predict that the majority support would flip in 5% of landmark bills and 6%

25. The standardized regressions we report in Online Appendix Tables A.6 and A.7 might be complicated by the expected high correlation between MC ancestry and CD ancestry, but we found there is considerable variation in the correlation between district and MC-level variables depending on generation, as we plot in Online Appendix Figure C.1 (0.41 for parents, 0.495 for grandparents, and 0.515 for immigration index). Although some of these correlations are high, the comparisons in Online Appendix Tables A.6 and A.7 are meaningful and do not include two perfectly correlated variables.

of all immigration bills. In comparison, a counterfactual shift of all MCs to the Republican Party produces a similar magnitude change in bill outcomes. Overall, placing bounds on possible shifts in bill passage rates, we estimate that changes in the composition of Congress in terms of MCs descended from immigrants could plausibly have predicted shifts in roughly 15% of immigration legislation.[26]

More broadly, with these prediction exercises we do not seek to claim that family immigration history always amounts to the most important explanatory factor. Such a claim would be implausible, as well-known factors such as political ideology and party clearly structure a large part of activity in Congress, including immigration policy making. Instead, these analyses show that for legislative behavior related to immigration, family immigration background rises to a point of importance approaching other well-studied characteristics thought to explain member behavior.

III.B. Regression Discontinuity Analysis

The previous analyses demonstrate the strong correlation between an MC's immigration background and vote choices on immigration policy, even when accounting for the electoral incentives facing lawmakers in office through district-level controls. But district-level selection, where districts with a preference for inclusive immigration policies elect candidates with immigrant backgrounds, and not legislator's personal background and preferences, could also explain our results. While the sensitivity analysis performed in Section III suggests that such a scenario is unlikely, we can do more to separate the effect of electing immigrant-descended MCs from the effect of district preferences.

Online Appendix Figure C.1 plots the relationship between a district's foreign-born population share and the ancestry of the lawmaker it elects. We can compare MC and CD ancestry at the first, second, or third generation or compare our summary immigration index measure. In all cases, the relationship is positive and close to linear. A district's composition correlates with both

26. One important caveat to this exercise, discussed further in Online Appendix E, is that changes in the composition of Congress along any dimension might also shift the legislative agenda, including what legislation reaches the floor for a vote in the first place; thus, while helpful for exploring counterfactual scenarios, we urge some caution in moving beyond marginal interpretations for the role of legislator characteristics in explaining legislative outcomes.

the immigrant background of lawmakers and with the votes cast by lawmakers representing those districts, presenting a potential challenge to estimating the effect of electing an immigrant-descended lawmaker.

To address this issue, we implement an RDD in which we compare the voting records for MCs from districts who narrowly elected a candidate with an immigrant background to districts who narrowly did not elect a candidate with an immigrant background. See Online Appendix D for more technical details on the RDD.

We want to be clear about what our RDD can (and cannot) estimate. Family immigration history is an immutable characteristic and could influence a person's entire life. The experiment generated by narrow elections between candidates with and without immigrant background allows us to unpack several key factors related to how MCs vote on legislation, but it does not necessarily allow us to compare the legislative behavior of two otherwise identical MCs. An immigrant background correlates with other characteristics too, and randomization of who wins through close elections may not entirely separate the effect of immigrant background from other personal characteristics. However, because the same district could be represented by an MC with or without an immigrant background, the RDD does allow us to better hold fixed district composition and thus the demand for an MC who is or is not descended from immigrants. Thus, this empirical exercise is particularly useful for accounting for district-level factors related to selection of congressional lawmakers.

To implement our RDD, we identify the electoral contests immediately preceding the term of each vote on immigration-related legislation. We focus on the full set of immigration final passage votes from the 51st to the 91st Congresses. Our design requires that we restrict the sample to a subset of elections in which a candidate with an immigrant background faces a candidate with no immigrant background and the outcome is close. We draw on election data that includes the names and vote shares for candidates.[27]

We are unable to match losing candidates to the census—to determine their family immigration history—because we lack

27. We focus on the top two vote getters. We exclude at-large House districts; often these districts attracted many candidates from the same party or had multiple winners.

even the most basic information on their ages and places of birth. Instead, for the RDD analysis, we impute all candidates' immigration histories based on two name-based proxies for immigration history: our surname scores and f-indices (Abramitzky, Boustan, and Eriksson 2020). Recall that the surname scores impute, based on surname and region for each candidate, immigration history based on the average number of foreign-born individuals, parents, and grandparents for everyone recorded in the census with that surname. The f-index is based on similar data but uses a normalized index and is less sensitive to outliers (rare names). For the sake of consistency, we use these surname-based approaches for election winners as well.[28]

How do we identify close elections where one candidate has a name that denotes an immigrant background and one candidate does not? We coarsen the key measure of immigration history into a binary variable that denotes whether a candidate is considered to have a family history of immigration based on their surname. We chose a simple rule of thumb and set the binary indicator for a family immigration history equal to one for MCs with a surname score in the top half of the distribution for their region (or nationally when we use the national measure). We set the indicator to zero for MCs with a surname score in the bottom half of the distribution for their region (or nationally). Finally, so that someone with a surname in the 50.1st percentile would not be considered treated and compared to someone in the 49.9th percentile as a control, we applied a donut and excluded surnames that fell in the interval (0.45,0.55].[29] This approach restricts the sample to elections with one candidate with an immigrant background and one without such a background based on these thresholds for the

28. Online Appendix C.2 provides details and illustrates the close relationship between surname score, f-index, and actual immigration history. In Online Appendix Table D.8, we show robustness to using actual immigration histories for winning candidates (for whom we know the true ancestry from census linking) against imputed ancestry for the losers. We see that for most specifications our main finding holds: MCs with more immigrant ancestry are more likely to vote in favor of permissive immigration policies. These results are robust to all measures of immigrant ancestry among the losing challengers.

29. $1(\text{Immigration History}_i)$ equals one when $F_{SS}(\text{Surname Score}_i) > 0.5 + x$, where $x = 0.05$; and, $1(\text{Immigration History}_i)$ equals zero when $F_{SS}(\text{Surname Score}_i) \leqslant 0.5 - x$, where again $x = 0.05$. All observations in $(0.5 - x, 0.5 + x]$ are excluded from the sample.

surname score. We apply the same procedure when we use f-indices rather than surname scores to proxy for family history.

To make our procedure concrete, in the 1910 census someone with the surname Feigenbaum residing in the Northeast averaged 3.98 foreign-born grandparents. This ranked in the 82nd percentile in terms of foreign-born grandparents. Conversely, someone with the surname Palmer, which averaged 1.20 foreign-born grandparents in 1910, ranked in the 17th percentile of surnames in terms of foreign-born grandparents. Thus, a close election between candidates named Feigenbaum and Palmer would generate as good as random variation in immigrant background as the winner would represent the same district in Congress but have different (imputed) immigration histories.

We estimate an equation of the form

$$y_{ib} = \alpha + \theta \cdot 1(\text{Immigration History Winner}_{ib}) + f(V_{ib}) + \gamma_b + \epsilon_{ib}, \quad (4)$$

where $1(\text{Immigration History Winner}_i)$ denotes that the winner of the election has a surname score in the top of the distribution for the relevant measure of immigration history. θ, the parameter of primary interest, provides an estimate of the effect on vote choice of the as-if-random assignment of an MC classified as having an immigration history as compared to the vote choice by an MC classified as not having an immigration history. The outcome variable y_{ib} denotes whether an MC cast a pro-immigration vote. To estimate the RDD, we calculate optimal bandwidths (following Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik 2014) and also use rule-of-thumb bandwidths of ± 5 and ± 10 for each regression. The term $f(V_{ib})$ is a function of the winning candidate's vote margin, which determines who wins the election and therefore treatment status, and we use a local linear specification estimated separately on each side of the threshold. We include bill fixed effects, γ_b.

Estimating the effects separately using our three different measures of immigration history—parents, grandparents, and immigration index—and our four different methods to convert surnames into ancestry—share or f-index, regional or national—we find a positive effect of having an immigration history on the probability of casting pro-immigration votes across all measures in Table III. The sizes of the point estimates vary only slightly depending on bandwidth. We start with Panel A, where candidate ancestry is predicted using regional surname shares. When estimating the effect of electing an MC with foreign-born parents on pro-immigration votes, our results suggest a statistically and

TABLE III

REGRESSION DISCONTINUITY: IMPUTED IMMIGRATION HISTORY AND VOTE CHOICE, ALL BILLS POOLED

	MC immigrant ancestry measured as:								
	Parents			Grandparents			Immigration index		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Panel A: Candidate ancestry measured from regional surname shares									
Estimate	0.095***	0.100***	0.097***	0.129***	0.179***	0.177***	0.090***	0.109***	0.106***
	(0.027)	(0.035)	(0.026)	(0.030)	(0.042)	(0.029)	(0.027)	(0.036)	(0.025)
N	5,316	5,316	5,316	4,770	4,770	4,770	5,393	5,393	5,393
N (effective)	2,404	1,428	2,558	2,202	1,301	2,281	2,330	1,532	2,648
Bandwidth	±9.07	±5	±10	±9.49	±5	±10	±8.3	±5	±10
Panel B: Candidate ancestry measured from national surname shares									
Estimate	0.091***	0.082***	0.130***	0.089***	0.078**	0.109***	0.071***	0.077**	0.105***
	(0.022)	(0.030)	(0.022)	(0.027)	(0.036)	(0.026)	(0.025)	(0.034)	(0.025)
N	5,610	5,610	5,610	5,294	5,294	5,294	5,538	5,538	5,538
N (effective)	3,065	1,764	2,996	2,602	1,568	2,744	2,811	1,690	2,909
Bandwidth	±10.32	±5	±10	±9.15	±5	±10	±9.39	±5	±10

TABLE III
CONTINUED

	MC immigrant ancestry measured as:								
	Parents			Grandparents			Immigration index		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Panel C: Candidate ancestry measured from regional surname f-index									
Estimate	0.107***	0.116***	0.115***	0.102***	0.151***	0.134***	0.115***	0.119***	0.133***
	(0.027)	(0.034)	(0.025)	(0.027)	(0.041)	(0.029)	(0.026)	(0.034)	(0.025)
N	5,382	5,382	5,382	4,783	4,783	4,783	5,414	5,414	5,414
N (effective)	2,336	1,465	2,600	2,516	1,308	2,283	2,471	1,563	2,665
Bandwidth	±8.55	±5	±10	±11.41	±5	±10	±8.88	±5	±10
Panel D: Candidate ancestry measured from national surname f-index									
Estimate	0.071***	0.076**	0.099***	0.121***	0.094***	0.134***	0.086***	0.076**	0.100***
	(0.024)	(0.031)	(0.023)	(0.027)	(0.036)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.033)	(0.024)
N	5,665	5,665	5,665	5,479	5,479	5,479	5,648	5,648	5,648
N (effective)	2,853	1,759	3,031	2,484	1,634	2,862	2,825	1,748	2,983
Bandwidth	±9.03	±5	±10	±8.19	±5	±10	±9.18	±5	±10

Notes. This table reports estimates from a regression discontinuity design where the sample is constructed by focusing on close elections in which one candidate is predicted to have an immigrant family history and the other is not, based on surnames. The coefficients represent the effect attributable to the candidate with a family history of immigration winning the election. Each panel presents results from different methods of predicting ancestry based on surnames (regional or national, simple shares, or an f-index measure). Results are shown for three different measures of immigration history (parents, grandparents, and an immigration index) and across various bandwidths (Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik 2014 optimal, ±5, and ±10) for the running variable vote share. Standard errors clustered at the MC level are reported in parentheses. The positive and statistically significant estimates across all specifications suggest that electing MCs with a family history of immigration increases the probability of casting a vote in favor of permissive immigration policy. * $p < .1$; ** $p < .05$; *** $p < .01$.



FIGURE III

RDD: Effect of MC Immigration History (Surname Score) on the Probability of Casting a Pro-Immigration Vote, 51st–91st Congresses

For each measure of family immigration history, we estimate the effect of immigration family history on supporting permissive immigration policies in final passage votes for immigration bills between the 51st and 91st Congresses. The sample is constructed by focusing on elections in which one candidate possessed an immigrant family history and one candidate did not. In this case, candidates with an immigrant family history are determined based on surname. Each dot represents the share of candidates who voted pro-immigration in a given vote share bin. We present 40 bins on either side of the discontinuity using the mimicking variance evenly spaced method from Calonico et al. (2017). We identify the effect by using close elections in which a candidate with an immigrant family history narrowly won or narrowly lost the election. Across all three measures of family history, we observe a significant and positive effect on support for permissive immigration legislation.

substantively significant increase of about 10 percentage points in the rate of casting a pro-immigration vote when we predict MC ancestry using the regional surname share (columns (1)–(3)). Use of optimal, ±5 or ±10 bandwidths appears to make no appreciable difference for the magnitude or significance of this result. For grandparents and our immigration index, shown in columns (4)–(9), the estimates retain similar levels of statistical significance. Ranging between 9 and 18 points, these coefficient estimates show that across the board electing MCs with immigrant family histories causes an increase in pro-immigration votes in Congress. The results from our other methods of predicting ancestry from surnames in Panels B, C, and D are similar. Overall, the effects are positive, of a notable magnitude, and statistically significant for all 36 specifications in Table III.

Figure III illustrates the main findings graphically using a linear functional form. The figures model the discontinuity



FIGURE IV

RDD Robustness Check: Sensitivity of Estimates to Surname Score Cutoff Donut for Treatment Assignment (Optimal BW)

This figure reports RDD estimates for different cutoffs in determining the threshold for classifying a surname as denoting foreign-born. Moving from left to right along the x-axis varies the threshold calculation used to determine when the binary variable indicating an immigrant family history takes a value equal to one. For example, when $x = 0$ individuals with a surname score higher than the 50th percentile are classified as having a family immigration history, and individuals whose surname score is below the 50th percentile are not. When $x = 10$, then individuals with a surname score higher than the 60th percentile are classified as having a family immigration history equal to one and individuals with a surname score less than or equal to the 40th percentile are assigned a zero; all others would be excluded from the sample. We continued to estimate the RDD results as long as we retained at least 50 effective observations. We perform a local linear regression to estimate the discontinuity and the sample is determined using an algorithm for optimal bandwidth (Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik 2014) in the running variable (vote share).

between a narrow loss and a narrow win for a candidate with an immigration history (based on surname scores for our four measures) as compared with a candidate without such a history. As is evident, there is a visible discontinuity in the voting record at the threshold between a narrow loss and a narrow win for a candidate with an immigrant background.

Defining when candidates with "high" versus "low" probability of family immigration history actually face each other represents a key choice in our RDD. However, as we see in Figure IV where we plot the RDD results for different threshold choices, our results are robust no matter the precise threshold used. As we move to the right in Figure IV, we increasingly restrict the size of the sample by increasing the difference required to classify candidates as having more or less immigrant backgrounds.

Across all measures and all surname score thresholds, the results remain positive. In general, as we grow more restrictive in defining who has a surname denoting a family immigration history, the effect sizes increase. This makes intuitive sense: setting $x = 0$ classifies some people as having an immigration history equal to one and others with an immigration history equal to zero when their surname scores are very similar. Such a coarse division likely adds considerable noise to our estimates. As the threshold grows more stringent, the distinction between a surname indicating an MC with a family history of immigration with an MC who does not have such a history grows sharper; but this comes with a loss of power and eventually we no longer have enough observations to estimate the effects.

We confirm our RDD findings with a battery of additional robustness checks in Online Appendix D. Online Appendix Figures D.1 and D.2 show that our results are robust to changes in the RD bandwidth or using different local polynomial degrees. Online Appendix Table D.6 shows the discontinuity occurs at the 50-50 cutoff between winning and losing rather than at alternative placebo thresholds. Online Appendix Table D.7 shows that the effects also remain robust when dropping elections around the 50-50 threshold, suggesting that our results are not sensitive to strategic sorting or that immigrant candidates who narrowly win are more likely to moderate or (alternatively) emphasize their pro-immigrant views precisely when winning a narrow election. Online Appendix Tables D.9 and D.10 show that our findings are generally robust to using full names or first names to impute candidate immigrant ancestry, though the results using first name are noisier, likely because first names carry a weaker signal of ancestry. Online Appendix Tables D.11 and D.12 show that our findings are robust to using a triangular or uniform kernel rather than a Epanechnikov kernel when weighting observations around the cutoff in the RDD.[30]

Finally, Online Appendix Table D.1 shows that all district-level covariates are uncorrelated with an immigrant winning a

30. In Online Appendix Table D.5, we present RDD results for our sample of landmark bills. We see positive effects in all but one case, echoing our results from Table III. However, only 1 of the 12 estimates is statistically significant at conventional levels (column (4)). This is not surprising as we are underpowered compared to the all-bills case because the effective sample was several times larger in Table III than in the landmark sample.

narrow election.[31] Similarly, when we look at the characteristics of MCs in the districts with narrow elections in the Congress before the close election, we see balance across all MC-level covariates (see Online Appendix Table D.2).[32] Consistent with the fact that a close election between immigrant and nonimmigrant candidates may not hold all other personal characteristics constant (since other personal characteristics correlate with immigrant status), we do observe that immigrant candidates who narrowly win elections are slightly more likely to be Democrats and to have less seniority than when a nonimmigrant candidate wins. Thus, our RDD bundles the treatment of electing a candidate with an immigrant background with a treatment of electing a Democrat and a member with less seniority.[33] Importantly, our treatment does not appear to bundle ideology as we see balance on both dimensions of DW-nominate.

III.C. Summary of Roll Call Vote Analysis

To summarize our findings on roll call voting, immigration family history correlates strongly with pro-immigration vote choices; this pattern holds even when accounting for party and underlying political ideology. These findings hinge neither on the varying compositions of the districts electing MCs nor varying electoral incentives faced by MCs in office.[34] The relative coefficient on family history is larger than that for district composition or party in standardized regressions, and family history ranks in the top handful of variables when benchmarked in variable importance against a wider set of variables in an alternative ridge regression predictive model (Online Appendix E.2). Based

31. District-level characteristics include census-region indicators; political outcomes (presidential vote share and presidential turnout); demographics (logs and shares of the foreign-born population, black population, female and male populations, urban population, and total population); ancestry shares by origin from Fulford, Petkov, and Schiantarelli (2020); and economic measures from Fulford, Petkov, and Schiantarelli (2020). In Online Appendix Table D.3, we report balance on our measures of local sentiment based on newspaper terms.

32. MC-level characteristics include age, party, and tenure in Congress. We also see balance in lagged values of DW-nominate first and second dimensions and lagged values of speech tone and counts from Card et al. (2022).

33. However, as we show in Online Appendix Table D.4, our RDD results are robust to controlling for these bundled covariates of party and tenure.

34. Differential patterns of missing data from census linking also do not appear to explain the results. Online Appendix Table A.31 replicates Table II using surname scores, which exist for all MCs.

on counterfactual shifts, the composition of family histories in Congress could have proven pivotal in a meaningful share of immigration votes, comparable to canonical variables such as party, region, and seniority (Online Appendix E.3). Finally, accounting for district-level selection through an RDD approach reveals that districts electing immigrant-descended MCs increase the odds of support for permissive immigration policies.

IV. Congressional Speech and Immigrant Background

We evaluate how an immigrant family history relates to an MC's presentation of self through floor speech. Floor speeches "increase members' visibility and voice in the legislative process" and provide chances for MCs to emphasize a policy area to their colleagues, constituents, and the press (Pearson and Dancey 2011). At the same time, speech serves as a potentially less costly signal than a vote on a key policy issue. Speech is not binding; listeners interpret a speech's meaning, which can be revised and reinterpreted in ways that a roll call vote cannot. However, congressional speech is not entirely cheap talk; by taking a position on the record, MCs signal their views and priorities, and they may face consequences later for taking votes contrary to their speeches. Furthermore, giving a speech may involve a degree of agenda-setting power absent from roll call votes. Whereas a roll call vote involves casting a "yea" or "nay" vote on a question generally determined by congressional leadership, giving a speech offers a less constrained choice about the subject matter to cover during a member's floor time. In this manner, choices made about the subject of a speech offer insight into a member's priorities and agenda.

Ultimately, our findings on speech echo our results in the previous section on roll call voting. We find that MC ancestry correlates with more positive speech sentiment about immigration and immigrants from MCs. We also see much larger correlations with ancestry than with district demographics or party in our standardized results. The close election RDD reveals that electing MCs with more immigrant ancestry leads on net to more positive tone about immigration and immigrants, holding district characteristics constant. We conclude by unpacking our tone results by speech frequency. We find that MCs with immigrant ancestry speak relatively less frequently about immigration and do not speak in positive terms more often than other MCs; instead, MCs

with immigrant ancestry speak slightly less frequently about immigration in general and use negative language around immigration less often.

We start by estimating equation (3) but replace the outcome with a measure of the tone of immigration speeches. Specifically, we use a measure of tone that ranges from −1 to 1 (with positive values indicating more positive tone) constructed in Card et al. (2022). We include Congress and chamber fixed effects.

Table IV presents our first set of speech-tone results. Across all three specifications and for all three measures of MC ancestry, we observe a positive and statistically significant association between family immigration history and the tone of immigration speeches; for instance, an additional foreign-born parent is associated with a roughly 0.018–0.023 point shift toward a more positive tone (roughly 7%–9% of a standard deviation). These results are also generally robust to the same additional controls we used on roll call votes as we document in Online Appendix Figures A.4–A.7. The controls include additional extended district demographics, additional fixed effects, measures of local attitudes about immigration from newspapers constructed via MRP, local economic conditions, and local source-country immigrant ancestry shares.[35]

When standardizing coefficients and comparing estimates for family history, district foreign-born population, and party, we find that family history appears to have the largest magnitude coefficients of these three explanatory variables for all specifications (Online Appendix Table A.20). A one standard deviation increase in foreign-born parents is associated with a roughly 10% of a standard deviation increase in the share of positive immigration speeches given by an MC, an estimate nearly three times larger than the magnitude of the estimate for district foreign-born

35. Of all the robustness results presented in Online Appendix Figures A.4–A.7, only a handful of specifications, such as those with CD fixed effects and CD fixed effects by year trends, are not statistically significant. In Online Appendix Table A.14 our speech-tone results are as robust as our roll call results to concerns about unobserved confounders, as any unobserved confounder would have to be as strong if not stronger than important controls like party fixed effects or district foreign-born population. In Online Appendix Table A.13, we show that our speech-tone results remain generally robust to the double or debiased machine learning procedure proposed by Chernozhukov et al. (2018). We find positive point estimates for all measures and only 1 of our 14 specifications includes zero in the confidence intervals.

TABLE IV

IMMIGRATION HISTORY AND IMMIGRATION SPEECHES: TONE

	Card et al. (2022) tone on immigration speech								
	MC immigrant ancestry measured as:								
	Parents foreign-born			Grandparents foreign-born			Immigration index		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
MC immigrant ancestry	0.023***	0.020***	0.018***	0.010***	0.008***	0.008***	0.018***	0.014***	0.013***
	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Log foreign-born population in congressional district	0.022***	0.028***	0.021***	0.026***	0.032***	0.023***	0.027***	0.033***	0.023***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)
Log total population	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Other CD controls	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Other MC controls	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Congress fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Chamber fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	9,720	9,720	9,720	6,599	6,599	6,599	6,599	6,599	6,599
Adjusted R^2	0.13	0.14	0.15	0.14	0.16	0.16	0.14	0.16	0.16

Notes. This table reports the relationship between the key measures of family immigration history and the tone of MC immigration speech. A higher value reflects a more positive tone. Specifically, tone is calculated in Card et al. (2022) by subtracting the share of negative-tone speeches from positive-tone speeches, where each speech is classified via a human-trained machine learning classifier. We measure MC immigrant ancestry in three ways with the measure indicated in the column header. In columns (1)–(3), parents foreign-born ranges between 0 and 2 and counts the number of foreign-born parents. In columns (4)–(6), grandparents foreign-born ranges between 0 and 4 and counts the number of foreign-born grandparents. In columns (7)–(9), immigration index ranges between 0 and 3 with each generation (self, parents, and grandparents) contributing one-third of the weight to the index. Standard errors clustered at the MC level are reported in parentheses. * $p < .1$; ** $p < .05$; *** $p < .01$.

population. In this manner, the results for tone align closely with our standardized regression results on roll call voting.[36]

Just as with our roll call results, it could be the case that districts that demand MCs who talk more positively about immigration are also the districts most likely to elect MCs with immigrant family history. To hold demand for such MCs constant, we again turn to an RDD design and isolate the effect of electing MCs with a family immigration history on the tone of immigration speeches. Table V and Online Appendix Figure D.3 present the RDD results for speech. We see that the change from electing an MC with a family history of immigration to one without such a background leads to a positive shift in tone. The exact point estimate fluctuates between 0.03 and 0.20 points (where standard deviation in tone of speech is 0.21) depending on the exact specification and bandwidth and remains statistically significant in only 28 of 36 specifications, but the balance of the evidence suggests a positive effect.[37]

Because the tone of a speech involves a strategic expression of a members' ideological position, it follows that the results here echo our findings on roll call voting. But speech could be measured in quantity as well as quality. Counting speeches may capture different aspects of congressional behavior. Specifically, frequency of speech could help capture willingness to spend a member's valuable floor time on the topic of immigration. So, do MCs with immigrant ancestries allocate their floor time differently? We find that they do but in a surprising way.

We decompose the speech-tone measure from Card et al. (2022) and directly count the numbers of positive and negative speeches about immigration given by MCs. We turn to our RDD

36. In parallel to our results for roll call voting, we also assess variable importance for tone of speech via a ridge regression model. Online Appendix Figure E.2 Panel B illustrates that as with roll call voting, family history ranks among the most important variables in terms of predictors for tone on speech. When benchmarked against our other key variables, counterfactual scenarios with different compositions of Congress (e.g., more or fewer MCs with family histories of immigration) predict changes in tones of speech of a magnitude on the order of what would occur for similar changes in the composition of Congress along the dimension of political party. Online Appendix E provides the full details.

37. Online Appendix Figures D.4–D.6 and Online Appendix Tables D.13–D.19 report a full battery of robustness checks. Online Appendix Table D.20 illustrates that the speech RDD results are again robust to including controls for party and tenure.

TABLE V

REGRESSION DISCONTINUITY: IMPUTED IMMIGRATION HISTORY (SURNAME SCORE) AND SPEECH (CARD ET AL. 2022 TONE)

	MC immigrant ancestry measured as:								
	Parents			Grandparents			Immigration index		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Panel A: Candidate ancestry measured from regional surname shares									
Estimate	0.057*	0.191***	0.103***	0.027	0.069	0.051	0.069**	0.161***	0.086***
	(0.031)	(0.043)	(0.031)	(0.032)	(0.047)	(0.034)	(0.031)	(0.041)	(0.030)
N	2,598	2,598	2,598	2,376	2,376	2,376	2,692	2,692	2,692
N (effective)	1,242	710	1,280	1,235	647	1,155	1,281	757	1,347
Bandwidth	±9.6	±5	±10	±10.83	±5	±10	±9.2	±5	±10
Panel B: Candidate ancestry measured from national surname shares									
Estimate	0.032	0.107***	0.041	0.073**	0.150***	0.086***	0.058*	0.141***	0.074***
	(0.029)	(0.038)	(0.027)	(0.033)	(0.039)	(0.028)	(0.032)	(0.040)	(0.028)
N	2,789	2,789	2,789	2,716	2,716	2,716	2,833	2,833	2,833
N (effective)	1,363	880	1,481	1,092	809	1,408	1,229	869	1,480
Bandwidth	±8.78	±5	±10	±7.13	±5	±10	±7.7	±5	±10

TABLE V
CONTINUED

	MC immigrant ancestry measured as:								
	Parents			Grandparents			Immigration index		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Panel C: Candidate ancestry measured from regional surname f-index									
Estimate	0.058*	0.184***	0.101***	0.054	0.095**	0.072**	0.076**	0.204***	0.099***
	(0.030)	(0.042)	(0.031)	(0.035)	(0.045)	(0.033)	(0.032)	(0.041)	(0.030)
N	2,631	2,631	2,631	2,392	2,392	2,392	2,689	2,689	2,689
N (effective)	1,323	724	1,300	1,034	654	1,165	1,161	767	1,338
Bandwidth	±10.23	±5	±10	±8.59	±5	±10	±8.28	±5	±10
Panel D: Candidate ancestry measured from national surname f-index									
Estimate	0.034	0.091**	0.050*	0.076**	0.128***	0.094***	0.033	0.085**	0.051*
	(0.029)	(0.039)	(0.028)	(0.031)	(0.038)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.036)	(0.026)
N	2,819	2,819	2,819	2,792	2,792	2,792	2,890	2,890	2,890
N (effective)	1,443	894	1,506	1,229	853	1,463	1,477	925	1,537
Bandwidth	±9.31	±5	±10	±7.79	±5	±10	±9.34	±5	±10

Notes. This table reports estimates from a regression discontinuity design where the sample is constructed by focusing on close elections in which one candidate is predicted to have an immigrant family history and the other is not, based on surnames. The coefficients represent the effect attributable to the candidate with a family history of immigration winning the election on the tone of immigration speeches given. Each panel presents results from different methods of predicting ancestry based on surnames (regional or national, simple shares, or an f-index measure). Results are shown for three different measures of immigration history (parents, grandparents, and an immigration index) and across various bandwidths (Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik 2014 optimal, ±5, and ±10) for the running-variable vote share. Standard errors clustered at the MC level are reported in parentheses. The positive estimates across most specifications suggest that electing MCs with a family history increases the chances for giving more positive speeches about immigration, although the statistical significance varies depending on the specification. * $p < .1$; ** $p < .05$; *** $p < .01$.

specification that generates variation in the ancestry of the winning candidate for a given district with a close election. Our outcome variables are $\log(1 + FloorSpeech_{it})$, where we count the total number of speeches about immigration or the number of positive or negative speeches as scored by the model in Card et al. (2022).[38]

In Online Appendix Table D.21, Panel A, we see a consistently negative estimate of the effect of electing an immigrant-descended MC on the frequency of congressional floor speeches about immigration, though the results are less statistically precise than our roll call or tone results (only two estimates are significant at better than the 5% level). As we see in Panels B and C, the reduction in immigration speech overall appears to be explained by declines in anti-immigration speeches rather than increases in pro-immigration speeches. We estimate null effects for changes in pro-immigration speeches (Panel B), but for anti-immigration speeches we observe effects ranging from −5% to −16% depending on specification (Panel C). Such a result appears consistent with MCs with family histories of immigration refraining from speaking during moments of anti-immigration sentiment in Congress, rather than making additional pro-immigration speeches.

Floor speech and roll call votes are two canonical forms of legislative behavior. MCs have historically used their voting and strategic communication tools differently, and we find that is the case in our context as well. While floor speeches allow MCs to engage in position taking—local press often reported directly on speeches given by a district's representatives—they retain discretion over whether to speak and what to say. Local press rarely reports on what MCs do not say. MCs with immigrant family backgrounds appear to avoid outsize shows of pro-immigration rhetoric compared to MCs with no such family history; this could allow them to advance their agenda through votes without fomenting backlash from certain constituents or fellow members of Congress—especially during moments of fierce political conflict over immigration and assimilation, such as when landmark immigration legislation was on the agenda. Adopting a more

38. We present the specification where treatment is defined using surname scores based on regional shares, but our results are robust to the constructions of treatment. Our results are also robust to using inverse hyperbolic sine (Online Appendix Table D.22).

cautious approach to floor speeches avoids drawing attention to their own heritage, signals their own assimilation, and avoids appearing to advocate for narrow, particularistic interests. These strategic choices by immigrant-descended MCs could allow them to build coalitions and advance other policy priorities even while voting in favor of pro-immigration policies.

V. Selection into Immigration

Based on RDDs accounting for district-level selection, electing MCs with immigrant family histories directly increases the number of lawmaker votes cast on permissive immigration policies and leads to speeches with net more positive tones. While the RDD approach helps account for district-level selection, it does not address the possibility that the choice to immigrate (and thus who is descended from immigrants) is closely related to many other individual-level or family-level characteristics that might also contribute to support for permissive immigration policies. We now seek to hold immigration-related background characteristics constant while allowing specific experiences related to international immigration to vary. This approach helps confirm that being descended from immigrants, and not other related characteristics, best explains the patterns we observe.

V.A. Family Traits

The decision to immigrate might be driven by a broader set of traits or values passed intergenerationally and affecting MC ideology. Immigration, especially in the era we study, was a difficult journey that required severing ties with those left behind. It was also an expensive and risky undertaking, with potential immigrants moving to a new country they had likely never seen before. For these reasons and more, self-selection might cause immigrant ancestors to vary on some dimensions, ranging from entrepreneurship, grit, and risk-taking to openness to new settings. MCs with immigrant family histories might support looser immigration restrictions because of these traits rather than international immigration itself.

But immigrants are not the only MC ancestors who might be self-selected. Migration within the United States in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries shared many of the same challenges as international immigration, including long journeys,

uncertain prospects, and breaking social bonds with familiar people and places, though of course immigrants faced additional barriers, including language, culture, and navigating the immigration and legal systems. In an effort to account for these factors and separate the role of international immigration from other elements common to both immigrants and migrants, we ask: Is there a difference between a family history of immigration and a family history of migration for immigration policy making?

To answer this question, we examine the birthplaces, by state, of MCs, their parents, and their grandparents. We define migration history to be comparable to our definition of immigration family history but where migration identifies people who move across states within the United States. An MC's parent is defined as a migrant if the MC was born in a different state from the MC parent, and an MC's grandparent is defined as a migrant if the MC's parent was born in a different state from the MC's grandparent. As with immigration, we count the number of migrant parents and grandparents an MC has.

Table VI replicates the main results but includes controls for family migration history. We find that MC support for more open immigration policies is driven by MCs with family histories of international immigration not those with family histories of domestic migration. Across all specifications, the coefficient on immigrant family history is roughly three to eight times larger in magnitude than the coefficient on domestic migrant family history. Formal hypothesis tests where the null is equality between the coefficients estimated for immigrant ancestry and migrant ancestry allow us to reject the null in all specifications for both landmark and all bills, as reported in the bottom row of each panel. Furthermore, the coefficient on MC migrant ancestry is statistically distinguishable from zero in only a handful of cases, whereas the coefficients for MC immigrant ancestry are statistically significant across all specifications. In addition, under the theory that internal migrants who traveled longer distances may be most comparable to international immigrants, specifications accounting explicitly for distance traveled reveal that domestic migrants traveling longer distances appear no more likely to support permissive immigration policies (see Online Appendix Table A.28).

Finally, as an additional piece of evidence against selection based on family traits, in Online Appendix Table A.29 we show that our main results are robust to controlling for an MC's own father's socioeconomic status. Once we control for family

TABLE VI

IMMIGRATION HISTORY AND MC VOTE CHOICE: ALL BILLS POOLED, FAMILY MIGRATION HISTORY CONTROLS

	MC immigrant ancestry measured as:								
	Parents foreign-born			Grandparents foreign-born			Immigration index		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Panel A: Pro-immigration vote in landmark-bill sample									
MC immigrant ancestry	0.077***	0.080***	0.056***	0.037***	0.041***	0.028***	0.065***	0.073***	0.053***
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.012)
MC migrant ancestry	0.012	0.023**	0.017*	0.005	0.011	0.005	0.008	0.023	0.015
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.014)
Log foreign-born pop. in congressional district	0.064***	0.054***	0.055***	0.088***	0.055***	0.055***	0.092***	0.055***	0.055***
	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.007)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Log migrant pop. in congressional district	−0.059***	−0.042***	−0.034**	−0.055***	−0.017	−0.012	−0.059***	−0.026	−0.018
	(0.012)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.016)	(0.019)	(0.018)
Log total population	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Other CD controls	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Other MC controls	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Bill fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Chamber fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3,881	3,881	3,881	2,697	2,697	2,697	2,697	2,697	2,697
Adjusted R^2	0.29	0.31	0.36	0.35	0.38	0.42	0.35	0.38	0.42
p-value hyp. test: immigrant coeff. = migrant coeff.	< .001	< .001	.001	< .001	< .001	.001	< .001	<.001	.005

TABLE VI
CONTINUED

	MC immigrant ancestry measured as:								
	Parents foreign-born			Grandparents foreign-born			Immigration index		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Panel B: Pro-immigration vote in all immigration bill sample									
MC immigrant ancestry	0.046***	0.049***	0.037***	0.024***	0.026***	0.017***	0.039***	0.044***	0.031***
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.005)
MC migrant ancestry	0.007	0.013***	0.012***	0.005	0.008**	0.003	0.001	0.009	0.004
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.006)
Log foreign-born pop. in congressional district	0.041***	0.042***	0.041***	0.047***	0.039***	0.039***	0.049***	0.040***	0.039***
	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Log migrant pop. in congressional district	−0.026***	−0.022***	−0.013**	−0.024***	−0.012	−0.003	−0.023***	−0.013	−0.004
	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Log total population	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Other CD controls	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Other MC controls	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Bill fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Chamber fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	19,329	19,329	19,329	14,045	14,045	14,045	14,045	14,045	14,045
Adjusted R^2	0.35	0.35	0.37	0.35	0.36	0.37	0.35	0.36	0.37
p-value hyp. test: immigrant coeff. = migrant coeff.	< .001	< .001	< .001	< .001	< .001	< .001	< .001	< .001	< .001

Notes. This table replicates Table II but includes an additional control for domestic migrant family history in addition to our key variable, international immigrant family history. We define migrant history comparably to immigrant family history but where migration identifies people who move across states (within the United States) rather than across countries. An MC is a migrant if he or she represents a state in Congress that is not his or her birth state. An MC's parent is defined as a migrant if the MC was born in a different state from the parent, and an MC's grandparent is defined as a migrant if the MC's parent was born in a different state from the grandparent. As with immigration, we count the number of migrant parents and grandparents each MC has. In the table, the controls match the controls used in Table II; we also add a control for the log of the migrant population in a district, parallel to our control for the log of the foreign-born population. In Panel A, the sample includes votes on the key immigration legislation listed in Table I, and Panel B includes all immigration votes. The bottom row of each panel reports the p-value from a hypothesis test comparing the coefficient for the MC immigrant variable to the coefficient for the MC migrant variable. Standard errors clustered at the MC level are reported in parentheses. * $p < .1$; ** $p < .05$; *** $p < .01$.

immigration history, there is little to no correlation between father's economic status and how his future MC child votes on immigration legislation, suggesting that although MCs with a family history of immigration were more likely to come from more humble backgrounds (lower father economic status), this does not explain our findings. Based on these results, we argue that our story is particularly about immigration, rather than some trait(s) common to all migrants.

V.B. Targets of Restrictive Immigration Policy

While "immigrant" or "descendant of immigrants" is a salient dimension of MC background, it elides variation in immigrant experience by country or continent of origin. Immigration bills can be coded as pro- or anti-immigration, but the legislation is often more complex: as an example, the Johnson-Reed Act in 1924 severely curtailed immigration from Italy, but the quotas were nonbinding on Irish immigrants.

These targeted restrictions allow us to hold MCs' immigration experiences constant while varying whether MC family background is differentially targeted. We start by pooling landmark immigration votes where the countries of origin for some MCs in our sample were differentially targeted. Landmark bills voted on after the onset of World War I provide ideal test cases for the effects of differential targeting.[39]

To analyze the effects of differential targeting, we implement the estimation approach in equation (3) but add an additional term interacting family immigration history with a variable indicating if the legislation targeted the nation of origin for an MC's immigrant ancestors. Specifically, we coded the target of legislation indicator to take the value of one if a member's parent (columns (1)–(4)) or grandparent (columns (5)–(8)) had a nation of origin targeted by the legislation, and the indicator takes a value of zero otherwise. For legislation that was permissive and had a mixed target, we coded all MCs' target indicator variable as zero.

Table VII, which reports the results, illustrates that not only does immigrant ancestry retain a positive association with permissive voting (e.g., voting against restrictive legislation and for permissive legislation), but this relationship grows larger when

39. The landmark bills before World War I either did not differentially target different foreign origins or, when they did, primarily targeted Chinese-origin immigrants, of whom there were none in Congress.

TABLE VII

TARGETED IMMIGRATION LEGISLATION AND MC VOTE CHOICE

	Parents				Grandparents			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
MC immigrant ancestry	0.084***	0.080***	0.061***		0.038***	0.037***	0.027***	
	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.012)		(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	
MC immigrant ancestry × target of legislation	0.098***	0.073**	0.059**	0.100**	0.059***	0.049***	0.041***	0.058***
	(0.034)	(0.032)	(0.030)	(0.039)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.017)
Log foreign-born population	0.095***	0.070***	0.070***	−0.175***	0.098***	0.063***	0.064***	−0.219***
	(0.005)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.042)	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.047)
Log total population	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Other CD controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Other MC controls	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes
Bill fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Chamber fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
MC fixed effects	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	3,134	3,134	3,134	3,134	2,408	2,408	2,408	2,408
Adjusted R^2	0.38	0.41	0.44	0.62	0.39	0.42	0.45	0.61

Notes. This table reports estimates from pooled regressions of landmark immigration bills after World War I's onset from Table I. Columns (1)–(3) and (5)–(7) replicate the standard specifications but include an additional term interacting the number of immigrant parents or grandparents with an indicator variable that takes a value of one if the MC's parent or grandparent was of an immigrant group targeted by the legislation. Columns (4) and (8) include individual fixed effects, which absorb each member's family immigration history. Belonging to an immigrant group targeted by legislation varies by bill within member; that variation allows us to estimate the coefficient for the interaction of MC immigrant history and the target indicator. We omitted the three pre–World War I landmark bills because they either did not differentially target an immigrant group or they targeted groups, such as people of Chinese heritage, with no members in Congress at the time. Standard errors clustered at the MC level are reported in parentheses. * $p < .1$; ** $p < .05$; *** $p < .01$.

MCs voted on legislation explicitly targeting their nation of origin. The coefficient estimate for immigrant ancestors targeted by the legislation is comparable to or larger than the estimate for immigrant ancestry on its own in every specification. While columns (1)–(3) and (5)–(7) replicate our previous approaches, columns (4) and (8) include MC fixed effects that leverage within-member variation in targeting. Since immigrant ancestry remains constant for each member, the individual fixed effect absorbs that coefficient; however, the interaction of the target term with immigrant ancestry yields a within-member estimate for targeting. In each case, we estimate a strong positive relationship between a member's ancestry being a target of legislation and permissive voting. Because this approach holds immigrant ancestries fixed while allowing specific experiences to vary, including within members, it again suggests that selection into immigration is unlikely to drive our results.[40] Furthermore, it points to the importance of group boundaries based on nation of origin in the broader category of "immigrant" or "descendent of immigrant," which we explore further in the next section.

VI. Mechanisms

We have established several results about the relationship between MCs with family histories of immigration and their stances on immigration policy. First, more recent familial immigration history correlates with MCs casting roll call votes in support of more permissive immigration policies and speaking with more positive tone about immigration. Second, neither district composition nor party explain support for permissive immigration policies as well as family history does among MCs in office. Third, the core relationship between family history of immigration and legislative behavior persists when we take measures to account for district-level candidate selection and selection into immigration.

We turn to the possible mechanisms that may help explain the relationship between immigration background and legislative behavior for members. We focus on three possible mechanisms: in-group identity, information, and correlated preferences.

40. We thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this approach.

VI.A. In-Group Identity

Aspects of identity can be important components in economic decision making (Akerlof and Kranton 2000; Kranton 2016) and identity's effects extend to political choices—even of professional political actors. As the children or grandchildren of immigrants, MCs are members of an identity group. In-group identity in this context refers to the sense of belonging and shared experience that legislators feel due to their family's immigrant background and connection to a source country. MCs who are part of an immigrant-descended group may have unique information about immigrants or share broader political preferences aligned with immigrant interests, but here we conceive of legislative behavior arising from group identity as driven by these MCs favoring others because they belong to the same group.

A long research tradition suggests that in-group identity can motivate favorable treatment toward other members of the same group (Tajfel 1982; Ben-Ner et al. 2009; Everett, Faber, and Crockett 2015).[41] In the congressional context, group boundaries could reflect specific source countries of origin or encompass a broader immigrant identity, or multiple boundaries could prove salient. For instance, an identity as "descended from Italian immigrants" and an identity based on the broader class "descended from immigrants" may matter to an MC whose grandparents immigrated from Italy. Our approach is to treat the extent to which different boundaries have mattered as an empirical question. To assess the evidence for a group-identity mechanism as an explanation for permissive stances on immigration among MCs with a family history of immigration, we ask: Do MCs with family histories of immigration exhibit behavior consistent with a group-identity mechanism in general (e.g., pre-congressional career)? Do they exhibit behavior consistent with a group-identity mechanism while in Congress?

This article documents three sets of results that all clarify how group identity may play a role. First, we show that a family history of immigration correlates positively with a key indicator of identity expression, the first names MCs give to their own children born before their congressional careers. This action is consistent with attachment to a cultural identity related to the source

41. Online Appendix B.3 provides detail on related concepts in the study of group identity that may motivate such behaviors.

country in MCs' immigrant family histories. Second, we document that once in Congress, MCs descended from immigrants speak about immigration using frames that are more personal, particularly appearing more likely to reference family and less likely to reference economic arguments when discussing immigration policy. Third, we have already documented that identity boundaries within the immigrant group grow more salient when particular bills restricted immigration differentially by nation of origin. This illustrates that group identities may emerge for specific subgroups in the broader category of those descended from immigrants and that ethnic identity and immigrant history may interact. We further explore the boundaries of these relationships by examining how MCs voted based on region of origin in a bill-by-bill analysis of landmark legislation. All together, these empirical patterns underscore the role of in-group identity, characterized by personal connection to an immigrant experience and cultural heritage, for immigrant-descended MCs.

1. *MC Ancestry and Their Children's Names.* Scholars view names as "signals of cultural identity" (Abramitzky, Boustan, and Eriksson 2020, 126), and the choice of name for a child proxies for efforts at assimilating versus retaining connection to a source country identity. Studying naming has the advantage of offering insight into a choice made fully by the immigrant parents (Fouka 2019, 408), and for our purposes has the added advantage that we can focus on child names given before an MC ever served in Congress.[42] In this manner, studying MCs' choices about naming their children illuminates their attachments to group cultural identity in a manner plausibly distinct from concerns about catering to a political base constituency.

We begin by assessing simply whether MCs with histories of immigration tended to be more likely to give their children first names suggesting an immigrant identity. To measure the foreignness of a first name, we follow Abramitzky, Boustan, and Eriksson (2020) and construct an f-index. The national distribution of first names in the population, recorded in each decennial census, determines a child's f-index score. Names held only by U.S.-born individuals receive a score of 0; names held only by foreign-born

42. Because 91% of MC children were born before the MCs entered Congress, this restriction barely shrinks our sample.

individuals garner a score of 100. Our main dependent variable is simply the percentile of these f-index scores.[43]

In Table VIII, we regress the foreignness of a child's first name on their MC parent's immigrant ancestry. In all specifications we include fixed effects for child-level characteristics including age, sex, and their interaction, as well as census year and MC chamber. We cluster standard errors at the MC level to account for MCs with more than one child and multiple observations of the same child across censuses.

MCs with immigrant ancestry retain a connection to a group identity connected to immigrant status: As we see in Table VIII, MC immigrant ancestry predicts the granting of more foreign-sounding first names to MC children. Across all methods of measuring MC ancestry, we estimate a positive relationship. For example, an additional foreign-born parent predicts an increase in f-index of roughly 2 percentage points off an average base of 44, or a 5% increase. When we replicate this exercise for the full population from 1880 to 1940 in Online Appendix Table A.21, we also find a positive and statistically significant relationship between immigrant ancestry and f-index for child's first name for both MCs and non-MCs. Though the magnitude is larger for non-MCs, MCs still make naming choices based on their ancestry, just like others in the population descended from immigrants. Clearly, non-MCs do not make their naming choices based on electoral concerns, so these results suggest that nonelectoral factors explain at least some part of MC naming choices as well. MCs with immigrant ancestry appear to have cultural attachments to an immigrant identity based on country of origin and not purely for political or strategic reasons.

2. *Personal Frames in Immigration Policy Speech.* In this subsection, we examine how family background correlates with specific frames and phrases MCs used in speech on immigra-

43. To assemble the data, we collected census observations of each MCs' children. We observe an MC's child in any census in which the MC and their children are cohabitating and we limit our sample to MC children who are born before their parent enters Congress. We construct these first name indices by sex to account for names that are used by both boys and girls during this period but are robust to using first name indices that do not vary by sex.

TABLE VIII

IMMIGRATION HISTORY AND MC CHILDRENS' NAMES

	Outcome: f-index percentile of child's name								
	MC immigrant ancestry measured as:								
	Parents foreign-born			Grandparents foreign-born			Immigration index		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
MC immigrant ancestry	1.95***	2.09***	2.01***	0.90***	1.10***	1.08***	1.99***	2.37***	2.32***
	(0.61)	(0.59)	(0.59)	(0.33)	(0.31)	(0.32)	(0.70)	(0.68)	(0.69)
Log foreign-born population in congressional district	0.17	0.96**	0.98**	0.64*	1.21**	1.21**	0.64*	1.20**	1.22**
	(0.25)	(0.39)	(0.39)	(0.33)	(0.52)	(0.53)	(0.33)	(0.52)	(0.53)
Log total population	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Other CD controls	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Other MC controls	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Child controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Chamber fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	9,504	9,504	9,504	5,512	5,512	5,512	5,512	5,512	5,512
Adjusted R^2	0.005	0.02	0.02	0.005	0.02	0.02	0.005	0.02	0.02
Dependent variable mean	44.1	44.1	44.1	44.5	44.5	44.5	44.5	44.5	44.5

Notes. This table uses the full individual census sample data from 1880 to 1940 to estimate the relationship between immigrant ancestry and f-index percentile of a child's name. The f-index is a likelihood ratio measuring the relative foreignness of a name calculated for each name as in equation (2) by sex. Child controls include age, sex, the interaction of age and sex, and census year. We limit our sample to MC children who are born before their parent enters Congress. Standard errors clustered at the MC level are reported in parentheses. * $p < .1$; ** $p < .05$; *** $p < .01$.

tion.[44] The logic behind this empirical test stems from past research showing that group membership based on a shared characteristic may lead people to "project relational (e.g., personal) ties onto relatively large collectives composed of many individuals with whom they have no personal relationships" (Swann et al. 2012, 441). Evidence of language evoking personal or family ties in congressional debates would suggest that immigrant-descended MCs see immigration policy as a political issue intertwined with their own group identity. Specifically, language used on the floor of Congress that projects personal and family connections onto immigrant populations, and the policies affecting them, aligns with the theoretical prediction that group membership can foster a sense of personal connection even without a direct relationship with individuals making up an immigrant group.

To convert immigration frames into an outcome variable, we calculate the share of all immigration speeches made by each MC in each Congress in each frame. Regressing this share on family immigration history using otherwise the same specifications as previously, we find that frames revolving around notions of "contribution," "culture," and "family" are all correlated positively (and statistically significantly) with a family history of immigration. On the other hand, frames related to "economic," "labor," and "legality" all register negative and statistically significant associations. Frames related to "crime" have negative coefficients but are not statistically distinguishable from zero in any of our specifications. Figure V reports the results for our specifications with and without controls for these key frames of immigration speech.[45]

This exercise requires parceling the immigration speech data into many subcategories, but the observed empirical patterns are still highly suggestive. MCs with immigrant family histories are more likely to emphasize family (their own and families of immigrants generally). This more personal framing suggests group identity may play a meaningful role in motivating support for more permissive immigration policies (Scabini and Manzi 2011).

44. Card et al. (2022) examine how MCs from different parties employ a variety of frames in their speech, which cover issues including crime, threat, migration, family, and several more.

45. For the remaining frames, see Online Appendix Figure A.8. Online Appendix Figures A.9–A.14 report robustness checks to additional district-level covariates.



FIGURE V

Relationship Between Family Immigration History and Frames Used for Immigration Speech

This figure reports the estimated relationship for MCs between family history (measured as number of foreign-born parents or grandparents) and use of specific frames in speeches in Congress about the subject of immigration. The data on frames are calculated as the share of all speeches on the subject of immigration that reference a particular frame. We report a subset of possible frames based on those that had a significant (or close to significant) relationship with family history of immigration. Under each frame identified with a *y*-axis label, we report the baseline mean for the frame (e.g., what share of the time did the average MC with no family history of immigration employ the given frame when speaking about immigration?).

Similarly, emphasizing cultural contributions of immigrants (the culture and contribution frames) aligns with valuing these group identities. In contrast, those with family histories of immigration also appear less likely to use economic or labor-related frames.

To assess further whether immigrant-descended MCs address immigration in a way that reflects a personal connection to the topic, we examine the emotional affect displayed in their speeches on immigration. Past research has found that a salient group identity can lead to more intense emotional reactions to issues perceived as having relevance to the group (Kuppens and Yzerbyt 2012). Regressing a measure of emotional affect from Gennaro and Ash (2022) on our set of covariates, we find a positive association of family immigration history with the emotionality measured in MC immigration speeches in Online Appendix Table A.27. We view heightened emotionality for

immigrant-descended MCs discussing immigration policy as also consistent with the increased personal connection to the topic of immigration evident in our study of speech frames.

Finally, an unstructured approach to evaluating the content of immigration-related speech again broadly aligns with our findings using predetermined frames and measures of emotional affect. When we evaluate the most distinctive phrases used by members with family histories of immigration versus those with no such family history using term frequency–inverse document frequency (tf-idf) for trigrams and bigrams, we find that the most distinctive phrases for members descended from immigrants are populated by terms related to family and humanitarian issues such as "mother american citizen," "wives children aliens," and "admission orphan children." In contrast, the most distinctive common phrases for members without family history of immigration include concerns about negative economic and cultural effects of immigration, characterized by terms such as "oversupply unskilled labor," "average farm wage," and references to "alien influences." Online Appendix I provides full details and additional discussion on our findings based on the exercise of comparing the most distinctive terms used by MCs across family histories of immigration.

Measuring the character of immigration speech through preestablished frames, emotional affect, and unstructured text, MCs descended from immigrants exhibit an increased tendency to discuss immigration in terms related to family and to immigrant well-being, and their language is more emotional. This constellation of findings suggests MCs descended from immigrants behaved in a manner consistent with belonging to an in-group based on immigrant identity while in Congress.

3. *Nation of Origin.* When examining landmark bills differentially targeting immigrants based on source country, we observed that MCs descended from targeted countries were even more likely than their peers to oppose the restrictive legislation. A family history of immigration correlated with more permissive immigration policy stances on these landmark bills, but specific source country identities mattered as well. To explore the boundaries of group identity further, we examine bill-by-bill results decomposed by region of origin for landmark immigration bills. On a bill-by-bill basis, region of origin again tends to correlate with im-

migration vote choices when those votes targeted members' narrower (region-based) identity groups.

In the period between the world wars, MCs with family trees rooted in Southern and Eastern Europe (the "New European" source countries during the age of mass migration), are more likely to vote against immigration restriction bills than MCs of "Old European" stock, and subtleties about the exact restrictions mattered as well.[46] On the other hand, for broadly permissive bills that did not target based on nation of origin and helped reshape U.S. immigration policy—for example, post–World War II bills such as the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965—the estimates are similar across MC immigrant backgrounds, regardless of whether the MCs' parents or grandparents came from New or Old Europe or the rest of the world. Similarly, before World War I—when landmark legislation targeted groups not present in Congress, such as Chinese immigrants—support did not differ meaningfully across regions of origin. To provoke heterogeneous responses from MCs appears to have required legislation targeting nations from which some immigrant MCs came and others did not. In this manner, the empirical evidence points to group boundaries mattering at both an immigrant-group level and a national or regional level, with the salience of these demarcations depending on specific legislative contexts.

The immigration restriction bills of the interwar era present the most direct test of whether nation of origin mattered (pre–World War II panel of Figure VI). The latter two of these bills symbolically and practically targeted immigrant populations other than those from Old Europe. The Immigration Quota Act (1921) sought to alter the distribution of immigrants such that Old Europe source countries would make up 55% of immigrants and New Europe countries would make up 45%; the Johnson-Reed Act aimed to further tip the balance to 84% Old Europe and 16% New Europe (Tichenor 2002, 145). The Immigration Act (1917) did not target New Europe immigration explicitly, but it implemented a literacy test and restricted Asian immigration (and included exemptions for close family members of current immigrants). We regress a dummy for pro-immigration votes on MC immigrant family history, dividing origins by region: New Europe,

46. We base these codings on Goldin (1994). Online Appendix C.6 lists the countries and regions that make up Old Europe and New Europe, drawing on IPUMS birthplace codes.



FIGURE VI

Relationship between Family Immigration History and Permissive Immigration Voting, by Nation of Origin

This figure reports the estimated relationship for MCs between family history (measured as number of foreign-born parents or grandparents) and casting permissive votes on landmark immigration legislation. Each bill is coded so that a permissive vote is the positive outcome. MCs' family history is decomposed by nation of origin into those with Old Europe, New Europe, and non-Europe heritage. For each bill under consideration, we also report the group or groups primarily targeted by the legislation (relatively speaking) as well as if the legislation itself was primarily permissive or restrictive.

Old Europe, and non-Europe.[47] We count the number of parents and number of grandparents born in each region, with U.S.-born

47. We report the regression results in Online Appendix Table A.16, Panel A and a series of explicit hypothesis tests in Online Appendix Table A.18. As some of these bills only saw recorded roll call votes in the Senate and we are running bill-by-bill regressions, we are not able to include our full set of controls.

parents and grandparents as the reference group. Though MCs with any (recent) European family immigration history are more likely to vote against the three immigration restriction bills, the estimates are much larger for MCs with more parents or grandparents from New Europe when New Europe immigrants were targeted. Hypothesis tests comparing coefficient estimates for New Europe ancestry to coefficient estimates for Old Europe ancestry can be rejected at $p < .01$ for both the Immigration Quota Act and the Immigration Act of 1924. The Immigration Act of 1917, which differentially targeted Asian immigrants, does not allow us to reject the null of no difference in estimates for non-Europe ancestry versus New or Old Europe ancestry in three of four cases—an unsurprising result given that the non-Europe ancestry MCs in our sample at this time did not have Asian ancestry.[48]

In the post–World War II panel of Figure VI, we ask if the patterns changed after the war.[49] The McCarran Internal Security Act, enacted over President Harry Truman's veto, targeted communists early in the Cold War. One provision relevant for our study: immigrants could have citizenship revoked if found in violation of the law within five years of naturalization. Old European heritage correlated with voting pro-immigrant (against the act); New European heritage did as well. A hypothesis test does not allow us to reject the null of equality between these coefficient estimates. The McCarran-Walter Immigration and Nationality Act, enacted two years later and retaining a quota system, resembled in some ways the pre–World War II immigration restriction bills, and it targeted New Europe and Non Europe ancestry differentially. Consistent with this, we find that MCs with New Europe immigration history were much more likely to oppose it than those from Old Europe; hypothesis tests allow us to reject equality between the Old and New Europe coefficients at $p < .01$.

48. In Figure VI, we distinguish between Old and New Europe. However, this divide does not perfectly correlate with restrictive immigration policy, in particular the 1921 and 1924 quotas. In Online Appendix Table A.25, we partition countries into quota exposure based on the predicted missing immigrants measure from Ager et al. (2024), cutting at the median. The implications are essentially unchanged.

49. Online Appendix Table A.16, Panel B reports the underlying regression results, and Online Appendix Table A.18 again reports results of explicit hypothesis tests.

But while the McCarran-Walter bill activated identity based on national origins just as pre–World War II restriction bills had, the Refugee Relief Act of 1953 and the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, which loosened immigration laws, appear different. MC immigrant background had a similar (positive) relationship with casting a permissive vote, regardless of where those MCs' families came from originally. None of the estimates (presented in the figure and Online Appendix Table A.16, Panel B, columns (5)–(8)) allow us to reject the null of no difference between Old Europe and New Europe coefficients.[50]

More broadly, our results on group identity due to nation of origin highlight that national and ethnic identity likely help demarcate subgroup boundaries within the broader category of "immigrant." MC voting behavior for bills presenting stark demarcations based on ethnic identity, such as legislation related to Chinese exclusion, also align with this idea. We estimate the relationship between MC family immigration history and permissive immigration votes while including an interaction term between family history and an indicator for bills on the subject of Chinese exclusion in Online Appendix Table A.17. While the main ancestry coefficient is positive and statistically significant, the interaction term attenuates the relationship completely: MCs descended from immigrants did not vote more permissively than their non–immigrant-descended counterparts when the subject of

50. For completeness, we also examine the landmark immigration legislation of the pre–World War I era in the top panel of Figure VI and Online Appendix Table A.15. The Geary Act (1892) extended the Chinese exclusion passed 10 years before and added additional restrictions (e.g., identification requirements). Given that we observe no presence of Chinese-origin MCs during the period of voting on this bill, a theory of in-group identity depending on region of origin does not suggest differences in support for the legislation based on nation or region of origin here. As illustrated in the pre–World War I panel of Figure VI and confirmed explicitly with hypothesis tests in Online Appendix Table A.18, we observe no meaningful difference in coefficient estimates broken out by region of origin for this vote. An important caveat for these estimates is that they reflect a small sample size since the early time period means we cannot successfully match as many MCs to their parents and grandparents. Furthermore, we did not have sufficient presence of MCs with New Europe ancestry for two of the pre–World War I votes to make an estimate for this group. The next landmark bills during the pre–World War I period—the Immigration Act of 1903 and the Immigration Act of 1907—did not restrict immigrant groups specifically by region, rather targeting anarchists (the former bill) and people suffering from disabilities (both the former and, with some expansions, latter bill). We again do not observe any statistically significant differences by origin for MCs voting on this legislation.

the vote was Chinese exclusion. This holds both overall and during the 51st–64th Congresses when this subject was most salient to debates about immigration. Any sense of pan-ethnic immigrant identity appears to have run up against its limits when voting on Chinese exclusion.[51]

Overall, these results suggest that when MCs faced a vote on legislation restricting immigration of people with family backgrounds similar to themselves, they were more likely to oppose the bill. While immigrants of all backgrounds had higher probabilities of opposing immigration restrictions on most votes, legislation targeting people of different backgrounds produced different levels of opposition. This points to the possibility of a role for immigrant group identity in legislative behavior, but also the conditions under which support for permissive immigration legislation based on background may break down.[52]

VI.B. Information

The second possible mechanism we explore is information. In contrast to MCs with no (recent) foreign-born ancestry, MCs with a family history of immigration might have more accurate information about immigration (and thus about the effects of restricting or liberalizing immigration policy). These MCs have firsthand experience with immigrants and immigration that could make them more empathetic to the plight of new immigrants. They might better understand the efficiency gains from immigration.

51. A final test approaches group identity from a different angle. How do MCs whose families descended from English-speaking source countries vote in Congress? While descended from immigrants, assimilation could have been easier due to shared language (and perhaps ethnic identity). Online Appendix Table A. 26, where we include an interaction between MC family history and an indicator for recent U.K., Irish, or Canadian ancestry, illustrates that overarching immigrant identity matters: even these MCs are still more likely to support pro-immigration legislation.

52. A related question involves whether behavior related to group identity arises from intrinsic versus extrinsic motivations. Online Appendix F assesses this question in detail by examining MC behaviors across differing levels of district composition, differing levels of visibility of MC actions, and accounting for differing levels of visibility of immigrant background. Across these scenarios, actual family immigration history retains a stable and significant relationship with downstream outcomes. Though a sense of group identity can matter whether arising from intrinsic (e.g., internal) or extrinsic motives (e.g., strategic motives related to base constituency), our analyses suggest that intrinsic factors play some role.

Or, as a particularly successful descendant of immigrants, they might recognize, through introspection, the (high) potential upward mobility of immigrants to the United States (Abramitzky et al. 2021b). Their own experience of mobility might also make them less likely to engage in zero-sum thinking (Chinoy et al. 2023). Though the information mechanism is a challenging one to assess, in this subsection, we present evidence that suggests that information about immigrant potential for upward mobility may increase support for immigration. However, this estimate is the same across MC immigrant backgrounds, consistent with an effect that is not differential between the descendants of immigrants and other MCs; thus, information about upward mobility appears unlikely to be driving our results.

To assess the information mechanism, we construct measures of intergenerational mobility. We summarize our approach—which follows Abramitzky et al. (2021b) but extends the sample to many more census-to-census links—here and provide full details in Online Appendix C.7. We use linked samples of fathers and sons to estimate rates of economic intergenerational mobility for the sons of immigrants and the U.S.-born from 1850 to 1940 for each state and decade. We focus on the expected ranked outcome of a son with a father at the 25th percentile and rank states by mobility within each census.

We turn to the relationship between MC support for immigration and intergenerational mobility in Online Appendix Table A.19, with landmark bills in Panel A and all immigration bills in Panel B. We see that MCs from states with higher intergenerational mobility (a higher rank) are more likely to vote in favor of immigration on landmark bills and all immigration bills. This positive pattern holds whether we measure local mobility using overall rates (columns (1) and (2)) or just mobility among the foreign-born (columns (3) and (4)). This could signal that information about the prospects of immigrants matters; MCs from districts with more mobility might welcome more immigration because they have local evidence of immigrants moving up the intergenerational status ladder. However, it does not appear that MCs with more or less immigrant ancestry are differentially affected by this information. Interactions of intergenerational

mobility with MC ancestry are economically small and not statistically significant in any of our four specifications.[53]

VI.C. Correlated Preferences

A third possible mechanism asks whether MCs might support immigration for ideologically strategic reasons. Efforts to shape the electorate—usually gerrymandering but also selective enfranchisement or disenfranchisement—date to at least the founding era. Immigration also changes the electorate. Potential immigrants, or their children, could eventually naturalize and become citizens and subsequently vote. If these future voters have political leanings aligned with MCs with immigrant family histories, then ideologically motivated MCs might view increased immigration as a tool for bending policy in their preferred direction. One possibility is suggested by Giuliano and Tabellini (2020), who find stronger support for an expanded welfare state among immigrants than the U.S.-born. In this case, lawmakers might support permissive immigration policies because inflows of immigrants to their districts would help build a constituency more likely to support their preferred policies.

To begin with, we view this mechanism as unlikely based on timing. Immigrants could only naturalize after five years, and naturalization was far from universal (Shertzer 2016). While noncitizen immigrants were able to vote in 24 states and territories in the mid-nineteenth century, during our period only a handful of states still allowed noncitizens to vote, and none did after 1926 (Henderson 2017). Combined with high levels of geographic mobility among immigrants (Biavaschi and Facchini 2020), it appears unlikely that MCs expected immigration to alter the ideological make-up of their electorate.

Beyond timing, as we show here, there are empirical reasons to doubt the correlated preferences mechanism as well. We identify a distinction between support for permissive immigration and other liberal policies: controlling for other factors,

53. Three caveats to our mobility analysis. First, we cannot say whether mobility overall or among the sons of immigrants is driving our results because the rates are highly correlated. Relatedly, we have no evidence that these higher rates of mobility were observable contemporaneously; other local conditions that might correlate with mobility could push MCs. Finally, other information about immigration and immigrants (and their effects) could be important and differential across MCs with and without (recent) immigrant ancestry.

lawmakers with an immigrant background do not generically favor liberal policies at a level that would suggest their strong support for increased immigration is merely a strategic attempt to change their future constituents. Instead, we find that immigrant family history is uniquely important for immigration policy.

Our analysis is straightforward: we compute the share of bills in different topic areas where immigration family history was a statistically significant predictor of liberal roll call voting. We do this in two samples: across all bills and across specific landmark legislation. First, we consider all bills in the 51st–91st Congresses. To implement this analysis, we classified bills with topic codes from Peltzman (1984), supplemented by our set of all immigration bills. These relatively broad topics include issues such as the budget, defense, and domestic social policy. Following Washington (2009), we identified votes where the majority of one party favored legislation and the majority of the opposing party did not (that is, there was conflict over the vote) and coded these votes based on whether an MC supported the ideologically left position when voting (again, based on which party supported the legislation).[54] For each topic, we ran regressions, bill by bill, of liberal votes on MC's immigration index. In Figure VII (other than the bottom four rows), we report the share of votes for each topic where we found a statistically significant result of immigration index on MC vote choice, controlling for other factors. By chance, we should expect 5% of individual votes to have a statistically significant relationship at $p < .05$ (the dotted vertical line). As the figure makes apparent, the immigration category registers by far the greatest share of roll call votes where an MC's immigration history mattered, and it is also statistically different from the estimate observed by chance. Immigrant background could of course matter for some other policy topics as well. We do observe that family immigration history predicts a liberal vote for topics related to budget (general interest) and regulation (general interest). But the results are not remotely as strong as in the immigration policy topic. For votes spanning the 51st–91st Congresses, an immigrant family history mattered most for bills related to immigration policy.

Second, we directly compare landmark legislation on immigration to other topic areas with major legislation (see the bot-

54. We make this restriction to identify bills with substantively meaningful conflict, rather than all members voting the same way.



FIGURE VII

Immigration History and Permissive/Liberal Votes for Placebo Topics, 51st–91st Congresses

This figure reports estimates for the coefficient on the immigrant family history variable in regressions with outcomes being a range of placebo-topic roll call votes during the 51st–91st Congresses. For each topic (as defined by Peltzman 1984), we identified all votes in our time period where conflict existed—based on whether majorities of each party opposed one another—and then for each bill we regressed vote choice on Immigration Index, district composition and all other covariates included in our main specifications. We then plot the share of regressions for each topic in which the coefficient for Immigration Index is statistically significant ($p < .05$) for vote choice. While family history is a frequent and strong predictor of roll call voting on all immigration final-passage votes, as well as major legislation affecting immigration policy (as defined by Stathis 2014), family history is not a frequent significant predictor of voting in almost every other area. For the bottom four rows in the figure, we performed a similar exercise for major legislation in the policy areas of immigration, transportation, the environment and social welfare.

tom four rows of Figure VII). We focus on landmark legislation passed in the areas of social welfare, transportation, and the environment, selecting landmark votes using the same source and procedure as for the landmark immigration votes (Stathis 2014). Compared with major legislation, immigration legislation again registers the greatest share of roll call votes where an MC's immigration history mattered. In fact, neither the transportation nor

the environment topics included a single bill where immigrant family background was correlated with vote choice at a statistically significant level. For social welfare, immigrant background helps explain some share of votes, although the estimated magnitude is still not as large as for immigration.

Overall, the share of bill-by-bill regressions where family immigration history is a significant explanatory factor is higher for immigration legislation than for other legislation. Averaging across bill topics, family immigration history is statistically significant in roughly 5% of regressions for other legislation; for immigration legislation, family immigration history is statistically significant at $p < .05$ about 24% of the time (Online Appendix Table G.1). Furthermore, these core results hold up under alternative approaches, including a version where we place no restrictions on the direction of the vote (e.g., allowing for more liberal/permissive or conservative/restrictive changes in policy for immigration and other topic areas) as well as when we expand the pool of votes beyond those involving a high level of partisan conflict to all votes. Online Appendix G reports the full results of these exercises.

Finally, an alternative method for identifying the effects of leaders due to Jones and Olken (2005) yields the same or possibly even stronger conclusions about the unique importance of family history for immigration votes. When a turnover in MC due to death occurs that involves a within-district change in immigration background, immigration legislation is the only topic area where we can identify a change in the roll call voting behavior related to this change in office-holding. Online Appendix H reports the full results.

VII. Conclusion

This article has analyzed the relationship between lawmakers' immigrant backgrounds and their legislative behavior. We studied both landmark immigration legislation and general roll call votes related to immigration policy, as well as congressional speeches about immigration. Our results demonstrate a strong relationship between personal immigration history and MC vote choice on immigration policy from the late nineteenth century to the mid-twentieth century. MCs with parents or grandparents born abroad voted in favor of pro-immigration policies more than those whose families immigrated to the United States in

earlier generations. Recent immigration experiences strongly predict votes for permissive policies, based on ideology measured through past roll call votes. Furthermore, this voting behavior is not just the result of pro-immigrant electorates selecting MCs with recent family immigration background, but occurs when implementing approaches designed to account for district-level characteristics, district-level selection, and individual selection into immigration. The tone MCs use in their speech follows a similar pattern: electing MCs with more recent family history of immigration yields a more positive tone on average when talking about immigration, though this occurs because they make relatively fewer negatively coded speeches about immigration.

Ultimately, an MC's group identity—belonging to a group based on family background, and making choices favorable to that group—appears to be the most crucial factor in explaining our findings. MCs, like the rest of the population with more recent immigrant family history, are more likely to give their children more foreign first names. In their speeches, MCs with immigrant family histories tend to emphasize personal and cultural aspects of immigration rather than economic or labor-related frames. Furthermore, the importance of in-group identity extends to one's specific nation or region of origin: we find that immigrants from Old Europe source countries reacted differently than immigrants originating from New Europe source countries when legislation differentially targeted New Europe immigrants with restrictions. Immigrant group identity also had some racial limits: when nineteenth-century legislation limited Chinese immigration, MCs with immigrant ancestry did not vote differentially, as no MCs had Chinese immigrants in their family trees.

We find little support for other accounts that would explain the link between immigrant family history and permissive attitudes on immigration. The possibility that other characteristics common to migrants (domestic or international) explain our findings—consistent with explanations related to selection into immigration—do not appear consistent with the evidence we examine. A family history of domestic migration does not have the same explanatory power as a history of international immigration. Nor can we explain our findings with a correlated preferences account, in which MCs with immigrant backgrounds seek (through immigration) to reshape the electorate and further a broad set of policy goals. An immigrant family history appears to possess unique explanatory power for decisions related to

future immigration policy, but not for roll call votes on many other policies.

Our findings highlight the critical role of identity in politics—for politicians and for citizens. Much of the literature on political identities focuses on descriptive characteristics such as race and gender, but other characteristics, somewhat less easily observable, also play a critical role in explaining MCs' legislative behavior. While immigration is closely tied to race and ethnicity, being an immigrant is also a distinct identity that varies within racial and ethnic groups. Immigration background has a crucial temporal component—people with the same ethnic backgrounds may be immigrants or descendants of immigrants with widely varying generational proximity to the immigration experience.

Our article also helps unpack what group boundaries are most relevant in a policy-making context by treating the extent to which group boundaries have mattered as an empirical question to test. We have let group boundaries vary in our assessment of immigrant history—considering not only temporal aspects (proximity/generational distance) but also visibility (surname), subregional identities (and when these are/are not salient), and the extent to which a group is targeted by restrictive policies. By unbundling immigrant background into component parts, we have sought to add breadth and depth to accounts of the role of immigrant identity.

Finally, personal characteristics and identity cannot be overlooked when seeking to understand legislative behavior. Fenno (1978) famously asked what elected representatives see when they look at their constituency. This article has sought to turn a lens inward. What do legislators see when they look at themselves? This study provides evidence that when setting immigration policy personal and family history matter, even several generations into the past; our findings raise the possibility that other dimensions of family history should be taken into account when studying the behavior of elected representatives in other policy-making domains.

Supplementary Material

An Online Appendix for this article can be found at *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* online.

Data Availability

The data underlying this article are available in the Harvard Dataverse, https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/R1PCY6 (Feigenbaum, Palmer, and Schneer 2025).

Boston University and National Bureau of Economic Research, United States
Boston University, United States
Harvard Kennedy School, United States

References

Abramitzky, Ran, Philipp Ager, Leah Boustan, Elior Cohen, and Casper W. Hansen, "The Effect of Immigration Restrictions on Local Labor Markets: Lessons from the 1920s Border Closure," *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics*, 15 (2023), 164–191. https://doi.org/10.1257/app.20200807

Abramitzky, Ran, and Leah Boustan, "Immigration in American Economic History," *Journal of Economic Literature*, 55 (2017), 1311–1345. https://doi.org/10.1257/jel.20151189

Abramitzky, Ran, Leah Boustan, and Katherine Eriksson, "Do Immigrants Assimilate More Slowly Today Than in the Past?," *American Economic Review: Insights*, 2 (2020), 125–141. https://doi.org/10.1257/aeri.20190079

Abramitzky, Ran, Leah Boustan, Katherine Eriksson, James Feigenbaum, and Santiago Pérez, "Automated Linking of Historical Data," *Journal of Economic Literature*, 59 (2021a), 865–918. https://doi.org/10.1257/jel.20201599

Abramitzky, Ran, Leah Boustan, Elisa Jacome, and Santiago Perez, "Intergenerational Mobility of Immigrants in the United States over Two Centuries," *American Economic Review*, 111 (2021b), 580–608. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20191586

Ager, Philipp, and Markus Brückner, "Cultural Diversity and Economic Growth: Evidence from the US during the Age of Mass Migration," *European Economic Review*, 64 (2013), 76–97. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2013.07.011

Ager, Philipp, James J. Feigenbaum, Casper W. Hansen, and Hui Ren Tan, "How the Other Half Died: Immigration and Mortality in U.S. Cities," *Review of Economic Studies*, 91 (2024), 1–44. https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdad035

Akerlof, George A., and Rachel E. Kranton, "Economics and Identity," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 115 (2000), 715–753. https://doi.org/10.1162/003355300554881

Alesina, Alberto, and Marco Tabellini, "The Political Effects of Immigration: Culture or Economics?," *Journal of Economic Literature*, 62 (2024), 5–46. https://doi.org/10.1257/jel.20221643

Alesina, Alberto, Armando Miano, and Stefanie Stantcheva, "Immigration and Redistribution," *Review of Economic Studies*, 90 (2023), 1–39. https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdac011

Allen, Irving Lewis, *The Language of Ethnic Conflict: Social Organization and Lexical Culture*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983). https://doi.org/10.7312/alle91760

Alsan, Marcella, Katherine Eriksson, and Gregory Niemesh, "Understanding the Success of the Know-Nothing Party," Working Paper no. 28078, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA, 2020. https://doi.org/10.3386/w28078

Beach, Brian, and W. Walker Hanlon, "Historical Newspaper Data: A Researcher's Guide," *Explorations in Economic History*, 90 (2023), 101541. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eeh.2023.101541

Ben-Ner, Avner, Brian P. McCall, Massoud Stephane, and Hua Wang, "Identity and In-Group/Out-Group Differentiation in Work and Giving Behaviors: Experimental Evidence," *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization*, 72 (2009), 153–170. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2009.05.007
Biavaschi, Costanza, and Giovanni Facchini, "Immigrant Franchise and Immigration Policy: Evidence from the Progressive Era," Discussion Paper no. 13195, IZA, Bonn, 2020. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3590893
Burchardi, Konrad B., Thomas Chaney, and Tarek A. Hassan, "Migrants, Ancestors, and Foreign Investments," *Review of Economic Studies*, 86 (2019), 1448–1486. https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdy044
Burden, Barry C., *Personal Roots of Representation*, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007). https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400866939.
Calonico, Sebastian, Matias D. Cattaneo, and Rocio Titiunik, "Robust Nonparametric Confidence Intervals for Regression-Discontinuity Designs," *Econometrica*, 82 (2014), 2295–2326. https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA11757
Calonico, Sebastian, Matias D. Cattaneo, Max H. Farrell, and Rocio Titiunik, "rdrobust: Software for Regression Discontinuity Designs," *Stata Journal*, 17 (2017), 372–404. https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/1536867X1701700208
Canon, David T., *Race, Redistricting, and Representation: The Unintended Consequences of Black Majority Districts*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999).
Card, Dallas, Serina Chang, Chris Becker, Julia Mendelsohn, Rob Voigt, Leah Boustan, Ran Abramitzky, and Dan Jurafsky, "Computational Analysis of 140 Years of US Political Speeches Reveals More Positive but Increasingly Polarized Framing of Immigration," *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*, 119 (2022), e2120510119. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2120510119
Carnes, Nicholas, "Does the Numerical Underrepresentation of the Working Class in Congress Matter?" *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 37 (2012), 5–34. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1939-9162.2011.00033.x
Chernozhukov, Victor, Denis Chetverikov, Mert Demirer, Esther Duflo, Christian Hansen, Whitney Newey, and James Robins, "Double/Debiased Machine Learning for Treatment and Structural Parameters," *Econometrics Journal*, 21 (2018), C1–C68. https://doi.org/10.1111/ectj.12097
Chinoy, Sahil, Nathan Nunn, Sandra Sequeira, and Stefanie Stantcheva, "Zero-Sum Thinking and the Roots of U.S. Political Divides," Working Paper no. 31688, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA, 2023. https://doi.org/10.3386/w31688
Cinelli, Carlos, and Chad Hazlett, "Making Sense of Sensitivity: Extending Omitted Variable Bias," *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society Series B: Statistical Methodology*, 82 (2020), 39–67. https://doi.org/10.1111/rssb.12348
Clemens, Michael A., Ethan G. Lewis, and Hannah M. Postel, "Immigration Restrictions as Active Labor Market Policy: Evidence from the Mexican Bracero Exclusion," *American Economic Review*, 108 (2018), 1468–1487. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20170765
Cormack, Lindsey, "Extremity in Congress: Communications versus Votes," *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 41 (2016), 575–603. https://doi.org/10.1111/lsq.12126
Crespin, Michael H., and David Rohde, "Political Institutions and Public Choice Roll Call Database," Carl Albert Center, 2018. https://ou.edu/carlalbertcenter/research/pipc-votes
Dinas, Elias, Vasiliki Fouka, and Alain Schläpfer, "Family History and Attitudes toward Out-Groups: Evidence from the European Refugee Crisis," *Journal of Politics*, 83 (2021), 647–661. https://doi.org/10.1086/710016
Everett, Jim A. C., Nadira S. Faber, and Molly Crockett, "Preferences and Beliefs in Ingroup Favoritism," *Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience*, 9 (2015), 126656. https://doi.org/10.3389/fnbeh.2015.00015
Facchini, Giovanni, and Anna Maria Mayda, "The Political Economy of Immigration Policy," HDRP-2009-03, Human Development Report Office, United

Nations Development Programme, 2009. https://ideas.repec.org/p/hdr/papers/hdrp-2009-03.html
Feigenbaum, James J., "Multiple Measures of Historical Intergenerational Mobility: Iowa 1915 to 1940," *Economic Journal*, 128 (2018), F446–F481. https://doi.org/10.1111/ecoj.12525
Feigenbaum, James, Maxwell Palmer, and Benjamin Schneer, "Replication Data for: "'Descended from Immigrants and Revolutionists": How Family History Shapes Immigration Policymaking'," 2025, Harvard Dataverse. https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/R1PCY6
Fenno, Richard F., *Home Style: House Members in Their Districts*, (Boston: Little, Brown, 1978).
Ferrara, Andreas, Patrick A. Testa, and Liyang Zhou, "New Area- and Population-Based Geographic Crosswalks for U.S. Counties and Congressional Districts, 1790–2020," *Historical Methods: A Journal of Quantitative and Interdisciplinary History*, 57 (2024), 67–79. https://doi.org/10.1080/01615440.2024.2369230
Fisher, Aaron, Cynthia Rudin, and Francesca Dominici, "All Models Are Wrong, but Many Are Useful: Learning a Variable's Importance by Studying an Entire Class of Prediction Models Simultaneously," *Journal of Machine Learning Research*, 20 (2019), 1–81.
Fisman, Raymond, Daniel Paravisini, and Vikrant Vig, "Cultural Proximity and Loan Outcomes," *American Economic Review*, 107 (2017), 457–492. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20120942
Fouka, Vasiliki, "How Do Immigrants Respond to Discrimination? The Case of Germans in the US during World War I," *American Political Science Review*, 113 (2019), 405–422. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055419000017
Fouka, Vasiliki, Soumyajit Mazumder, and Marco Tabellini, "From Immigrants to Americans: Race and Assimilation during the Great Migration," *Review of Economic Studies*, 89 (2022), 811–842. https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdab038
Fridkin, Kim L., and Patrick J. Kenney, *The Changing Face of Representation: The Gender of U.S. Senators and Constituent Communications*, (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2014). https://doi.org/10.3998/mpub.6200859.
Fulford, Scott L., Ivan Petkov, and Fabio Schiantarelli, "Does It Matter Where You Came From? Ancestry Composition and Economic Performance of US Counties, 1850–2010," *Journal of Economic Growth*, 25 (2020), 341–380. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10887-020-09180-9
Gennaro, Gloria, and Elliott Ash, "Emotion and Reason in Political Language," *Economic Journal*, 132 (2022), 1037–1059. https://doi.org/10.1093/ej/ueab104
Gentzkow, Matthew, Edward L. Glaeser, and Claudia Goldin, "The Rise of the Fourth Estate: How Newspapers Became Informative and Why It Mattered," in *Corruption and Reform: Lessons from America's Economic History*, Edward L. Glaeser and Claudia Goldin, eds. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006), 187–230. https://doi.org/10.7208/chicago/9780226299594.003.0007.
Gentzkow, Matthew, Jesse M. Shapiro, and Matt Taddy, "Measuring Group Differences in High-Dimensional Choices: Method and Application to Congressional Speech," *Econometrica*, 87 (2019), 1307–1340. https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA16566
Ghosh, Arkadev, "Religious Divisions and Production Technology: Experimental Evidence from India," Available at SSRN 4188354, 2022. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4188354
Giuliano, Paola, and Marco Tabellini, "The Seeds of Ideology: Historical Immigration and Political Preferences in the United States," Working Paper no. 27238, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA, 2020. https://doi.org/10.3386/w27238
Glover, Dylan, Amanda Pallais, and William Pariente, "Discrimination as a Self-Fulfilling Prophecy: Evidence from French Grocery Stores," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 132 (2017), 1219–1260. https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjx006

Glynn, Adam N., and Maya Sen, "Identifying Judicial Empathy: Does Having Daughters Cause Judges to Rule for Women's Issues?," *American Journal of Political Science*, 59 (2015), 37–54. https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12118

Goldin, Claudia, "The Political Economy of Immigration Restriction in the United States, 1890 to 1921," in *The Regulated Economy: A Historical Approach to Political Economy*, Claudia Goldin and Gary D. Libecap, eds. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), 223–258. https://doi.org/10.7208/chicago/9780226301341.001.0001.

Hainmueller, Jens, and Daniel J. Hopkins, "Public Attitudes toward Immigration," *Annual Review of Political Science*, 17 (2014), 225–249. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-102512-194818

Hanretty, Chris, "An Introduction to Multilevel Regression and Post-Stratification for Estimating Constituency Opinion," *Political Studies Review*, 18 (2020), 630–645. https://doi.org/10.1177/1478929919864773

Henderson, Morgan, "*Three Essays on the Substance and Methods of Economic History*," Ph.D. diss., University of Michigan, 2017.

Hjort, Jonas, "Ethnic Divisions and Production in Firms," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 129 (2014), 1899–1946. https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qju028

Jaeger, David A., Joakim Ruist, and Jan Stuhler, "Shift-Share Instruments and the Impact of Immigration," Working Paper no. 24285, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA, 2018. https://doi.org/10.3386/w24285

Jones, Benjamin F., and Benjamin A. Olken, "Do Leaders Matter? National Leadership and Growth Since World War II," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 120 (2005), 835–864. https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/120.3.835

Kalt, Joseph P., and Mark A. Zupan, "Capture and Ideology in the Economic Theory of Politics," *American Economic Review*, 74 (1984), 279–300.

Keena, Alex, and Misty Knight-Finley, "Governed by Experience: Political Careers and Party Loyalty in the Senate," *Congress & the Presidency*, 45 (2017), 1–21.

Kranton, Rachel E., "Identity Economics 2016: Where Do Social Distinctions and Norms Come From?," *American Economic Review*, 106 (2016), 405–409. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.p20161038

Kuppens, Toon, and Vincent Y. Yzerbyt, "Group-Based Emotions: The Impact of Social Identity on Appraisals, Emotions, and Behaviors," *Basic and Applied Social Psychology*, 34 (2012), 20–33. https://doi.org/10.1080/01973533.2011.637474

Law, Anna O., "The Diversity Visa Lottery: A Cycle of Unintended Consequences in United States Immigration Policy," *Journal of American Ethnic History*, 21 (2002), 3–29. https://doi.org/10.2307/27501196

Lee, David S., Enrico Moretti, and Matthew J. Butler, "Do Voters Affect or Elect Policies? Evidence from the US House," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 119 (2004), 807–859. https://doi.org/10.1162/0033553041502153

Levitt, Steven D., "How Do Senators Vote? Disentangling the Role of Voter Preferences, Party Affiliation, and Senator Ideology," *American Economic Review*, 86 (1996), 425–441.

Lewis, Jeffrey B., Brandon DeVine, Lincoln Pitcher, and Kenneth C. Martis, "Digital Boundary Definitions of United States Congressional Districts, 1789–2012," 2013. https://cdmaps.polisci.ucla.edu

Lewis, Jeffrey B., Keith Poole, Howard Rosenthal, Aaron Rudkin, Adam Boche, and Luke Sonnet, "Voteview: Congressional Roll-Call Votes Database," 2017. https://voteview.com/

Masuoka, Natalie, "Together They Become One: Examining the Predictors of Panethnic Group Consciousness Among Asian Americans and Latinos," *Social Science Quarterly*, 87 (2006), 993–1011. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6237.2006.00412.x

Mayda, Anna Maria, Giovanni Peri, and Walter Steingress, "The Political Impact of Immigration: Evidence from the United States," *American Economic Jour-*

nal: Applied Economics, 14 (2022), 358–389. https://doi.org/10.1257/app.20190081
McGuirk, Eoin F., Nathaniel Hilger, and Nicholas Miller, "No Kin in the Game: Moral Hazard and War in the US Congress," *Journal of Political Economy*, 131 (2023), 2370–2401. https://doi.org/10.1086/724316
Mian, Atif, Amir Sufi, and Francesco Trebbi, "The Political Economy of the US Mortgage Default Crisis," *American Economic Review*, 100 (2010), 1967–1998. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.100.5.1967
Moser, Petra, and Shmuel San, "Immigration, Science, and Invention: Lessons from the Quota Acts," SSRN Scholarly Paper no. 3558718, Social Science Research Network, Rochester, NY, 2020. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3558718
Oh, Suanna, "Does Identity Affect Labor Supply?," *American Economic Review*, 113 (2023), 2055–2083. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20211826
Pearson, Kathryn, and Logan Dancey, "Elevating Women's Voices in Congress: Speech Participation in the House of Representatives," *Political Research Quarterly*, 64 (2011), 910–923. https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912910388190
Peltzman, Sam, "Constituent Interest and Congressional Voting," *Journal of Law and Economics*, 27 (1984), 181–210. https://doi.org/10.1086/467062
Roberts, Jason, David Rohde, and Michael H. Crespin, "Political Institutions and Public Choice Senate Roll Call Database," Carl Albert Center, 2018. https://www.ou.edu/carlalbertcenter/research/pipc-votes
Ruggles, Steven, Sarah Flood, Ronald Goeken, Josiah Grover, Erin Meyer, Jose Pacas, and Matthew Sobek, "*IPUMS USA: Version 10.0*," [data set], Minnesota Population Center, Minneapolis, MN, 2020.
Scabini, Eugenia, and Claudia Manzi, "Family Processes and Identity," in *Handbook of Identity Theory and Research*, Seth J. Schwartz, Koen Luyckx, and Vivian L. Vignoles, eds. (New York: Springer, 2011), 565–584. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4419-7988-9_23
Schildkraut, Deborah J., "Boundaries of American Identity: Evolving Understandings of 'Us'," *Annual Review of Political Science*, 17 (2014), 441–460. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-080812-144642
Shertzer, Allison, "Immigrant Group Size and Political Mobilization: Evidence from European Migration to the United States," *Journal of Public Economics*, 139 (2016), 1–12. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2016.02.004
Stathis, Stephen W., *Landmark Legislation 1774–2012: Major U.S. Act and Treaties*, 2nd ed., (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2014).
Stigler, George J., "The Theory of Economic Regulation," *Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science*, 2 (1971), 3–21. https://doi.org/10.2307/3003160
Swann, William B., Jolanda Jetten, Ángel Gómez, Harvey Whitehouse, and Brock Bastian, "When Group Membership Gets Personal: A Theory of Identity Fusion," *Psychological Review*, 119 (2012), 441–456. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0028589
Swarns, Rachel L., " An Immigration Debate Framed by Family Ties," *New York Times*, April 4, 2006.
Tabellini, Marco, "Gifts of the Immigrants, Woes of the Natives: Lessons from the Age of Mass Migration," *Review of Economic Studies*, 87 (2020), 454–486. https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdz027
Tajfel, Henri, "Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations," *Annual Review of Psychology*, 33 (1982), 1–39. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.ps.33.020182.000245
Tichenor, Daniel J., *Dividing Lines: The Politics of Immigration Control in America*, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002).
Timmer, Ashley S., and Jeffrey G. Williamson, "Racism, Xenophobia or Markets? The Political Economy of Immigration Policy Prior to the Thirties," Working Paper no. 5867, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA, 1996. https://doi.org/10.3386/w5867

Washington, Ebonya L., "Female Socialization: How Daughters Affect Their Legislator Fathers' Voting on Women's Issues," *American Economic Review*, 98 (2009), 311–332. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.98.1.311

Williamson, Scott, Claire L. Adida, Adeline Lo, Melina R. Platas, Lauren Prather, and Seth H. Werfel. "Family Matters: How Immigrant Histories Can Promote Inclusion." *American Political Science Review*, 115 (2021), 686–693.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055420001057

Zolberg, Aristide R., *A Nation by Design: Immigration Policy in the Fashioning of America*, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009).