

“Descended from Immigrants and Revolutionists”*: How Family Immigration History Shapes Legislative Behavior in Congress †

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Abstract

Does recent immigrant lineage influence the legislative behavior of members of Congress on immigration policy? We develop a theory positing a relationship between the immigrant background of legislators (i.e., their generational distance from immigration) and legislative behavior, which we measure using roll-call votes on landmark immigration legislation and congressional speech on the floor. We find that legislators more proximate to the immigrant experience tend to support more permissive immigration legislation and also speak more often about immigration in Congress, though district composition explains a larger share of variation in speech. The effects also differ based on visibility of immigration history (measured through surname) and, when faced with restrictive legislation targeting specific immigrant groups, by nation of origin. These findings are consistent with an account where lawmakers draw significantly upon personal views, which are in turn informed by experiences transmitted from previous generations to the lawmaker.

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*Franklin Delano Roosevelt, April 21, 1938. Speech to the Daughters of the American Revolution.

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The whole debate we are now undertaking over immigration and the Dreamers has become somewhat personal for me because it has reminded me, in a very strong way, that I and my brother are first-generation Americans. We are the sons of an immigrant who came to this country at the age of 17 without a nickel in his pocket. . .

– Senator Bernie Sanders, Speech on Floor of Senate, 2/14/2018

Introduction

A large majority of the population of the United States today is descended from immigrants.¹ Many Americans have their own personal or family story of immigration, and members of Congress (MCs) often cite their personal history when discussing immigration policy (Swarns, 2006; Burden, 2007, p.18). Despite common family histories of immigration, immigration policy has alternated between restrictive and expansive policy regimes. Support for restrictive immigration legislation has been commonplace throughout the 20th and 21st centuries in Congress, and aggregate public opinion has often aligned with these policies or supported even more extreme restrictions (Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2014).

What influences the types of immigration policies that emerge? For one, institutional conditions in Congress and political conditions in the US and abroad have structured the terms of debate on immigration policy: “veto points” and “opportunity points,” changes in party systems, and international events such as war or famine all shape the prospects for policy change (Tichenor, 2002). Far less attention, however, has been paid to how individual characteristics of key decision-makers in Congress affect immigration policy.

This gap is notable because well-established research traditions in political science have posited that individual legislator backgrounds and characteristics strongly influence legislative behavior in other areas. Indeed, a substantial literature suggests that demographics, personal characteristics and personal experience are important factors in political decision making. Burden (2007) argues that the backgrounds and experiences of legislators play an important role in their vote choices. Lawmaker race (Canon, 1999), gender (Fridkin and Kenney, 2014), economic class (Carnes, 2012),

¹The 2017 American Community Survey reported a population of 3.2 million Native Americans, Alaskan Natives, and Native Hawaiians or other Pacific Islanders (less than one percent). African-Americans account for less than 15 percent of the population, the majority of whom are descended from enslaved people of African origin. See U.S. Census Bureau, 2017 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates.

prior political experience (Keena and Knight-Finley, 2017) and children’s gender (Washington, 2009) also all play a significant role in legislative behavior.

In this paper, we posit that a key determinant of legislative behavior with respect to immigration policy in Congress is the immigrant background and family history of legislators themselves. Our theory, which we detail in the next section, is that the immigration experiences of previous generations help shape the views, and sense of group boundaries, for future generations, and these matter significantly when legislators consider immigration policy in Congress. Based on this theory, we offer several key predictions: having a *family history* of immigration, *proximity* or less generational distance to the experience, the *visibility* of one’s immigrant background, and the *nation of origin* all influence legislator support for more (or less) permissive immigration policy. To assess precisely how such characteristics may matter, we analyze their role on two canonical forms of legislative behavior for MCs: legislative voting and speeches on the floor of Congress. Because immigrant identity is complex and hard to infer, we use historical census data from 1900–1940 to directly observe the family backgrounds of lawmakers in the 64th–91st Congresses. Our sample period includes two of the most consequential changes to American immigration policy: the closing of the border in the 1920s and the reshaping of immigration in 1965 by the Immigration and Nationality Act. Linking to the census allows us to examine the countries of origin of the lawmakers themselves, their parents, and, in many cases, their grandparents.

While a relatively low share of MCs are immigrants themselves (see Figure 1), a significant number have foreign-born parents or grandparents.² For example, in the 115th Congress, only 11 representatives (2.5%) and one senator were immigrants. However, 11.8% of representatives and 14.6% of senators had at least one foreign-born parent. In the first half of the 20th century, the share of representatives with a foreign-born parent reached as high as 30 percent of the chamber.

We find that MCs with family histories of immigration (1) cast pro-immigration votes — against restrictive bills or in favor of expanding immigration — at higher rates; and, (2) give more floor speeches about immigration. We observe decreasing effect sizes as one’s generational distance from the immigrant experience increases. When controlling for the composition of an

²See Lawson (1957) for a statistical summary of foreign-born MCs through 1949. Our numbers differ slightly, due to our efforts to exclude MCs who were born abroad to American parents.




Figure 1: **Foreign-Born MCs Over Time.** The gray box highlights the period of our analysis.

MC's district (i.e., foreign-born population), the effect of immigration history on roll-call voting persists and MCs appear to weight each factor equally; for immigration-related speech, however, district composition explains a greater share of variation than does immigrant background. This difference in results may suggest that any MC may be willing to engage in some forms of position taking on immigration but only those with an immigrant background will take on costly actions such as breaking with their party on a crucial roll-call vote.

Second, we use a regression discontinuity design to estimate the effects of electing an MC with a family immigration history on voting on immigration bills. This approach avoids concerns over why some districts elect representatives with (or without) immigrant family histories and holds constant the MC's geographic constituency. These results confirm our main finding, suggesting that districts quasi-randomly assigned MCs with family histories of immigration voted in favor of expansive immigration policies at higher rates. Thus, electing legislators with foreign-born parents or grandparents has more than just symbolic consequences for representation: these MCs not only give voice to the issue of immigration policy, but also stake out more permissive policy positions overall — positions in line with the tendency of citizens who are foreign born or who have foreign-born parents to support permissive policies (Schildkraut, 2013a).

Next, we study when lawmakers tend to place more or less weight on immigrant background. MCs with surnames denoting an immigrant background (based on census records) support more permissive immigration policy, holding actual immigrant background constant. We also observe how levels of support for permissive immigration policy can break down along narrower lines of

ethnic identity. When faced with legislation restricting immigration based on national origin, MCs with an immigrant background but from nations unaffected by restrictions supported restrictive policies at a higher rate than their colleagues with family origins in targeted countries. Thus, while MCs with family histories of immigration share a common tendency towards permissive immigration policy, under some conditions it can be subsumed by a narrower group identity.

In sum, our study adds unprecedented breadth and depth to accounts of the role of immigrant background in legislatures by unbundling it into component parts. We let group boundaries vary in our assessment of immigrant history — considering salience, temporal aspects, visibility, as well as subregional origins — while recognizing the challenges inherent to making causal inferences about immutable characteristics such as race or ethnicity (Sen and Wasow, 2016).³

A Theory of Intergenerational Transmission of Immigrant Experience and Legislative Behavior

We develop a simple model to explain the intergenerational transmission of immigrant experience for lawmakers: (1) lawmakers draw in part upon personal views when engaged in legislative decision-making; (2) their personal views are influenced by their conception of group boundaries; (3) previous generations transmit experiences and outlooks to the lawmaker, influencing their personal views directly as well as indirectly through group boundaries. In these ways, family history — such as having a grandparent who immigrated from abroad — can have bearing on legislative behavior in Congress years later. We now describe each step in more detail.

Legislative Decision-making

When considering legislative decisions, MCs weigh some combination of their personal views along with the preferences of their geographic constituency, reelection or support constituency, and national party (Fenno, 1978). A legislator's own views sometimes appear to outweigh these other considerations, with some estimates suggesting that a Senator's personal ideology holds more weight than any other factor in a legislator's decision function (Levitt, 1996). Other research has similarly argued that differences in legislative behavior (and particularly roll-call voting) tend

³See Appendix A.1.3 for additional discussion of the relationship between race and immigrant background.

to correspond to differences in underlying views on policy (Carnes, 2012); in fact, surveys conducted on legislators find differences in opinion along the same demographic lines (race and gender for example) for which differences in voting are observed (Carnes, 2012; Barrett, 1995).

Given these findings, we posit that when casting roll-call votes and when speaking on the floor of Congress, legislators draw in part upon personal views, characteristics and experiences to decide how to vote and what to say. While a single background characteristic rarely has a deterministic relationship with legislative behavior, lawmakers do have some leeway in their decision-making and in such cases these characteristics can tip the balance towards a Yea or Nay on a key immigration vote, or the decision to speak or not to speak about immigration on the floor of Congress.

Group Boundaries

An MC's family history may influence his or her sense of group boundaries and, in turn, personal political views. Scholars define group identification as when a person has an awareness of belonging and psychological attachment to a group — often based on shared interests, experiences or beliefs (McClain et al., 2009). Social psychologists have illustrated a robust tendency of people to show favoritism towards one's own group (Sherif, 1961; Tajfel, 1982). In the US context, scholars have predominantly focused on racial and ethnic identity groups, but group identification can occur more broadly, for example with panethnic groups (Masuoka, 2006) or with national identity (Schildkraut, 2014).

Several overlapping processes explain the tendency for MCs to draw upon group-based considerations when forming personal views. First, processes that make ethnic identity a more salient boundary for individual MCs can help explain how MCs may view group identity as relevant in a legislative context. Specific group-based considerations will depend on the personal, lived experiences of MCs (both within and outside the family). Factors that might influence personal experiences include how many ancestors have immigrated (and how recently), the language spoken at home, and the external visibility of having immigrated through, for example, surname. As group identity grows increasingly salient to lawmakers, legislators with family histories of immigration will increasingly prefer immigration policies seen as advantageous to their group. We

discuss examples in more detail in Appendix A.1.4.

Second, how an MC draws upon group identity in a legislative setting will depend upon the institutional context, incentives in place in the legislature, and the MC's conception of political representation — who precisely he or she is representing. Some legislators may see themselves as “descriptive” representatives, sharing a common characteristic with, and acting on behalf of, constituents. Furthermore, both selection as a legislator and in-office incentives for reelection may push lawmakers to visibly highlight their belonging to a particular group. Lawmakers may overtly position themselves as descriptive representatives for immigrant groups in their district (Mansbridge, 1999). Districts with more recent immigrants may be particularly likely to elect descriptive representatives; for example, Schildkraut (2013*b*) finds that “less acculturated” Latinos and Asians have stronger preferences for descriptive representation than others. For such reasons, a lawmaker's unique position as representative complicates the study of group identification in a legislature. Sample selection may create a pool of representatives uniquely conscious of immigrant background; reelection motives may also play a role. As a result, we take particular care to distinguish district-level characteristics and constituent preferences from those of the lawmaker.

Intergenerational Transmission

What role do the backgrounds and experiences of parents and grandparents play in the formation of political beliefs — and the development of group boundaries — for MCs? The family has long been thought to serve as an important factor in the formation of political beliefs (Hyman, 1959). Under a standard model of direct transmission of beliefs between parent and child, similarities in political views arise through parents' social influence as well as learning within the household. Transmission of beliefs occurs through “observational learning and its variants of modeling, imitation, and identification, all of which work to heighten reproductive fidelity along political lines” (Jennings, Stoker and Bowers, 2009). That said, researchers have found considerable heterogeneity in the transmission of values from parent to child (Jennings and Niemi, 1968). This variation in the degree of transmission occurs along multiple dimensions, including the type of political issue, the level of political interest in the home, the political climate at the time, and the relationship between parent and child.

While most of the political science literature focuses on transmission of specific political beliefs or behaviors (e.g., partisan identification, propensity to vote), scholars have also examined the transmission of identity, values, culture, and language (Vathi, 2015). Through observational learning and imitation, children sop up the experiences and perspectives of their parents; on balance the process predisposes the child of a foreign-born parent to develop understanding of, and adopt views sympathetic to, the specific group or groups to which their parents feel tied.

Intergenerational transmission may operate uniquely for legislators. Politicians are on balance more likely to have had families with higher than typical levels of political awareness, and intergenerational transmission of politics-related behaviors and beliefs appears heightened in families with higher levels of political awareness (Jennings, Stoker and Bowers, 2009).

Importantly, the specifics of how the processes we have described apply in a legislature are uncertain. Meaningful group boundaries may form at the level of a specific nation of origin (e.g, Italian immigrants, Irish immigrants), panethnic group, or for an American national identity in which immigration is valued. External visibility of having immigrated — signalled by, for example, surname — may also influence the salience of group boundaries. *The extent to which these different processes have operated over the history of Congress is ultimately an empirical question that we test in our paper.*

Hypotheses

Our theory posits a link between family histories of immigration and legislative behavior. We do not claim that this theory precludes other influences on legislative behavior; instead, it explains one important channel likely to affect immigration policy in particular. If the theory elaborated above holds, we should be able to observe several empirical relationships between legislative behavior and a family history of immigration. These include:

H1 (Salience): *Immigrant background is a salient characteristic that leads MCs to engage in legislative behavior supporting more permissive immigration policy.*

H2 (Proximity): *As generational distance from immigration decreases, it will explain increasingly more variation in legislative behavior related to immigration policy.*

H3 (Visibility): *As visibility of immigration increases (for example, based on surname), it will explain*

increasingly more variation in legislative behavior related to immigration policy.

H4 (Nation of Origin): *When considering legislation that restricts immigration based on national origin, MCs with an immigrant background but from nations unaffected by the restrictions will support permissive policies at a lower rate than colleagues with family origins in targeted countries.*

Immigration Legislation and Speech

The size and scope of immigration to the U.S. has been determined by three main factors historically: the costs of migration, the benefits to the migrants, and American policy (Abramitzky and Boustan, 2017). As these three factors have changed over time, total flows and the selection of immigrants has changed. The Age of Mass Migration — dating from the late nineteenth century to the immigration restriction acts of 1917, 1921, and 1924 — was made possible by falling costs of trans-Atlantic transportation, relatively open border policies, and the industrializing and urbanizing American economy (Abramitzky and Boustan, 2017). This historical moment did not just coincide with an increase in the number of immigrants, but also a significant shift in their source countries. As Abramitzky and Boustan (2017) document, in 1850, more than 90% of the foreign-born in the U.S. came from Northern and Western Europe, mostly Great Britain, Ireland, and Germany. Seventy years later, the foreign-born population in the U.S. was split between old and new Europe, 45% from “old” sending countries and 41% from “new”.

To assess legislative behavior related to immigration policy, we identified key immigration bills in the 1915–1971 period (the 64th through 91st Congresses) using Stathis’ (2014) compilation of landmark legislation and key bills identified by Tichenor (2002). We selected this time period for two reasons: (1) this period spans many major immigration bills of the 20th century; and, (2) members serving in this period were likely to be identifiable in the 1900–1940 censuses. We then identified the final roll-call vote in each chamber for each bill — either the vote on final passage or on the conference vote — using the VoteView database (Lewis et al., 2017). Several bills were dropped because final votes on the bill were not recorded; also, in a handful of cases, the final vote occurred to override a presidential veto.⁴

⁴Veto override votes occurred for the Immigration Act of 1917, the McCarran Internal Security Act and the McCarran-Walter Immigration and Nationality Act.

We included bills in this time period that Stathis and Tichenor both identified as major legislation and for which there was a recorded roll-call vote on final passage. The time period omits the first and last years of the 20th century because we only have access to individual-level census data with names before 1940. For example, we would have liked to include the Illegal Immigration Reform and Responsibility Act of 1996 but we would not have been able to match MCs younger than 56 years old. Ultimately, our sample years reflect a balance between covering as much time as possible while still having the ability to match MCs to their census records successfully. Appendix Table A1 lists the eight bills that we included in our analysis, and Appendix Section A.1.2 describes the legislation in detail.⁵ These bills represented major changes to U.S. immigration policy during the mid-20th century. Five of the bills restricted immigration, and three increased immigration or reduced restrictions.

Our second primary outcome is congressional speech for the 64th–91st Congresses. To measure speech on immigration, we drew upon speeches recorded in the *Congressional Record* and assembled in Gentzkow, Shapiro and Taddy (2019). These authors also construct keywords, which we use in this paper, to identify speeches on 22 substantive topics including immigration.⁶ Gentzkow, Shapiro and Taddy (2019) report the full details on the processing and construction of the congressional speech data.

Identifying Immigration Background

To estimate the effects of family immigration background on MC vote choice, we use individual-level data from the 1900 through 1940 U.S. Censuses. We begin by constructing a new linked sample, locating MCs in the 1900, 1910, 1920, 1930, and 1940 Federal censuses, based on the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) complete count censuses (Ruggles et al., 2020).

To start, we identify all MCs, serving between 1915 and 1971 (the 64th through 91st Congresses). To link these MCs back to the census, we extract their full names, dates of birth, and states of birth from the *Biographical Directory of the United States Congress*. For members who were born abroad (and are consequently very difficult to match to census records), we search for their

⁵Appendix Section A.1.1 discusses historical context for U.S. immigration policy.

⁶See keywords in Appendix A.2.4.

family backgrounds manually and record the citizenship status of their parents (and grandparents when possible) directly. Members born abroad to at least one U.S. citizen parent are not considered immigrants, as they are citizens from birth.

Census questions vary slightly year to year, but they nonetheless provide a wealth of information for each person we can link.⁷ For studying family immigration history, we focus on questions asked about birthplace. All people enumerated in 1900, 1910, 1920, and 1930 were asked their place of birth and their mother's and father's places of birth.⁸ Because members of the same households are linked in the enumeration, when we observe MCs as children, we can also observe the place of birth of all their grandparents, using their mothers' and fathers' answers to their own parents' places of birth question.

We link all members to their census records in 1900, 1910, 1920, 1930, or 1940 with the linking method described in Feigenbaum (2018).⁹ Linking historical records is complicated by the lack of a unique identifier. Instead, we rely on variables like name, place of birth, and date of birth, which should not change over time. Still, noise in our data makes exact matching — requiring an MC to report his or her first and last name, year of birth, and state of birth exactly the same in the census as in our congressional data — impractical and potentially biased. Hand linking records is likely the method most able to distinguish between subtle errors in two records identifying the same person or distinguishing two different people. But it is not practical to apply hand linking to large samples and — even with clear instructions on how to make links — not replicable. Instead, we apply a machine learning approach, training an algorithm to learn to make matches based on a smaller sample of carefully linked data. The algorithm learns from the human how to trade off errors in first names or last names or how large a penalty to apply to potential matches with one or two years off in the year of birth. A priori, the costs of such errors are unknown, so the approach makes the implicit rules used by a human linker explicit. The algorithm makes use of a wide range of record linkage features to build predictions for matches including Jaro-Winkler string distance and Soundex agreement on first and last name, absolute difference in year of birth, agreement on

⁷See Appendix Section A.2.2 for more information.

⁸In 1940, the mother's and father's places of birth question was only a sample line question, asked only of 2 people on each 40 person census page.

⁹See Appendix Section A.2.2 for discussion of the merits of this and other census-linking approaches.

first and last characters of names, as well as name commonness and state of birth.

Overall, we link 94.1% of the MCs in our study sample to at least one of the five decennial censuses. Our match rates into each of the five censuses are all above 57%, peaking at 68.7% matching into the 1910 census, when we limit to MCs born as of the census year. The true positive rate is 92% in cross-validation, and the precision of the linking algorithm implies that it makes the same choice as a well-trained hand linker 86.3% of the time.¹⁰

We present three examples of MCs from the linked data in Table 1. Former Speaker of the House Carl Albert was born in Oklahoma in 1908, to a mother from Texas and a father from Missouri. All four of his grandparents were born in the United States as well. Clinton Anderson, a former MC, Senator, and Secretary of Agriculture, was born in 1895 in South Dakota, to a mother from South Dakota and a father who immigrated from Sweden. His maternal grandmother was born in Illinois, his maternal grandfather in Wisconsin. His father’s census records report that Anderson’s paternal grandparents were both born in Sweden as well. Finally, former Boston Mayor, Governor, and MC James Michael Curley was born in Massachusetts in 1874 to Irish immigrant parents. In 1900, his mother reports that her parents were both born in Ireland; though his Irish immigrant father died in 1884, we assume his paternal grandparents were born in Ireland as well. These examples highlight the diversity of MC family histories. While all three are white men who served in Congress in the 1940s, their immigration backgrounds vary.

Table 1: Examples of Family Background from Census Data

	Carl Albert	Clinton Anderson	James Michael Curley
Birthplace	Oklahoma	South Dakota	Massachusetts
Mother	Texas	South Dakota	Ireland
Father	Missouri	Sweden	Ireland
Maternal Grandparents	Missouri Kansas	Illinois Wisconsin	Ireland Ireland
Paternal Grandparents	Missouri Texas	Sweden Sweden	Ireland Ireland

¹⁰Appendix Section A.2.1 provides an example describing linked MCs with varying family immigration histories.

We take several approaches to measuring immigration history, our variable of interest. In addition to measuring an MC’s own place of birth, we also examine the number of foreign-born parents an MC has, ranging from 0 to 2. As Table 2 reports, the average MC in our sample had 0.38 parents born abroad. We also measure the number of foreign-born grandparents (ranging from 0 to 4). On average, an MC in our sample had 1.7 foreign-born grandparents. By necessity, any empirical analysis that includes foreign-born grandparents will have a smaller sample because we could only successfully measure nativity of grandparents when we observed MCs residing in their parents’ home. This missingness occurs most frequently in the early years of our sample, particularly among older MCs who were not living with their parents during the 1900 or 1910 censuses. Across the sample of voting MCs, 15 percent had both parents foreign born and 34 percent had all grandparents foreign born.

Perhaps surprisingly, we observe little difference in immigration histories across party in our sample of votes. Table 2 shows that in the House slightly more Republicans than Democrats had foreign-born parents and grandparents. The differences across party are equally small in the Senate. On the other hand, we do observe notable differences across region: Southern MCs from both parties had by far the lowest rates of foreign-born parents and grandparents, and Democrats from the Northeast exhibited greater numbers of foreign-born parents and grandparents than Republicans from the Northeast. We also checked whether over-time variation masks broader differences in immigration histories between the parties. In the House, more Republican MCs have family histories of immigration in the early sample years with the trend later reversing.

Table 2: Family Immigration History for MCs by Party and Chamber

Chamber	Party	N	MC	Parents	Grand- parents	At Least One Parent	At Least One Grand- parent	All Parents	All Grand- parents
Both	All	852	0.03	0.38	1.70	0.23	0.55	0.15	0.34
House	Dem	234	0.03	0.39	1.51	0.23	0.48	0.16	0.30
House	Rep	343	0.04	0.44	1.85	0.27	0.60	0.18	0.36
Senate	Dem	149	0.01	0.27	1.59	0.17	0.51	0.10	0.32
Senate	Rep	122	0.04	0.31	1.75	0.20	0.57	0.11	0.37

Overall, we have the measure of foreign-born grandparents for slightly under 60% of the sample of voting members, and we have the measure of foreign-born parents for 93% of voting mem-

bers.¹¹ For those MCs without missing data, we constructed an “Immigration Index” summarizing immigration history by averaging across place of own birth, parents’ birth and grandparents’ birth.¹²

We also make use of surnames as a proxy for family immigration history. We take the 90 to 140 million people enumerated in each decennial census and calculate — for each surname — share foreign born, mean number of foreign-born parents, mean number of foreign-born grandparents and average Immigration Index. We will refer to these surname-based measures of immigration history as *Surname Scores*. We performed each surname calculation by census region (i.e., Northeast, Midwest, South and West) since the same surname can denote meaningfully different immigration histories depending on region of the country. We then matched an individual’s surname to the Surname Scores calculated for the census preceding their election to Congress and the relevant region.¹³

Roll-Call Vote Analysis

We have hypothesized that family immigration background influences legislative behavior (*salience*) and that the effects are decreasing in generational distance (*proximity*). To test this, we evaluate the relationship between an MC’s immigration history and vote choice on several key 20th Century immigration votes. We employ a model of the form

$$y_{ib} = \alpha + \delta \cdot \text{Immigration History}_i + X \cdot \beta + \gamma_b + \epsilon_{ib} \quad (1)$$

where i indexes individual MCs and b indexes bills. X is a matrix of covariates including a measure of foreign-born population in a state/district, indicators for chamber, party, region, age and tenure. Our main specification pools across bills and therefore also includes γ_b , a bill fixed effect. Further, this approach allows us to take subsamples of the data by bill, chamber and expected vote choice to evaluate heterogeneity in the effects of immigration experience on vote choice.

¹¹Appendix Tables A8 and A9 display summary statistics for former MCs who cast key immigration votes and all MCs, respectively. We exclude MCs who were foreign born as citizens.

¹²Immigration Index = $\mathbb{1}(\text{MC Foreign Born}) + \frac{1}{2} \cdot (\# \text{ Parents Foreign Born}) + \frac{1}{4} \cdot (\# \text{ Grandparents Foreign Born})$, and ranges from 0 (all grandparents, parents, and MC born in the United States) to 3 (MC foreign born).

¹³See Appendix Section A.2.3.

For each of the bills listed in Table A1, we determined whether a “yea” or “nay” vote best aligned with a political position generally favoring a less restrictive immigration policy.¹⁴ We coded MCs who cast pro immigrant votes in this direction with a 1 and those who did not with a 0. We excluded MCs who abstained from voting from the sample.¹⁵

We use Equation 1 to estimate the relationship between immigration history and vote choices on immigration policy across our range of congressional immigration votes. Each model uses a different measure of family immigration status. Model 1 in Table 3 reports the effect of the MC being an immigrant (foreign born) themselves; model 3 reports effect of the MC having a foreign both parent, model 5 reports the effect of the MC having a foreign-born grandparent, and model 7 uses our immigration index.

With no controls other than a bill fixed effect, we find that a foreign-born MC has a more than 25 percentage point higher rate of casting a pro vote; having one foreign-born parent is associated with a more than 16 percentage point increase; and having one foreign-born grandparent is associated with a more than 8 percentage point increase. In each case, we can reject the null hypothesis of no effect at standard levels of statistical significance ($p < 0.01$), and the strong relationship between immigration history and pro-immigration votes provides support for both the *salience* and *proximity* hypotheses. The advantage of such a sparse specification is that we do not have to worry about bias induced by controlling for post-treatment variables. We next include a host of control variables known to be associated with roll-call vote choice including foreign-born population, party, age, tenure and region. Including controls for party and foreign-born population deserves particular attention. One concern that arises is that an individual MC’s immigration history influences choice of party, and conditioning on this choice induces bias. While we cannot discount that possibility entirely, we think the effect of a marginal immigrant/non-immigrant grandparent does not strongly influence party choice since the parties have roughly even rates of parent and grandparent foreign birth. One might also worry that districts with a large share of foreign born residents both select representatives with immigrant backgrounds and select repre-

¹⁴Yeas and Nays in the regression analyses include announced votes and paired votes.

¹⁵Especially in this era missed votes occurred frequently and were due more to travel and scheduling limitations than strategic absences.

Table 3: Immigration History and MC Vote Choice: All Bills Pooled

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
MC Foreign Born	0.256*** (0.062)	0.120** (0.056)						
Parents Foreign Born			0.165*** (0.013)	0.078** (0.011)				
Grandparents Foreign Born					0.085*** (0.006)	0.031*** (0.006)		
Immigration Index							0.169*** (0.013)	0.067*** (0.013)
log(CD Pop. Foreign)		0.044*** (0.006)		0.041*** (0.006)		0.043*** (0.008)		0.042*** (0.008)
Republican		-0.226*** (0.019)		-0.207*** (0.020)		-0.226*** (0.025)		-0.225*** (0.025)
Other Party		0.116 (0.121)		0.111 (0.120)		0.119 (0.133)		0.093 (0.129)
Northeast		0.148*** (0.020)		0.136*** (0.021)		0.145*** (0.026)		0.143*** (0.026)
South		-0.264*** (0.026)		-0.233*** (0.027)		-0.274*** (0.038)		-0.279*** (0.037)
West		-0.023 (0.024)		-0.015 (0.026)		0.031 (0.033)		0.031 (0.033)
Age		-0.011* (0.006)		-0.012* (0.007)		-0.004 (0.009)		-0.002 (0.009)
Age Sq.		0.0001 (0.0001)		0.0001 (0.0001)		0.00003 (0.0001)		0.00001 (0.0001)
Tenure		-0.003 (0.002)		-0.005* (0.002)		-0.007* (0.003)		-0.006* (0.003)
Tenure Sq.		0.00003 (0.0001)		0.0001 (0.0001)		0.0001 (0.0001)		0.0001 (0.0001)
Bill FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Chamber FE	no	yes	no	yes	no	yes	no	yes
N	3,448	3,384	3,203	3,141	2,037	1,994	2,037	1,994
R ²	0.270	0.444	0.319	0.445	0.319	0.455	0.313	0.457

* p < .1; ** p < .05; *** p < .01
SEs clustered at MC level.

sentatives that vote for expansive immigration policies. As a result, state or district composition could drive the positive correlations observed in Table 3. To check for this possibility, we determined the number of foreign born residents of each MC's constituency (congressional districts for the House and states for the Senate).¹⁶

We continue to find a strong relationship between immigration history and pro-immigration votes as we show in columns 2, 4, 6 and 8 of Table 3. Controlling for other factors, we find that MCs with one foreign-born parent cast pro-immigration votes at a rate 8 percentage points higher than those with none. Similarly, an additional foreign-born grandparent increased pro-immigration voting rates by 3.1 percentage points. Importantly, these effect sizes obtain even when controlling for political party and foreign-born population. Thus, we observe these findings over and above whatever extent party identification determined one's position on immigration.

Across all models in Table 3, we find a positive and statistically significant effect of immigration experience on voting in favor of immigration in Congress. Furthermore, when we exclude foreign born MCs from the sample, and re-estimate the effect (for native-born MCs) of having a foreign-born parent or a foreign-born grandparent, we find identical results to those in Table 3. The coefficients decline by roughly half with each preceding generation's immigration history (in line with the *proximity* hypothesis); interestingly, the effect of immigration background on voting is similar for a foreign born MC, a US-born MC with two immigrant parents, and a US-born MC with four immigrant grandparents, but the effect is smaller for an MC with one immigrant grandparent as compared to one immigrant parent.

Family history of immigration also helps explain ideologically-surprising or "miscalc" votes on immigration issues. Foreign-born parents or grandparents predict a reduced rate of diverging from pre-existing ideology when an MC is predicted to vote in favor of immigration and an increased rate of diverging when an MCs pre-existing ideology predicts a vote against permissive immigration policy. Appendix Section A.3.1 reports the full results.

Overall, we interpret these findings to suggest that immigration history, even two generations back, is highly predictive of pro-immigration vote choices; this pattern holds even when account-

¹⁶Foreign-born residents in a district correlates very highly with native-born residents who have foreign-born parents. We include this covariate as a general proxy for constituencies with histories of immigration in the district.

ing for one's party and underlying political ideology. Furthermore, the evidence suggests that these findings do not hinge on the composition of the district electing MCs.¹⁷

To put these results in context, we compared the predictive power of immigrant family history on vote choices to the predictive power for votes occurring in other policy areas. Family history explains variation in roll-call votes on immigration bills better than other categories of legislation. See Appendix A.3.3 for the full analysis. We also display the coefficients estimated for each major immigration vote by chamber. Appendix A.3.5 reports the bill by bill results in detail. Finally, we note the secondary implications of our results for descriptive representation. In Appendix A.3.4 we outline how demand for descriptive representatives in districts with high foreign-born populations has translated into selection of MCs with immigrant backgrounds; in turn, these MCs have supported permissive legislation on immigration at higher rates.

Regression Discontinuity Analysis

In the previous section, we demonstrated the strong correlation between an MC's immigration background (in terms of own, parent, and grandparent place of birth as well as in terms of an Immigration Index) and vote choices on immigration policy. One critique is that immigration background might correlate strongly with unobserved variables, such as district characteristics, that also correlate with vote choice. Perhaps districts with a preference for inclusive immigration policies elect candidates with immigrant backgrounds who favor permissive immigration policies. District preferences rather than an MC's personal immigration background might still drive the observed votes for more permissive immigration policies.

To check such an issue, we use an approach that yields as good as random variation in the immigration background of an elected official at the district level. We implement a regression discontinuity design (RDD) in which we compare the voting records for officials from districts who *narrowly* elected a candidate with an immigrant background to districts who narrowly did not elect a candidate with an immigrant background.¹⁸

To implement this research design, we supplemented the data we gathered on MCs with ad-

¹⁷Differential patterns of missing data also do not appear to explain the results. Section A.3.2 replicates Table 3 using Surname Scores, which exist for all MCs.

¹⁸See Appendix A.3.6 for more technical discussion of the RDD.

ditional election data, including gathering the names and vote shares for individuals who ran for office and lost. For House general elections, we identified the top two vote getters and determined their vote shares. We excluded at-large House districts; often these districts attracted many candidates from the same party or had multiple winners.

When determining immigration background for losing candidates, it was not possible to match to census data because we lacked information on ages and places of birth. Instead, for this regression discontinuity design, we impute all candidates' immigration histories based on Surname Scores.¹⁹ For the sake of consistency, we use this surname-based approach for election winners as well.

For each of our key immigration votes, we identify the electoral contest preceding the term in which the vote was cast. In an experimental setting, we might flip a coin to determine the family immigration history of the person casting a vote; in our case, we have instead identified close elections where one candidate has a Surname Score that denotes an immigrant background and where one candidate does not. Specifically, we coarsen the key measure of immigration history into a binary variable that denotes whether or not a candidate is considered to have a family history of immigration based on their surname.

To determine a threshold for whether surname indicates a family history of immigration or not, we examined the distribution of Surname Scores. We chose a simple rule of thumb and set the binary indicator for a family immigration history equal to one for MCs with a Surname Score in the top third of the distribution for their region. We set the indicator to zero for MCs with a Surname Score in the bottom third of the distribution for their region.²⁰ This approach restricts the sample to elections with one candidate with an immigrant background and one without such a background based on these thresholds for the Surname Score. As a robustness check, we also report results for all other possible thresholds: the specific cutoff chosen is not consequential for our results.

¹⁹Appendix A.2.3 provides full details and illustrates the close relationship between Surname Score and actual immigration history.

²⁰ $\mathbb{1}(\text{Immigration History}_i)$ equals one when $F_{SS}(\text{Surname Score}_i) > 0.5 + x$, where $x = 0.17$; and, $\mathbb{1}(\text{Immigration History}_i)$ equals zero when $F_{SS}(\text{Surname Score}_i) \leq 0.5 - x$, where again $x = 0.17$. All observations in $(0.5 - x, 0.5 + x]$ are excluded from the sample.

We estimate an equation of the form

$$y_i = \alpha + \theta \cdot \mathbb{1}(\text{Immigration History Winner}_i) + f(V_i) + \epsilon_i \quad (2)$$

where $\mathbb{1}(\text{Immigration History Winner}_i)$ denotes that the *winner* of the election has a Surname Score in the top third of the distribution for the relevant measure of immigration history. θ , the parameter of primary interest, provides an estimate of the effect on vote choice of the as-if random assignment of an MC classified as having an Immigration History as compared to the vote choice by an MC classified as not having an Immigration History. The outcome variable y_i denotes whether or not an MC cast a “pro” immigration vote, just as in the previous section. The term $f(V_i)$ is a flexible function of the winning candidate’s vote margin, which determines who wins the election and therefore treatment status.

To estimate the RDD, we calculate optimal bandwidths and also use bandwidths of ± 20 and ± 10 for each regression. We estimate treatment effects using a local linear specification estimated separately on each side of the threshold.

One departure from the results presented in the previous section of this paper is that we must restrict our estimates here only to include House members because we did not have enough observations in the Senate to perform the estimation and draw any conclusions — given the requirement of including only elections with one candidate in the top third of the Surname Score distribution and one candidate in the bottom third of the Surname Score distribution. We elected not to pool across chambers given the different electoral dynamics for House and Senate races.

Estimating the effects separately using our four different measures of immigration history — self, parents, grandparents and Immigration Index — we find a positive effect of having an immigration history on the probability of casting pro-immigration votes across all four measures. Figure 2 illustrates the main findings using a linear functional form. The figures model the discontinuity between a narrow loss and a narrow win for a candidate with an immigration history as compared to a candidate without such a history. The estimates range from a 42.1 percentage point increase (Foreign Born (Self)) in the rate of casting a pro-immigration vote on the high end to a 20.6 percentage point increase on the low end (Foreign-Born Grandparents).




Figure 2: RDD: Effect of MC Immigration History (Surname Score) on probability of casting Pro Immigration Vote, BW = ± 10

Table 4: Regression Discontinuity: Imputed Immigration History (Surname Score) and Vote Choice, All Bills Pooled

	MC		Parents			Grandparents			Immigration Index			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Estimate	0.419** (0.187)	0.421** (0.188)	0.404*** (0.151)	0.355* (0.188)	0.319* (0.179)	0.382*** (0.135)	0.421* (0.244)	0.206 (0.207)	0.259* (0.149)	0.264 (0.195)	0.256 (0.194)	0.278* (0.144)
N	183	183	183	252	252	252	243	243	243	244	244	244
N (Effective)	91	91	152	113	125	206	91	121	203	119	122	200
BW	±10.073	±10	±20	±8.641	±10	±20	±7.039	±10	±20	±9.559	±10	±20

* p < .1; ** p < .05; *** p < .01
SEs clustered at MC level.

The size of the point estimates varies only slightly depending on bandwidth. Table 4 reports full results for the calculated optimal bandwidths along with bandwidths of ± 10 and ± 20 . When attempting to measure the effect of an MC's own foreign-born status on pro-immigration votes, our estimates hover around an increase of 40 percentage points in the rate of casting a pro-immigration vote, no matter the bandwidth (and none of the 95% confidence intervals overlap with zero). When measuring the effect of foreign-born status of an MC's parents on vote choice, our estimates are slightly over 30 percentage points (and two of three of the 95% confidence intervals do not overlap with zero). For grandparents, the estimates vary more widely, ranging between 20.6 percentage points and 42 percentage points (here two of three 90% confidence intervals do not overlap with zero, but all three 95% confidence intervals overlap). Finally, when determining immigration status using the Immigration Index, which averages across self, parents and grandparents, our estimates all suggest a slightly more than 25 percentage point increase in pro-immigration voting rates when a candidate with a high immigration index holds the seat as compared to when someone with a low immigration index holds the seat (one of three estimates has 90% confidence intervals that do not overlap with zero).

These results help confirm the patterns observed in the previous section, and they suggest that immigration history causes an MC to cast votes in favor of more permissive immigration policy. When we vary the criterion that MCs with Surname Scores in the top third of the distribution should be considered to have an immigration history, the results remain similar. See Section A.3.7 in the Appendix for details. We also confirm our findings with a battery of robustness checks in Appendix A.3.8.²¹

Congressional Speech and Immigrant Background

We next evaluate how an immigrant family history relates to an MC's presentation of self through floor speech. Floor speeches "increase members' visibility and voice in the legislative process" and provide chances for MCs to emphasize a policy area to their colleagues, constituents and the

²¹As compared to the RDD for immigration voting, the results of the RDD for immigration speech as the outcome appear weaker. Table A7 in the Appendix shows that the results for speech are not robustly distinguishable from zero and fluctuate depending on specification and bandwidth — consistent with our finding, discussed in the next section, that district composition more strongly influences speech.

press (Pearson and Dancey, 2011). At the same time, speech serves as a less costly signal than a vote on a key policy issue. Speech is not binding; listeners interpret a speech's meaning, which can be revised and reinterpreted in ways that a roll-call vote cannot. However, congressional speech is not entirely cheap talk; by taking a position on the record, MCs signal their views and priorities, and they may face consequences later for taking votes contrary to their speeches.

For each Congress (64th–91st), we count the distinct number of times each MC used a phrase related to the topic of immigration as well as the number of distinct speeches that include phrases related to the topic of immigration. We estimate the same model as described in Equation 1, but now replace the outcome measuring roll-call votes with a measure of floor speech, $\log(1 + FloorSpeech_{it})$ where i indexes MCs and t indexes congresses. We also include Congress and chamber fixed effects.

Table 5 presents the results. When we do not include covariates, we observe a statistically significant and positive relationship between familial immigration history and floor speeches on immigration, with the one exception of whether an MC herself or himself was foreign born. We estimate that having a foreign-born parent increases the number of speeches including mentions of immigration by roughly 7.4 percent; a foreign-born grandparent registers a 4.6 percent increase. MCs with an immigrant background also speak about immigration in more personal terms.

When we include covariates, the coefficients on our measures of family immigration history remain positive and distinguishable from zero. However, the strength of the result for family immigration history appears weaker for speech than for roll-call voting. First, for specifications with covariates in Table 5, the null hypothesis of no effect either cannot be rejected or can only be rejected at $p < 0.05$ instead of $p < 0.01$. Second, immigrant population in the congressional district emerges as a particularly important predictor for engaging in immigration-related speech. When we use standardized coefficients to evaluate the explanatory power of family immigration history versus district composition, foreign-born population in the congressional district has a relative importance 3 times that of immigration history. A one standard deviation change in district foreign-born population yields a 0.118 change in speech on immigration; for foreign-born parents, there is a 0.039 change. When the outcome is immigration roll-call votes, the relative importance

Table 5: Immigration History and Immigration Speeches

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
MC Foreign Born	0.168 (0.110)	0.060 (0.106)						
Parents Foreign Born			0.074*** (0.020)	0.041** (0.021)				
Grandparents Foreign Born					0.046*** (0.009)	0.026** (0.010)		
Immigration Index							0.095*** (0.021)	0.058** (0.023)
log(CD Pop. Foreign)		0.055*** (0.010)		0.050*** (0.010)		0.045*** (0.013)		0.045*** (0.013)
Republican		-0.033 (0.028)		-0.034 (0.030)		-0.016 (0.036)		-0.015 (0.035)
Other Party		0.100 (0.115)		0.087 (0.114)		0.108 (0.136)		0.097 (0.136)
Northeast		-0.061* (0.033)		-0.068* (0.035)		-0.068 (0.044)		-0.071 (0.044)
South		-0.039 (0.038)		-0.036 (0.039)		-0.069 (0.048)		-0.072 (0.047)
West		0.055 (0.041)		0.032 (0.041)		-0.005 (0.050)		-0.005 (0.050)
Age		0.015** (0.007)		0.014* (0.008)		0.001 (0.010)		0.002 (0.010)
Age Sq.		-0.0002*** (0.0001)		-0.0002*** (0.0001)		-0.0001 (0.0001)		-0.0001 (0.0001)
Tenure		0.041*** (0.004)		0.040*** (0.004)		0.037*** (0.005)		0.037*** (0.005)
Tenure Sq.		-0.001*** (0.0001)		-0.001*** (0.0001)		-0.001*** (0.0002)		-0.001*** (0.0002)
Congress FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Chamber FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
N	14,760	14,282	13,646	13,188	8,959	8,651	8,959	8,651
R ²	0.187	0.227	0.193	0.228	0.231	0.260	0.231	0.260

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01
SEs clustered at MC level.

of these covariates registers as roughly equal (0.15 versus 0.12).

This pattern of results suggests that MCs who represented districts with substantial foreign-born populations weight district composition more heavily than their own family histories when choosing whether to speak on immigration. Such floor speeches allow MCs to engage in position taking, essentially responding to the incentives in place for their district. Local press often reported directly on speeches given by a district's representatives.²² As a result, composition of the district appears to have been a key factor driving this form of behavior. On the other hand, MCs weighted family immigration history and district composition roughly equally for roll-call votes.

Unbundling MC Immigrant Background

Having established that more recent familial immigration history leads MCs to cast roll-call votes in support of more permissive immigration policies, we now turn to examining the characteristics — such as visibility and nation of origin — that may condition the relationship between immigration background and legislative behavior.

Visible Indicators of Immigrant Background

The visibility of one's background, and the impressions held by others, may also influence legislative behavior. We examine how visible indicators of an immigrant background influence an MC's decision-making on key immigration roll-call votes, holding *actual* immigration history constant.

Table 6 reports the results of regressions where we include the measures of family immigration history as well as Surname Scores for each MC. This approach decomposes family immigration history into an MC's actual family history and the public perception of family immigration history based on population-level statistics. Consider an MC who has one foreign-born parent but a surname that does not indicate a recent family history of immigration (for example, "Smith" averaged 0.03 foreign-born parents among people in the South in 1930). Now compare this to someone who also has one foreign-born parent but who possesses a surname suggesting a high probability

²²See *Schlagend, Argumente gegen Einwanderungsbill, In der Haus-Debatte vorgebracht* (1914) as an example of a German-language newspaper reporting at length on speeches by representatives in the congressional debates on literacy test legislation. An English-language translation of article's sub-header reads: "The battle of speeches raged for several hours. [...] Friends of immigrants fought their hardest against the literacy test clause."

of an immigrant background (for example, “Sundstrom” indicated on average 1.56 foreign-born parents for someone born at the turn of the century in the Northeast). This estimation procedure identifies whether this type of variation in surname leads to meaningfully different behavior on immigration roll-call votes. We have hypothesized that visible indicators of an immigrant background do in fact lead to adopting more permissive attitudes on immigration.

Table 6: Immigration History and MC Vote Choice: All Bills Pooled with Foreign Surnames

	Pro Immigration Vote			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
MC Foreign Born	0.088 (0.057)			
Surname MC Foreign Born	0.341*** (0.082)			
Parents Foreign Born		0.059*** (0.013)		
Surname Parents Foreign Born		0.072*** (0.024)		
Grandparents Foreign Born			0.021*** (0.008)	
Surname Grandparents Foreign Born			0.031** (0.013)	
Immigration Index				0.046*** (0.015)
Surname Immigration Index				0.059*** (0.022)
log(CD Pop. Foreign)	0.042*** (0.006)	0.039*** (0.006)	0.041*** (0.008)	0.043*** (0.008)
Controls	yes	yes	yes	yes
Bill FE	yes	yes	yes	yes
Chamber FE	yes	yes	yes	yes
N	3,367	3,126	1,976	1,968
R ²	0.446	0.445	0.455	0.459

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01
SEs clustered at MC level.

Our estimates appear to bear out this hypothesis. Across all four specifications, the coefficient on the surname score variable registers as equal to or bigger than the magnitude of the coefficient on actual immigration history. The difference appears most extreme for an MC’s own foreign-born

status; this result likely occurs because while few MCs were themselves born abroad, a surname indicating a significant probability of foreign birth also suggests a likelihood of foreign-born parents and grandparents, which we know also influences vote choice. For our other measures, the size of the coefficients are roughly equal and we cannot reject the null hypothesis of equality between the coefficients.

There are several possible mechanisms that could cause an MC with an immigrant surname to vote differently than an MC whose surname does not indicate recent immigration history. For example, when MCs have surnames visibly identifying their family histories of immigration, their constituents might view them as “descriptive representatives” and expect them to take pro-immigrant positions on legislation. An immigrant surname might boost the election chances of an MC in a district with immigrant constituents, in turn reinforcing a role as a descriptive representative. A second possibility is that a surname denoting a family history of immigration influences an MCs sense of group boundaries, leading to subtly different legislative behavior. While we cannot distinguish between these processes, the effect remains the same: being easily identifiable as having an immigrant background (holding actual background constant) correlates with increased support for permissive immigration policies, in line with our *visibility* hypothesis.

Nation of Origin

While “immigrant” or “descendant of immigrants” is one salient dimension of MC background, it elides variation in immigrant experience by country or continent of origin. Immigration restriction bills can be coded as pro or anti immigration, but the legislation is often more complex: as an example, while the Johnson-Reed Act in 1924 severely curtailed immigration from Italy, the quotas were non-binding on Irish immigrants. These targeted restrictions allow us to assess the importance of group boundaries.

In this section, we show that region of origin mattered for immigration votes. Before World War II, MCs with family trees rooted in southern and eastern Europe (the “New European” source countries during the Age of Mass Migration), were more likely to vote against immigration restriction bills than MCs of “Old European” stock, and subtleties about the exact restrictions mattered

as well.²³ After WWII, particularly for broadly permissive bills that reshaped American immigration policy — i.e., the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 — the effects of MC immigrant backgrounds were similar, whether the MCs’ parents or grandparents came from New or Old Europe or the rest of the world.

We start by examining the three immigration restriction bills of the interwar era (Table 7). We regress a dummy for pro-immigration votes on MC immigrant family history, dividing origins by region: New Europe, Old Europe, and Non Europe. Specifically, we count the number of parents (0, 1, or 2) and number of grandparents (0 to 4) who are born in each region, with American-born parents and grandparents as the reference group. Though MCs with any (recent) European family immigration history are more likely to vote against the three immigration restriction bills, the effects are much larger for MCs with more parents or grandparents from New Europe.²⁴ Each of these bills symbolically and practically targeted immigrant populations other than those from Old Europe. The Immigration Act (1917) primarily implemented a literacy test (and also included exemptions for close family members of current immigrants). The Immigration Quota Act (1921) was projected to alter the distribution of immigrants such that Old Europe source countries would comprise 55% of immigrants and New Europe countries would comprise 45%; the Reed-Johnson Act aimed to further tip the balance to 84% Old Europe and 16% New Europe (Tichenor, 2002, p. 145). In sum, in the moments leading up to final passage, each of these bills appeared to target immigrants from places other than Old Europe most harshly, though to varying degrees.

Strikingly, the results in Table 7 identify conditions under which the general tendency towards permissive immigration legislation held by those with immigrant backgrounds may break down somewhat. When restrictive immigration policies targeted specific immigrant sub-groups (i.e., New Europe immigrants), country of origin operates as a key predictor of MC roll-call voting. We implement hypothesis tests with the null that the coefficient on New Europe Parents (Grandparents) equals the coefficient on Old Europe Parents (Grandparents). For the Immigration Act (1917), which implemented a literacy test but did not drastically alter the balance of New Europe

²³We base these codings on Goldin (1994). Section A.2.5 in the Appendix lists the countries that comprise Old Europe and New Europe.

²⁴The effects of Non-European immigration history is a bit noisier and harder to interpret, but in these Congresses, this group is much smaller.

immigrants, the difference in coefficients is relatively fuzzy. We cannot reject the null of no difference at $p = 0.10$ for Old Europe versus New Europe parents or grandparents. On the other hand, for the Immigration Quota Act and Johnson-Reed Act, both of which placed stricter quotas on New Europe immigrants, we can reject the null of no difference for parents and grandparents at $p < 0.01$ (specifications 3, 4 and 6) and $p < 0.05$ (specification 5).

Did the patterns change after WWII? Here we focus on four bills from the House of Representatives: the McCarran Internal Security Act, the McCarran-Walter Immigration and Nationality Act, the Refugee Relief Act of 1953, and the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 (Table 8). The McCarran Internal Security Act, enacted over Truman's veto, targeted Communists early in the Cold War. One provision relevant for our study: immigrants could have citizenship revoked if found in violation of the law within five years of naturalization. Old European heritage led to voting pro immigrant (against the act); New European heritage (columns 1 and 2) did as well, though with an effect of a smaller magnitude. Enacted two years later, the McCarran-Walter Immigration and Nationality Act resembled in some ways the pre-WWII immigration restriction bills, retaining a quota system. MCs with New Europe immigration history were much more likely to oppose it than those from Old Europe (columns 3 and 4).

But while the McCarran-Walter bill activated identity based on national origins just as pre-WWII restriction bills had, the Refugee Relief Act of 1953 and the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 appear different. MC immigrant background had similar (positive) effects on casting a permissive vote, regardless of where those MCs' families came from originally. None of the effects estimated in columns 5, 6, 7, or 8 of Table 8 allow us to reject the null of no difference between Old Europe and New Europe coefficients.

These results suggest that when MCs faced a vote on legislation restricting immigration of people with family backgrounds similar to themselves, they were more likely to oppose the bill. While immigrants of all backgrounds had higher probabilities of opposing immigration restrictions, legislation targeting people of different backgrounds produced different levels of opposition. Group boundaries at the level of *nation of origin* — not just a general preference for permissive immigration policy — best explains the observed pattern of legislative behavior.

Table 7: Country of Origin and MC Vote Choice, Pre-WWII Immigration Votes

	Immigration Act (1917)		Immigration Quota Act (1921)		Johnson-Reed Act (1924)	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Old Europe Parents	0.164*** (0.025)		0.099*** (0.021)		0.159*** (0.024)	
New Europe Parents	0.404* (0.211)		0.353*** (0.080)		0.450*** (0.078)	
Non Europe Non Native Parents	0.078 (0.085)		0.040 (0.061)		0.319*** (0.073)	
Old Europe Grandparents		0.099*** (0.023)		0.058*** (0.018)		0.090*** (0.018)
New Europe Grandparents		0.214* (0.118)		0.183*** (0.052)		0.233*** (0.046)
Non Europe Non Native Grandparents		0.037 (0.053)		0.011 (0.044)		0.172*** (0.056)
Constant	0.193*** (0.022)	0.146* (0.075)	0.059*** (0.016)	0.034 (0.053)	0.101*** (0.018)	0.068 (0.049)
N	486	135	403	118	459	151
R ²	0.086	0.135	0.092	0.146	0.165	0.246

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01

Table 8: Country of Origin and MC Vote Choice, Post-WWII Immigration Votes

	McCarran Internal Security Act (1950)	McCarran-Walter Immigration and Nationality Act (1952)	Refugee Relief Act (1953)	Immigration and Nationality Act (1965)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Old Europe Parents	0.138*** (0.028)		0.139*** (0.033)		0.193*** (0.036)		0.144*** (0.038)	
New Europe Parents	0.097*** (0.049)		0.368*** (0.051)		0.230*** (0.054)		0.142*** (0.042)	
Non Europe Non Native Parents	0.279*** (0.084)		0.137* (0.082)		0.313*** (0.094)		0.122* (0.065)	
Old Europe Grandparents		0.047*** (0.012)		0.061*** (0.013)		0.108*** (0.014)		0.086*** (0.013)
New Europe Grandparents		0.053** (0.024)		0.190*** (0.025)		0.131*** (0.025)		0.087*** (0.019)
Non Europe Non Native Grandparents		0.118*** (0.036)		0.107*** (0.042)		0.153*** (0.046)		0.077*** (0.030)
Constant	0.102*** (0.019)	0.075*** (0.024)	0.224*** (0.023)	0.189*** (0.028)	0.482*** (0.025)	0.415*** (0.029)	0.739*** (0.021)	0.664*** (0.025)
N	414	354	451	394	465	404	436	387
R ²	0.082	0.074	0.131	0.161	0.100	0.168	0.058	0.136

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01

Conclusion

This paper has developed a theory of intergenerational transmission of immigrant experience for lawmakers and tested it empirically by studying the relationship between lawmakers' immigrant background and their legislative behavior. Our results demonstrate a strong relationship between personal immigration history and MC vote choice on immigration policy in the early and mid-20th century. MCs born abroad or with parents or grandparents born abroad voted in favor of pro-immigration policies more than those whose families immigrated to the United States in earlier generations. This voting behavior is not just the result of pro-immigrant electorates selecting MCs with recent family immigration background, but occurs independently of district characteristics and selection. Recent immigration experiences serve as strong predictors of votes for permissive policies even when MC ideology would predict otherwise.

While a Congress with MCs who have family histories of immigration may contribute to support for permissive immigration policies, this is conditioned by a variety of factors. Position taking through congressional speech appears best explained as a function of district composition, though an MC's immigration background also matters significantly. Elements that point towards the importance of the MC's conception of group boundaries — visibility of immigrant background and nation of origin — appear crucial: holding actual immigration history constant, an immigrant surname increases the probability of casting permissive immigration votes. And, when faced with immigration restrictions based on nationality, MCs tended to give more support to the immigration of people with the same origins as themselves, though here a tendency to vote for permissive immigration overall persisted. The empirical patterns appear consistent with a model where family histories of immigration influence current legislative behavior through effects on MCs' political views and conceptions of group boundaries.

Fenno (1978) famously asked what elected representatives see when they look at their constituency, sparking a voluminous literature investigating legislator behavior in the district. Our paper has sought to turn a lens inward. We have tried to ask: What do legislators see when they look at themselves? Our paper suggests that answers to this question should be taken into account when studying the behavior of elected representatives in a legislature.

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A Online Appendix

A.1 Supplementary Historical Information

A.1.1 U.S. Immigration Policy

Since the First Congress, legislators have grappled with immigration and citizenship policies. These policies, and specifically legislator roll-call votes and floor speech, provide the basis for our measures of legislative behavior related to immigration policy. Evaluating these outcomes requires some background on immigration policy in Congress. The Naturalization Act of 1790 marked the first comprehensive immigration policy set forth by Congress and, as did later acts of Congress, balanced naturalization of some citizens — free Whites who met certain residence and character requirements — with exclusion of others — American Indians and enslaved peoples to name but a few. In the two centuries since, immigration policy has not moved linearly towards more openness. Rather, U.S. immigration policy can be characterized as a sequence of restrictive and expansive policy regimes, responding to changes in the political environment over time (Tichenor, 2002). In this framework, institutional “veto points” and “opportunity points” help structure the processes from which immigration policies emerge. Changes in party systems may yield structural advantages (or disadvantages) for political actors; coalitions spanning party and ideology may develop in response to existing government institutions and policies; and, international events may influence the opportunities for policy change available to domestic actors. Yet, while this historical-institutionalist approach does well to examine the fundamental *institutional* conditions that help shape policy opportunities and obstacles, it has less to say about the characteristics that determine the views of key decision-makers in the first place. For example, the largely restrictive and exclusionary immigration policies coming out of Congress in the first quarter of the 20th century, capping all immigration and favoring immigrants from Northern Europe, can be explained in part by veto and opportunity points but also by a restrictionist outlook that emerged among political actors.

A.1.2 Immigration Bills

We now describe the major immigration legislation for which we measure roll-call votes. The Immigration Act of 1917 was the first major bill designed to restrict European immigration into the United States that ultimately went into law. Passed by Congress over Woodrow Wilson's veto at the end of the 64th Congress, the act imposed a literacy test on European immigrants, and barred immigrants from Asian countries. The Immigration Quota Act (also called the Emergency Immigration Act of 1921 or Immigration Act of 1921) capped the number of immigrants and set quotas for immigration based on the number of people of each nationality already residing in the United States. The Immigration Act of 1924 (the Johnson-Reed Act) further lowered the number of immigrants allowed each year and heavily favored Northern European immigrants over those from Southern or Eastern Europe.²⁵ All three bills passed each chamber by large margins.

A second cluster of immigration acts followed World War II. The Displaced Persons Act of 1948 and Refugee Relief Act of 1953 temporarily increased the number of immigrants admitted due to the vast number of refugees in Europe after the war.²⁶ The McCarran-Walter Immigration and Nationality Act, passed by Congress in 1952 over the veto of Harry Truman, reorganized and consolidated immigration laws while preserving strict nationality quotas limiting immigration. Finally, the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 overhauled the immigration system once again, eliminating the nationality-based quota system and replacing it with a multi-category system that prioritized special skills or having relatives already residing in the United States. The long-term effect of the bill was to end the preference for Northern European immigrants and allow for increased immigration from the rest of the world. Abramitzky and Boustan (2017) suggest that the 1965 bill led to a new era of Mass Migration, albeit with very different source countries than the previous one.

²⁵For a detailed account of the politics of immigration reform, see Tichenor (2002).

²⁶The House of Representatives did not hold a final roll-call vote on the Displace Persons Act of 1948; we only include the Senate vote in our analysis.

Table A1: Immigration Bills

Congress	Bill	Roll Call #	Pro Immigrant	Yea*	Nay*	
64	HR10384	Immigration Act of 1917				
		House	121	Nay	309	117
		Senate	324	Nay	65	22
67	HR4075	Immigration Quota Act				
		House	21	Nay	285	41
		Senate	21	Nay	90	2
68	HR7995	Immigration Act of 1924 (Johnson-Reed Act)				
		House	90	Nay	319	72
		Senate	126	Nay	72	11
80	S2242	Displaced Persons Act of 1948				
		House	N/A (no final roll-call vote)			
		Senate	198	Yea	75	17
81	HR9490	McCarran Internal Security Act				
		House	264	Nay	302	56
	S4037	Senate	444	Nay	77	12
82	HR5678	McCarran-Walter Immigration and Nationality Act				
		House	165	Nay	284	116
		Senate	298	Nay	60	31
83	HR6481	Refugee Relief Act of 1953				
		House	64	Yea	225	189
		Senate	82	Yea	63	30
89	HR2580	Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965				
		House	177	Yea	330	79
		Senate	232	Yea	80	20

*Yeas and Nays include announced votes and paired votes.

A.1.3 Race and Immigrant Experience

The relationship between race and immigrant experience also marks a complex point of comparison between our period of study and today's Congress. Most of the immigrant MCs in our historical sample are white, echoing both the history of race in American politics and the fact that immigration to the US from most non-European countries was nearly impossible for the late 19th and early 20th centuries. (The shares from Europe were over 80% from 1850 to 1950, with immigrants

from Canada making up another substantial share (Abramitzky and Boustan, 2017). Immigration to the US from Asia was banned entirely for much of the period.) But as scholars (for example, Painter (2011) and Roediger (2006)) have documented extensively, the concept of race and whiteness in the early 20th century was contested. (So too in Congress. See Tichenor (2002) for detailed accounts of how Congress relied on racial tropes and discredited pseudo-science from groups such as the Immigration Restriction League when formulating immigration policy.) American society, and lawmakers, did not always view European immigrants, especially those from southern and eastern Europe, as belonging to the same racial group as “white” Americans (Guglielmo, 2003). Thus, while the analysis of historical legislative behavior in our study may not speak directly to the racial dynamics at play in today’s immigration debates, ideas about race still had bearing on the immigration policies applied to European immigrants in the early and mid 20th Century.

A.1.4 Mechanisms Affecting Group Boundaries

Processes that make ethnic identity a more salient boundary for MCs include group consciousness and/or linked fate. The concept of “group consciousness” involves “identification with a group and a political awareness or ideology regarding the group’s relative position in society along with a commitment to collective action aimed at realizing the group’s interests” (Miller et al., 1981). The concept of “linked fate” suggests that some political beliefs and actions taken by people who belong to minority ethnic or racial groups can be explained by their perceptions of racial group interests. Most famously, researchers have posited that linked fate helps explain the political cohesion of black voters in the US (Dawson, 1995). But notions of linked fate have since been shown to operate for groups based on race, ethnicity, gender, class and religion (Gay, Hochschild and White, 2016). For lawmakers who belong to a relevant group, these processes link the interests of the group to those of the lawmaker. In traditional applications of group consciousness and linked fate, researchers have found that these concepts explain increased rates of political participation as well as more liberal views towards public policy (Verba and Nie, 1987; Dawson, 1995). The core logic underlying these empirical relationships is that individuals exhibiting group consciousness or a sense of linked fate *are more likely to engage in political behaviors advantageous to “their” group.*

Extending this theory to a legislative context would suggest that, when these mechanisms are present, legislators with family histories of immigration would be more likely to prefer immigration policies seen as advantageous to their group.

A.2 Supplementary Data Details

A.2.1 Census Linking Overview

The complete 1900, 1910, 1920, 1930, and 1940 Federal Censuses have recently been digitized by a joint effort of Ancestry.com and the Minnesota Population Center. The restricted-access version of the data, managed by IPUMS (Ruggles et al., 2020) and housed at the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), includes transcribed names that enable us to link to external data sources at the individual-level. We search for each member in each of the decennial Federal Censuses from 1900 to 1940 to link MCs to census records. Individuals' names as enumerated in the US Federal Census are restricted for 72 years following the census for privacy reasons, so we stop with the 1940 census, released publicly in 2012.

A.2.2 Discussion of Census-Linking Procedures

In recent work, Enamorado, Fifield and Imai (2019) propose a probabilistic linking method to match records across individual-level datasets like voter files. Though similar to other methods used in the historical census record linking literature like Abramitzky, Mill and Pérez (2019) in that it uses an Expectation-Maximization (EM) algorithm, we turn to the Feigenbaum (2018) method for three key reasons. First, in a recent review of historical census linking methods, Abramitzky et al. (2019) finds that the most commonly used methods trace out a frontier, trading off false positives and false negatives in linking. The Feigenbaum method, by replicating the hand links a trained researcher would make, does particularly well at minimizing false negatives or records for which a true match exists but is not recovered. Because we link from high quality source data (the Congressional Biographical Directories including middle names and exact dates of birth) and link into *five* censuses, we believe we are creating a linked sample that is unlikely to have many false positives as well. Second, Abramitzky et al. (2019) also note that choice of exact historical linking

method, among those commonly used by recent economic historians working with the complete count census, tends not to affect research conclusions. Third, as McVeigh, Spahn and Murray (2019) find when evaluating the Enamorado, Fifield and Imai (2019) method with historical data, methods developed to deal with the linking challenges of modern data (fuzzy street addresses and typos in string and numeric fields) may not be the best tool to apply to historical data likely to contain transcription errors, respondent to enumerator noise, and degradation of raw sources over time.

A.2.3 Surname Scores

Surname-based measures are useful for individuals for whom we have less available information. This includes older MCs who we are unlikely to find residing at home with their parents. In addition, it is extremely difficult to census link failed candidates for Congress: for these challengers, we rarely observe either year of birth or place of birth, two variables key to census linking. Surname scores allow us to proxy for immigration histories of these challengers. And, in subsequent analyses, they provide a measure for public perceptions or visibility of immigrant background since they report the average immigration background for an individual based on surname alone.

While not a one to one correspondence, the correlation between actual immigration family history and surname score is very high. We view immigration history based on surname as measuring the variable of interest, Immigration History_{*i*}, but with some error — that is, Immigration History_{*i*} = Surname Score_{*i*} + ε_{*i*}. The error term can be thought of as the difference for each individual between the average immigration background of someone with that surname and the actual immigration background of the individual under study.

Figure A1 illustrates the correspondence between Immigration History_{*i*} and Surname Score_{*i*} for House members. Each dot in a figure represents the average outcomes for all MCs in the sample *by state*.




Figure A1: Comparison of Actual Foreign-Born Status to Imputed Foreign-Born Status (Surname Scores) by State, House Members

A.2.4 Key Terms for Identifying Topics of Speech

The key terms to identify immigration speech are: “across border”, “administr foreign”, “allow foreign”, “along border”, “american foreign”, “beyond border”, “billion foreign”, “border patrol”, “border protect”, “border region”, “border secur”, “border state”, “border unit”, “broken immigr”, “canadian border”, “citizenship immigr”, “come foreign”, “come illeg”, “comprehens immigr”, “control border”, “countri illeg”, “custom border”, “enforc immigr”, “feder immigr”, “flow illeg”, “foreign born”, “foreign languag”, “foreign student”, “foreign worker”, “illeg activ”, “illeg immigr”, “immigr act”, “immigr children”, “immigr come”, “immigr countri”, “immigr custom”, “immigr enforc”, “immigr issu”, “immigr natur”, “immigr polici”, “immigr problem”, “immigr reform”, “immigr refuge”, “immigr servic”, “immigr status”, “immigr subcommitte”,

“immigr system”, “immigr unit”, “immigr visa”, “involv foreign”, “legal illeg”, “legal immigr”, “mani foreign”, “mexican border”, “million foreign”, “million illeg”, “nation border”, “nation immigr”, “need foreign”, “northern border”, “open border”, “peopl foreign”, “peopl illeg”, “percent foreign”, “protect border”, “reform immigr”, “report foreign”, “resid alien”, “restrict immigr”, “secur border”, “side border”, “southern border”, “southwest border”, “state border”, “state illeg”, “stop illeg”, “subcommitte immigr”, “undocu immigr”, “undocu worker”, “within border”.

The key terms to identify family speech are: “mother”, “father”, “grandmoth”, “grandfath”, “uncl”, “aunt”, “cousin”, “brother”, “sister”, “parent”, “grandpar”, “children”, “famili”, “relat”, “kin”, “clan”, “hous”, “household”, “home”, “sibl”, “lineag”, “blood”, “brood”, “descend”, “legaci”, “inherit”, “genealog”, “in-law”, “folk”, “ancestor”, “root”, “spous”, “wife”, “husband”, “marriag”, “wed”.

A.2.5 Coding Places of Origin into Regions

We identify regions of origin based on the birth countries of parents and grandparents. Countries are grouped into regions as follows:

Old Europe includes people with census country codes for Denmark, Faroe Islands, Finland, Iceland, Lapland, Norway, Svalbard and Jan Meyen, Svalbard, Jan Meyen, Sweden, England, Channel Islands, Guernsey, Jersey, Isle of Man, Scotland, Wales, United Kingdom, Ireland, Northern Ireland, Northern Europe, Belgium, France, Alsace-Lorraine, Alsace, Lorraine, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Monaco, Netherlands, Switzerland, Western Europe, Austria, Austria-Hungary, Austria-Graz, Austria-Linz, Austria-Salzburg, Austria-Tyrol, Austria-Vienna, Austria-Kaernten, Austria-Neustadt, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Bohemia, Bohemia-Moravia, Slovakia, Czech Republic, Germany, Berlin, West Berlin, East Berlin, West Germany, Baden, Bavaria, Braunschweig, Bremen, Hamburg, Hanover, Hessen, Hesse-Nassau, Lippe, Lubeck, Oldenburg, Rheinland, Schaumburg-Lippe, Schleswig, Sigmaringen, Schwarzburg, Westphalia, Wurttemberg, Waldeck, Wittenberg, Frankfurt, Saarland, Nordrhein-Westfalen, East Germany, Anhalt, Brandenburg, Kingdom of Saxony, Mecklenburg, Saxony, Thuringian States, Sachsen-Meiningen, Sachsen-Weimar-Eisenach, Probable Saxony, Schwerin, Strelitz, Probably Thuringian States, Prussia, Hohenzollern, and Nieder-

sachsen.

New Europe includes people with census country codes for Albania, Andorra, Gibraltar, Greece, Dodecanese Islands, Turkey Greece, Macedonia, Italy, Malta, Portugal, Azores, Madeira Islands, Cape Verde Islands, St. Miguel, San Marino, Spain, Vatican City, Southern Europe, Hungary, Poland, Austrian Poland, Galicia, German Poland, East Prussia, Pomerania, Posen, Prussian Poland, Silesia, West Prussia, Russian Poland, Romania, Transylvania, Yugoslavia, Croatia, Montenegro, Serbia, Bosnia, Dalmatia, Slavonia, Carniola, Slovenia, Kosovo, Central Europe, Eastern Europe, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Baltic States, Other USSR/Russia, Byelorussia, Moldavia, Bessarabia, Ukraine, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Republic of Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kirghizia, Tadzhik, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Siberia, USSR, Europe.

A.3 Supplementary Analysis

A.3.1 Miscast Votes

Family history of immigration also helps us explain ideologically-surprising or “miscast” votes on immigration issues. Specifically, we examine bills where (1) an MC was predicted to vote pro immigration based on their ideological position (as measured by both dimensions of DW-NOMINATE) but instead voted anti immigration; and, (2) an MC was predicted to vote anti immigration but instead voted pro immigration. These “miscast” votes allow us to examine instances where immigration history led MCs to depart from what would be predicted by their overall political ideology. This approach moves beyond simply controlling for party, as in Table 3, which is useful because restrictionist ideologies cut across both parties, for example by bringing together Southern Democrats and some Western Republicans.

To implement this test, we divided our data into sub-samples: (1) Individuals predicted to cast a “pro” immigration vote; and, (2) individuals predicted to cast an “anti” immigration vote. Within each subsample, we then coded all individuals with a “miscast” vote with a 1 and those who voted according to expectations with a 0. Appendix Table A2 reports the results. In all cases, the direction of the effects accords with our expectations. First, immigration history predicts a reduced rate of diverging from pre-existing ideology when an MC is predicted to vote in favor

of immigration. We estimate that being foreign born is associated with a reduction of 11 percentage points in the rates of casting an anti-immigration vote that departs from existing ideology; an additional foreign-born parent is associated with a reduction of 4 percentage points; and a one percentage point effect for additional foreign-born grandparents. We also observe a positive relationship between immigration history and casting a pro vote despite having an overall political ideology that would predict casting an anti vote, with effect sizes similar to the prior case, but in the opposite direction.

Table A2: Miscast Votes

	Predicted Pro but Anti				Predicted Anti but Pro			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
MC Foreign Born	-0.109 (0.068)				0.135** (0.067)			
Parents Foreign Born		-0.040*** (0.013)				0.050*** (0.014)		
Grandparents Foreign Born			-0.013* (0.007)				0.021*** (0.007)	
Immigration Index				-0.031** (0.014)				0.052*** (0.015)
log(CD Pop. Foreign)	-0.020* (0.010)	-0.022** (0.011)	-0.014 (0.010)	-0.014 (0.010)	0.021*** (0.005)	0.018*** (0.005)	0.018** (0.008)	0.016** (0.008)
Controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Bill Dummy	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Chamber Dummy	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
N	1,124	1,002	836	836	2,166	2,047	1,143	1,143
R ²	0.112	0.126	0.103	0.104	0.094	0.096	0.101	0.106

* p < .1; ** p < .05; *** p < .01
SEs clustered at MC level.

A.3.2 Replicating Main Results Using Surname Scores

Another possibility is that the pattern of missing data — particularly for foreign-born grandparents — might somehow bias our results. In particular, missingness for this measure occurs in our earliest sample years. As one check against this possibility, we re-estimate our core results using estimated immigration histories based on surname, which has the advantage of no missingness (though measures everyone’s immigration history with some error). Table A3 in the Appendix replicates the results from Table 3 using only foreign-born scores derived from an MCs surname

and finds similar results as to when we measured immigration history using individual level census data.

Table A3: Immigration History and MC Vote Choice: All Bills Pooled with Foreign Surnames

	Pro Immigration Vote			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Surname MC Foreign Born	0.361*** (0.083)			
Surname Parents Foreign Born		0.120*** (0.020)		
Surname Grandparents Foreign Born			0.055*** (0.009)	
Surname Immigration Index				0.103*** (0.016)
log(CD Pop. Foreign)	0.042*** (0.006)	0.039*** (0.006)	0.039*** (0.006)	0.040*** (0.006)
Republican	-0.216*** (0.019)	-0.209*** (0.020)	-0.207*** (0.020)	-0.209*** (0.019)
Other Party	0.117 (0.115)	0.134 (0.115)	0.146 (0.116)	0.131 (0.114)
Northeast	0.121*** (0.021)	0.121*** (0.020)	0.123*** (0.020)	0.117*** (0.020)
South	-0.241*** (0.028)	-0.213*** (0.029)	-0.198*** (0.029)	-0.201*** (0.029)
West	-0.033 (0.025)	-0.024 (0.025)	-0.021 (0.025)	-0.021 (0.025)
Age	-0.012* (0.006)	-0.012* (0.006)	-0.011* (0.007)	-0.011* (0.006)
Age Sq.	0.0001 (0.0001)	0.0001* (0.0001)	0.0001 (0.0001)	0.0001 (0.0001)
Tenure	-0.004 (0.002)	-0.004 (0.002)	-0.004 (0.002)	-0.004 (0.002)
Tenure Sq.	0.00003 (0.0001)	0.00003 (0.0001)	0.00004 (0.0001)	0.00003 (0.0001)
Bill FE	yes	yes	yes	yes
Chamber FE	yes	yes	yes	yes
N	3,367	3,367	3,362	3,352
R ²	0.446	0.449	0.449	0.451

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01
SEs clustered at MC level.

A.3.3 Immigration History and Roll-Call Votes in Other Policy Areas

To put our main results in context, we take two complementary approaches that illustrate the predictive power of immigrant family history on vote choice. First, we classify all remaining bills in the same Congresses as our landmark immigration votes by topic codings constructed by Peltz-

man (1984). These relatively broad topics include issues such as the Budget, Defense, Domestic Social Policy and others. According to this coding scheme, Domestic Social Policy includes bills (other than our landmark legislation) on immigration policy. Following an approach outlined by Washington (2009), we identified votes where the majority of one party favored legislation and the majority of the opposing party did not (i.e., conflict existed over the vote) and coded these votes based on whether an MC supported the ideologically left position when voting (again, based on which party supported the legislation).

Figure A2 (other than the bottom 3 rows) reports the share of votes for each broad topic where we found a statistically significant result of foreign-born parents on MC vote choice, controlling for other factors. By chance, we should expect 5 percent of individual votes to have a statistically significant relationship at $p = 0.05$ (demarcated by the dotted vertical line in the figure). As the figure makes apparent, Domestic Social Policy registers the greatest share of roll-call votes where an MC's immigration history mattered that is also statistically different from a zero effect.²⁷ For this subset of politically polarized votes, family history matters most for the topic that includes bills related to immigration policy. Immigrant background and identity should matter for some other policy topics (given its association with more permissive and/or more liberal policy choices), but if operating along the lines described in our theory it should matter *most* for legislation on immigration.

We also directly compare major legislation on Immigration to other topic areas with major legislation. We chose two narrower topics that we viewed as orthogonal to immigrant background (transportation and environment), and we selected landmark votes in these areas using the same procedure as for the landmark immigration votes (i.e., consulting Stathis (2014) to identify landmark legislation in an area and then identifying the vote for final passage). This approach comprises a perhaps more fitting comparison since Stathis selected both the landmark immigration legislation studied in our paper and these bills on transportation and environment without regard to whether partisan conflict over the vote existed (e.g., these are apples-to-apples comparisons).

Taking this approach, immigration legislation registers by far the greatest share of roll-call

²⁷The magnitude of the effect for DC is larger but not statistically significant.




Figure A2: Effect of Foreign-Born Parents on Permissive/Liberal Vote for Placebo Topics (ML denotes Major Legislation)

votes where an MC’s immigration history mattered. In fact, neither the transportation nor the environment topics included a single bill where immigrant family background mattered for vote choice.

A.3.4 Immigration History and Descriptive Representation

Overall, we have shown that an MC places considerable weight on his or her immigrant background when casting roll-call votes on immigration. To what extent does the tendency to draw upon own immigrant background enhance representation of immigrant groups in the district? First, previous research has suggested that people who are first or second generation immigrants themselves express more permissive attitudes on immigration overall.²⁸ So, legislator actions in favor of permissive immigration policy accords with the views of immigrant groups in an MC’s district more often than not. Second, we know that congressional districts with higher numbers of foreign-born constituents tended to elect candidates with immigrant family histories. Figure A3

²⁸See Mayda (2006), O’Rourke and Sinnott (2006), and Schildkraut (2013) as examples of this empirical regularity.




Figure A3: Relationship between CD Foreign-Born Pop. and Immigration Index of Elected MCs

displays a binned scatter plot that shows the strong, positive relationship between foreign-born population in a district and the Immigration Index for the MC elected. Table A4 reports similar results from regressions that also control for the urban population in the district and region. Congressional districts containing constituencies with immigrant populations systematically selected candidates with immigrant backgrounds at higher rates than districts without these constituencies. Demand for descriptive representatives at the district level translated into the selection of MCs with immigrant backgrounds to draw upon when deciding how to vote on key immigration legislation; in turn, these MCs supported permissive legislation on immigration.

A.3.5 Bill by Bill Results

We can examine effects by bill, rather than pooling all votes together and including bill fixed effects, by estimating the model specified in Equation 1 and restricting the sample by vote and by

Table A4: District Composition and MC Immigration History, 64th – 91st Congresses (House Only)

	MC Foreign Born	Parents Foreign Born	Grandparents Foreign Born	Immigration Index
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
log(CD Pop. Foreign)	0.012*** (0.003)	0.102*** (0.012)	0.370*** (0.034)	0.183*** (0.017)
log(CD Pop. Urban)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.002 (0.003)	-0.003 (0.007)	-0.005 (0.004)
Northeast	-0.016* (0.009)	0.073* (0.041)	0.059 (0.099)	0.069 (0.052)
South	-0.014** (0.007)	-0.228*** (0.036)	-0.903*** (0.112)	-0.343*** (0.053)
West	-0.030*** (0.009)	-0.182*** (0.046)	-0.358*** (0.138)	-0.197*** (0.066)
Congress FE	yes	yes	yes	yes
N	12,075	11,046	7,444	7,444
R ²	0.024	0.131	0.296	0.276

* p < .1; ** p < .05; *** p < .01

SEs clustered at district level by redistricting cycle.

chamber. Figure A4 reports the results for the House and the Senate.²⁹


In the House, we observe consistently positive and significant effects; both foreign-born parents and foreign-born grandparents were strongly associated with casting pro-immigration votes. In the Senate, the bill by bill results appear more mixed. Looking at parental immigration history, the effects register as positive for six of seven bills, but in most cases we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no effect. A similar pattern persists when examining foreign-born grandparent effects in the Senate.

A.3.6 RDD Technical Introduction

The RDD approach in our paper follows the standards for employing a regression discontinuity design in an electoral setting (Lee, 2008). The key assumption hinges on the notion that winning a very close election occurs largely due to random factors. As an election grows closer, a candidate's chance of landing narrowly on one side or the other of the 50% vote threshold, which determines the winner, begins to resemble a coin flip. By comparing the gap in vote choices between winners

²⁹For the Senate, we had to omit several votes; in some cases, we had insufficient variation in the outcome variable (i.e., HR4075 was a 90-2 vote) or insufficient data on foreign-born grandparents. HR10384, the Immigration Act of 1917, lacked enough data on foreign-born grandparents. This was because most MCs voting were also adults in 1900 or 1910 and not living with their parents. This made it difficult to determine the immigration histories of their grandparents.

Foreign-Born Parents, House Foreign-Born Grandparents, House



Foreign-Born Parents, Senate Foreign-Born Grandparents, Senate




Figure A4: Effect of Foreign-Born Parents and Grandparents on Pro Immigration Vote on Individual Bills

and losers at the 50% threshold we obtain an estimate of the effect of immigration background on vote choice. Crucially, this regression discontinuity approach relies on the continuity of the conditional mean function as we approach the threshold from at least one side (Lee and Lemieux, 2010). We employ several robustness checks to provide additional evidence that (1) there are not jumps in the outcome at thresholds other than 50%, and (2) the assignment mechanism at the threshold is close to random.

A.3.7 RDD Thresholds

The specific choice of threshold distinguishing “high” versus “low” probability of family immigration history based on surname does not appear to matter for the results. Figure A5 visually displays the RDD results for different threshold choices. Moving from left to right along the x-

axis varies the threshold calculation used to determine when the binary variable indicating an immigrant family history takes a value equal to one. For example, when $x = 0$ individuals with a Surname Score higher than the 50th percentile are classified as having a family immigration history and individuals whose Surname Score is below the 50th percentile are not. When $x = 10$, then individuals with a Surname Score higher than the 60th percentile are classified as having a family immigration history equal to one and individuals with a Surname Score less than or equal to the 40th percentile are assigned a zero. As we move to the right, we increasingly restrict the size of the sample until it is no longer reasonable to perform the estimation. We continued to estimate the RDD results as long as we retained at least 50 effective observations.




Figure A5: RDD Robustness Check: Sensitivity of Estimates to Surname Score Cutoff Donut for Treatment Assignment (Optimal BW). The figures illustrate the effect of MC Immigration History (Surname Score) on probability of casting Pro Immigration Vote

Across all measures and all Surname Score thresholds, the results remain positive. In general,

as we grow more restrictive in terms of defining who does and does not have a surname that denotes a family immigration history the effect sizes increase. This makes intuitive sense: setting $x = 0$ classifies some people as having an immigration history equal to one and others with an immigration history equal to zero when their Surname Scores are very similar (i.e., someone in the 49th percentile would have an indicator variable equal to zero and someone in the 51st percentile would have the indicator set to one). Such a coarse division likely adds considerable noise to our estimates. As the threshold grows more stringent, the distinction between a surname indicating an MC with a family history of immigration with an MC who does not have such a history grows sharper — until we no longer have enough observations to estimate the effects.

A.3.8 RDD Robustness Checks

Table A5 reports the results of the same estimation procedure as in the main RDD, but using placebo outcomes as the dependent variable. We estimate the effects of quasi-random assignment of an MC with an immigrant history on pre-treatment covariates including age, party, and region. Across all of these placebo outcomes, we do not observe any meaningful relationship. Table A6 reports continuity checks for the RDD results. We reformulate our estimation as if the threshold between winning and losing an election was $0.5 \pm c$ and re-estimate the results. Given that these thresholds are artificially constructed, we should observe no meaningful relationship between an MC's immigration history and the outcome; put differently, we should not observe a jump in the probability of casting a pro-immigration vote anywhere except the actual threshold between electing an MC with versus without an immigrant background. Again, we do not observe statistically significant results at any of the alternative thresholds.

Table A5: RDD Robustness Check with Placebo Outcome Variables: Imputed Immigration History (Surname Score) and Vote Choice, All Bills Pooled (House, Foreign Born Parents Determine Treatment Status)

	Age	Dem	Northeast	South	Midwest	West
Estimate	-1.192 (3.241)	0.17 (0.202)	0.101 (0.18)	-0.035 (0.1)	-0.194 (0.182)	0.134 (0.209)
N	278	278	278	278	278	278
N (Effective)	137	101	146	119	132	101
BW	±10.195	±6.968	±10.892	±8.413	±9.76	±6.942

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01
SEs clustered at MC level.

Table A6: RDD Continuity Check: Imputed Immigration History (Surname Score) and Vote Choice, All Bills Pooled (House, Foreign Born Parents Determine Treatment Status)

	40	45	50	55	60
Estimate	-0.206 (0.208)	0.26 (0.182)	0.355* (0.188)	-0.155 (0.336)	0.117 (0.342)
N	252	252	252	252	252
N (Effective)	95	111	113	75	54
BW	±7.536	±7.66	±8.641	±6.785	±7.16

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01
SEs clustered at MC level.

Table A7: Regression Discontinuity: Imputed Immigration History (Surname Score) and Vote Choice, All Bills Pooled

	(1)	MC (2)	(3)	(4)	Parents (5)	(6)	Grandparents (7)	(8)	(9)	Immigration Index (10)	(11)	(12)
Estimate	-0.177 (0.46)	-0.393 (0.353)	0.102 (0.292)	0.571 (0.445)	0.026 (0.321)	0.024 (0.369)	0.668* (0.368)	0.174 (0.328)	0.114 (0.3)	0.556* (0.312)	0.28 (0.302)	0.364 (0.26)
N	195	195	195	269	269	269	264	264	264	262	262	262
N (Effective)	53	94	160	77	129	216	76	128	216	79	126	210
BW	±5.571	±10	±20	±5.324	±10	±20	±5.914	±10	±20	±5.898	±10	±20

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01
SEs clustered at MC level.

A.4 Additional Tables

Table A8: Summary Statistics for Key Variables, Sample of Voting MCs Matched to Census Data

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Median
Foreign Born MC	852	0.03	0.18	0
Parents Foreign Born	783	0.38	0.73	0.00
Grandparents Foreign Born	505	1.70	1.81	1.00
Immigration Index	505	0.76	0.94	0.25
At Least One Foreign Born Parent	783	0.23	0.42	0.00
At Least One Foreign Born Grandparent	534	0.55	0.50	1.00
All Foreign Born Parents	783	0.15	0.36	0.00
All Foreign Born Grandparents	505	0.34	0.47	0.00
Surname Foreign Born MC	847	0.09	0.12	0.06
Surname Parents Foreign Born	847	0.48	0.46	0.35
Surname Grandparents Foreign Born	845	1.23	1.10	0.97
Democrat	852	0.45	0.50	0
Republican	852	0.55	0.50	1
Other Party	852	0.005	0.07	0
House	852	0.68	0.47	1
Nonwhite	769	0.00	0.00	0.00
Northeast	852	0.27	0.45	0
Midwest	852	0.30	0.46	0
West	852	0.16	0.37	0
South	852	0.27	0.45	0
CD Foreign Born Pop.	843	122,018.30	335,141.30	26,397.00
Age (Last Obs.)	852	56.24	10.84	56.5
Tenure (Last Obs.)	852	8.37	8.21	6

Table A9: Summary Statistics for Key Variables, Sample of MCs Matched to Census Data, 64th–91st Congress

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Median
Foreign Born MC	2,915	0.04	0.19	0.00
Parents Foreign Born	2,660	0.42	0.76	0.00
Grandparents Foreign Born	1,569	1.87	1.83	2.00
Immigration Index	1,569	0.87	0.98	0.50
At Least One Foreign Born Parent	2,661	0.26	0.44	0.00
At Least One Foreign Born Grandparent	1,694	0.60	0.49	1.00
All Foreign Born Parents	2,660	0.17	0.37	0.00
All Foreign Born Grandparents	1,569	0.38	0.49	0.00
Surname Foreign Born MC	2,909	0.09	0.11	0.06
Surname Parents Foreign Born	2,909	0.47	0.45	0.35
Surname Grandparents Foreign Born	2,906	1.23	1.10	0.98
Democrat	2,916	0.52	0.50	1
Republican	2,916	0.47	0.50	0
Other Party	2,916	0.01	0.10	0
House	2,916	0.82	0.38	1
Nonwhite	2,596	0.003	0.06	0.00
Northeast	2,916	0.28	0.45	0
Midwest	2,916	0.32	0.47	0
West	2,916	0.12	0.33	0
South	2,916	0.28	0.45	0
CD Foreign Born Pop.	2,813	98,982.31	294,168.90	24,631.83
Age (Last Obs.)	2,915	55.95	11.31	56.00
Tenure (Last Obs.)	2,916	9.39	7.67	6

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