

# “Descended from Immigrants and Revolutionists”\*: How Family Immigration History Shapes Representation in Congress<sup>†</sup>

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## Abstract

Does recent immigrant lineage influence the legislative behavior of members of Congress on immigration policy? We examine the relationship between the immigrant background of legislators (i.e., the generational distance from immigration) and legislative behavior, focusing on roll-call votes for landmark immigration legislation and congressional speech on the floor. Legislators more proximate to the immigrant experience tend to support more permissive immigration legislation. Legislators with recent immigration backgrounds also speak more often about immigration in Congress, though the size of immigrant constituencies in their districts accounts for a larger share of this effect. A regression discontinuity design on close elections, which addresses selection bias concerns and holds district composition constant, confirms that legislators with recent immigrant backgrounds tend to support pro-immigration legislation. Finally, we demonstrate how a common immigrant identity can break down along narrower ethnic lines in cases where restrictive legislation targets specific places of origin. Our findings illustrate the important role of immigrant identity in legislative behavior and help illuminate the legislative dynamics of present-day immigration policy.

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\*Franklin Delano Roosevelt, April 21, 1938. Speech to the Daughters of the American Revolution.

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## Introduction

Descriptive representation hinges on identity. When “representatives are [...] typical of the larger class of persons whom they represent” (Mansbridge 1999; Birch 2002), this shared identity can help dictate how constituents evaluate their representatives (Gay 2002), how representatives respond to constituents (Butler and Broockman 2011; Broockman 2014), and how constituent preferences are translated into policy (Bratton and Ray 2002). While scholars have both critiqued and extolled descriptive representation as it pertains to observable or self-identified characteristics, such as gender or race (Swers 1998, 2002; Swain 1995; Cameron, Epstein and O’Halloran 1996; Washington 2012), evaluating other characteristics proves more challenging. This is particularly true for immigrant identity. Scholars have characterized the immigrant experience as a central component of American national identity, drawing on it in developing concepts such as “incorporationism” or “cultural pluralism” (Schildkraut 2014; Kallen 1924). In research describing conversations about political representation, the notion of an overarching, common “identity as immigrants emerged [...] strongly and consistently” for people from a variety of immigrant backgrounds (Schildkraut 2013a). However, it is not clear *a priori* that elected representatives who have immigrated from different source countries and differ in religion, class and culture would form a coherent group or have aligned preferences on important policy issues. In this paper, we evaluate the role of immigrant identity among representatives elected to Congress. For whom and under what conditions is it salient? When does it influence policy preferences (on immigration policy, for example) and when does it not?

Over 99% of the population of the United States today is descended from immigrants or enslaved people of African origin.<sup>1</sup> A large majority of Americans have their own personal or family story of immigration, and members of Congress (MCs) often cite their own familial immigration history when discussing immigration policy (Swarns 2006; Burden 2007, p.18). And yet, a common immigrant identity that submerges intragroup boundaries does not always extend to the realm of immigration policy, where support for restrictive immigration legislation has been commonplace

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<sup>1</sup>The 2017 American Community Survey reported a population of 3.2 million Native Americans, Alaskan Natives, and Native Hawaiians or other Pacific Islanders. See U.S. Census Bureau, 2017 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates.

throughout the 20th and 21st centuries in Congress (Tichenor 2002), and aggregate public opinion has often aligned with these policies or supported even more extreme restrictions (Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014).

This paper studies the familial histories of members of the U.S. Congress to address several key questions about representation and immigrant background. What manner of immigrant background prompts legislators to hold systematically different views on immigration policy? Does electing a legislator with an immigrant background enhance representation of immigrant groups? Does having foreign-born parents or grandparents contribute to an overarching, common immigrant identity or instead do narrower categories such as country of origin or ethnicity better explain legislative behavior?

To answer these questions, we analyze the role of immigrant background and family history on two canonical forms of legislative behavior for MCs: legislative voting and speeches on the floor of Congress. Because immigrant identity is complex and hard to infer, we use historical census data from 1900–1940 to directly observe the family backgrounds of lawmakers in the 64th–91st Congresses. This approach allows us to examine the countries of origin of the lawmakers themselves, their parents, and, in many cases, their grandparents.<sup>2</sup> While a relatively low share of MCs are immigrants themselves (see Figure 1), a significant number have foreign-born parents or grandparents.<sup>3</sup> For example, in the 115th Congress, only 11 representatives (2.5%) and one senator were immigrants.<sup>4</sup> However, 11.8% of representatives and 14.6% of senators had at least one foreign-born parent.<sup>5</sup> In the first half of the 20th century, the share of representatives with a

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<sup>2</sup>To enable us to link this potentially noisy historical data, we use the machine learning algorithm developed in Feigenbaum (2016), which learns from the links made by hand by carefully trained census linkers to produce links at scale that are replicable. We match MCs to their census records from this period and we identify key elements of their immigrant background. Individuals' names as enumerated in the US Federal Census are restricted for 72 years following the census for privacy reasons, so we stop with the 1940 census, released publicly in 2012.

<sup>3</sup>See Lawson (1957) for a statistical summary of foreign-born MCs through 1949. Our numbers differ slightly, due to our efforts to exclude MCs who were born abroad to American parents. For example, Franklin Delano Roosevelt Jr., who represented the 20th District of New York from 1949 to 1955, was born in New Brunswick, Canada. However, as an American citizen from birth, we do not code him as foreign born.

<sup>4</sup>Countries of origin are Mexico (3), Cuba (2), India (2), Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Taiwan, Japan and Vietnam.

<sup>5</sup>We were able to identify the country of origin for the parents of 98% of the MCs in the 115th Congress. We cross-referenced our numbers for the 115th Congress with Geiger (2019) and found agreement on the vast majority of cases with a few minor discrepancies such as the birthplace of Nancy Pelosi's mother (Italy) and Earl Blumeneur's father (Canada).




Figure 1: **Foreign-Born MCs Over Time.** The gray box highlights the main period of our analysis.

foreign-born parent reached as high as 30 percent of the chamber.

We develop hypotheses about immigrant background and descriptive representation based on a simple model of legislative decision-making: MCs weigh some combination of their personal views along with the preferences of their geographic constituency, reelection or support constituency, and national party (Mayhew 1974; Fenno 1978; Levitt 1996). A background characteristic such as familial immigration history is relevant because it may shape MCs’ policy views. The legislative behavior that we observe reveals information about this process — particularly, when and for what outcomes immigrant background matters most. The degree to which differences in immigrant background translate into measurable differences in legislative behavior should depend on factors that interact with family history to shape MCs’ views, including the political context, the visibility of the MC’s identity, and constituent demands for a “descriptive representative” with an immigrant background (Mansbridge 1999).

We hypothesize that less distance from the immigrant experience increases the probability that lawmakers view themselves as representatives of immigrant communities; in turn, this perspective leads lawmakers to hold more permissive views on immigration policy and to allot more attention to immigrant constituencies and immigration policy in general — even when holding constant the composition of the lawmakers’ constituency.<sup>6</sup> We also hypothesize that characteristics visibly identifying a lawmaker with an immigrant community complement this alignment of

<sup>6</sup>We think these outcomes occur both due to selection (i.e., immigrant communities selecting MCs with immigrant backgrounds who have demonstrated interest in issues relevant to immigrant communities) and due to responding to incentives after entering office.

descriptive with substantive representation. Thus, a surname indicating a more recent immigration history will increase the probability of a lawmaker representing the interests of immigrant groups, independent of *actual* immigration history.

We find that MCs with family histories of immigration (1) cast pro-immigration votes — against restrictive bills or in favor of expanding immigration — at higher rates; and, (2) give more floor speeches about immigration. We observe decreasing effect sizes as one’s generational distance from the immigrant experience increases. When controlling for the composition of an MC’s district (i.e., foreign-born population), the effect of immigration history on roll-call voting persists and MCs appear to weight each factor equally; for immigration-related speech, however, district composition explains a greater share of variation than does immigrant background. This difference in results might suggest that any MC may be willing to engage in some forms of position taking on immigration but only those with an immigrant background will take on costly actions such as breaking with their party on a crucial roll-call vote. Second, we use a regression discontinuity design to estimate the effects of electing an MC with a family immigration history on voting on immigration bills. This approach avoids concerns over why some districts elect representatives with (or without) immigrant family histories and holds constant the MC’s geographic constituency. These results confirm our main finding, suggesting that districts quasi-randomly assigned MCs with family histories of immigration voted in favor of expansive immigration policies at higher rates. All together, these findings illustrate that electing legislators with foreign-born parents or grandparents has more than just symbolic consequences for representation: these MCs not only give voice to the issue of immigration policy, but also stake out more permissive policy positions overall — positions broadly in line with the tendency of citizens who are foreign born or who have foreign-born parents to support such permissive policies (Mayda 2006; O’Rourke and Sinnott 2006; Schildkraut 2013a).

Next, we study the conditions under which lawmakers tend to place greater weight on immigrant background when making immigration policy decisions. MCs with surnames denoting an immigrant background (based on census records) support more permissive immigration policy, holding actual immigrant background constant. We observe significant differences in the impor-

tance of different family members on a lawmaker's behavior: for MCs in our sample (almost exclusively male), the origins of their father and father's father have larger effects than those of their mother and other grandparents. We also observe how levels of support for permissive immigration policy can break down along narrower lines of ethnic identity. When faced with legislation restricting immigration based on national origin, MCs with an immigrant background but from nations unaffected by the restrictions supported restrictive policies at a higher rate than their colleagues with family origins in targeted countries. Thus, while MCs with family histories of immigration share a common tendency towards permissive immigration policy, under some conditions it can be subsumed by a preference for a narrower group identity based on national origin.

Finally, we show that mechanisms similar to those we identify in this historical data (1) persist in present-day politics, and (2) accord with the polarized state of current immigration politics. Evaluating the relationship between familial immigration history and recent immigration votes (while controlling for political party), MCs who are the children and grandchildren of immigrants still tend to oppose restrictive legislation. The explanatory power of political party for positions taken on immigration has increased greatly over time (Gimpel and Edwards 1999; Abrajano and Hajnal 2017), but immigrant identity continues to also play a critical role. We also document sharp declines in the number of Republicans with recent immigrant family histories; given the relationship (both historical and contemporary) between family history and views on immigration, this shift in the composition of the parties reflects the sharp differences in immigration policy stances across parties in the contemporary Congress.

The relationship between race and immigrant identity also marks a complex point of comparison between our period of study and today's Congress. Most of the immigrant MCs in our historical sample are white, echoing both racial power dynamics in American politics and the fact that immigration to the US from most non-European countries was nearly impossible for the late 19th and early 20th centuries.<sup>7</sup> But as scholars (for example, Painter (2011) and Roediger (2006))

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<sup>7</sup>The shares from Europe were over 80% from 1850 to 1950, with immigrants from Canada making up another substantial share (Abramitzky and Boustan 2017). Immigration to the US from Asia was banned entirely for much of the period.

have documented extensively, the concept of race and whiteness in the early 20th century was contested.<sup>8</sup> American society, and lawmakers, did not always view immigrants, especially those from southern and eastern Europe, as belonging to the same racial group as white Americans. Thus, while the analysis of historical legislative behavior in our study may not speak directly to the racial dynamics at play in today's immigration debates, it would also be a mistake to think that ideas about race had no bearing on the immigration policies applied to European immigrants in the early and mid 20th Century.

This paper's findings add to and extend a robust literature on descriptive representation and its effects on legislative activity and policy. For example, Swers (1998) finds that women MCs vote differently than men on women's issues, controlling for other major factors including party and ideology, and Green (2003) finds mixed results when analyzing differences in voting by gender among MCs from the South. On race, Baker and Cook (2005) find that black MCs better represent the interests of black constituents than do white MCs, even when there is not an electoral benefit. Preuhs and Hero (2011) find that minority lawmakers employ different cues when making decisions, providing different representation than whites when politics have a racial dimension. Overall, these works suggest that MCs who are political minorities represent their constituencies differently — a finding echoed by our results on the effects of immigrant background.<sup>9</sup>

Our key contribution, and a departure from most literature in this area, is to add unprecedented breadth and depth to these accounts of descriptive representation by unbundling immigrant background into component parts. We let group boundaries vary in our assessment of immigrant history: considering its temporal aspects (generational distance), visibility (surname), composition (which ancestors matter), as well as subregional identities (and when these are/are not salient). Our approach recognizes and tries to account for critiques such as the one made by Sen and Wasow (2016) — who highlight the difficulties in making causal inferences about fundamentally immutable characteristics such as race, ethnicity and gender — by including analyses at

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<sup>8</sup>So too in Congress. See Tichenor (2002) for detailed accounts of how Congress relied on racial tropes and discredited pseudo-science from groups such as the Immigration Restriction League when formulating immigration policy.

<sup>9</sup>A second thread of the literature has assessed the *value* of descriptive representation (Mansbridge 1999) for women (Hansen 1997; Swers 1998; Atkeson and Carrillo 2007) and ethnic and racial minorities (Gay 2002; Whitby 2007; Hayes and Hibbing 2017; Tate 2018; Casellas and Wallace 2015) as well group preferences for descriptive representatives (Schildkraut 2013*b*, 2017).

the district level where variation in immigrant background occurs at the level of candidates (with or without such backgrounds) in close elections.

Finally, our paper connects with a line of work focusing on how individual legislator backgrounds and characteristics affect behavior. A substantial literature suggests that demographics, personal characteristics, experience and ideology are important factors in political decision making and help explain differences in vote choice between legislators with similar measures of political ideology. Burden (2007) argues that the backgrounds and experiences of legislators play an important role in their vote choices. Lawmaker race (Canon 1999), gender (Fridkin and Kenney 2014*a,b*), economic class (Carnes 2012, 2013), and children's gender (Washington 2009) all play a significant role in legislator vote choice and behavior.

## **Immigration Legislation and Speech**

Since the First Congress, legislators have grappled with immigration and citizenship policies. These policies, and specifically legislator roll-call votes and floor speech, provide the basis for our measures of legislative behavior related to immigration policy. Evaluating these outcomes requires some background on immigration policy in Congress. The Naturalization Act of 1790 marked the first comprehensive immigration policy set forth by Congress and, as did later acts of Congress, balanced naturalization of some citizens — free Whites who met certain residence and character requirements — with exclusion of others — American Indians and enslaved peoples to name but a few. In the two centuries since, immigration policy has not moved linearly towards more openness. Rather, U.S. immigration policy can be characterized as a sequence of restrictive and expansive policy regimes, responding to changes in the political environment over time (Tichenor 2002). In this framework, institutional “veto points” and “opportunity points” help structure the processes from which immigration policies emerge. Changes in party systems may yield structural advantages (or disadvantages) for political actors; coalitions spanning party and ideology may develop in response to existing government institutions and policies; and, international events may influence the opportunities for policy change available to domestic actors. Yet, while this historical-institutionalist approach does well to examine the fundamental *institutional*



conditions that help shape policy opportunities and obstacles, it has less to say about the characteristics that determine the views of key decision-makers in the first place. For example, the largely restrictive and exclusionary immigration policies coming out of Congress in the first quarter of the 20th century, capping all immigration and favoring immigrants from Northern Europe, can be explained in part by veto and opportunity points but also by a restrictionist outlook that emerged among political actors.

The size and scope of immigration to the U.S. has been determined by three main factors historically: the costs of migration, the benefits to the migrants, and American policy (Abramitzky and Boustan 2017). As these three factors have changed over time, total flows and the selection of immigrants has changed. The Age of Mass Migration — dating from the late nineteenth century to the immigration restriction acts of 1917, 1921, and 1924 — was made possible by falling costs of trans-Atlantic transportation, relatively open border policies, and the industrializing and urbanizing American economy (Abramitzky and Boustan 2017). This historical moment did not just coincide with an increase in the number of immigrants, but also a significant shift in their source countries. As Abramitzky and Boustan (2017) document, in 1850, more than 90% of the foreign-born in the U.S. came from Northern and Western Europe, mostly Great Britain, Ireland, and Germany. Seventy years later, the foreign-born population in the U.S. was split between old and new Europe, 45% from “old” sending countries and 41% from “new”.

We identified key immigration bills in the 1915–1971 period (the 64th through 91st Congresses) using Stathis’ (2014) compilation of landmark legislation and key bills identified by Tichenor (2002). We selected this time period for two reasons: (1) this period spans most major immigration bills of the 20th century; and, (2) members serving in this period were likely to be identifiable in the 1900–1940 censuses.<sup>10</sup> We then identified the final roll-call vote in each chamber for each bill — either the vote on final passage or the vote on the conference vote — using the VoteView database (Lewis et al. 2017). Several bills were dropped because final votes on the bill were not recorded

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<sup>10</sup>Goldin (1994) studies the political economy of immigration restriction in a slightly earlier period, focusing in particular on the anti immigrant literacy test bills passed out of the House 5 times from 1897 to 1917 and out of the Senate 4 times. These bills were vetoed by presidents of both parties. Goldin also explores the votes in the House and Senate to override the presidential vetoes. She finds important district level economic and demographic variables at play: districts with slower wage growth or fewer immigrants were more likely to vote against immigration. Goldin’s analysis, however, does not extend to the characteristics of the MCs.

and, in a handful of cases, the final vote occurred to override a presidential veto.<sup>11</sup> Table 1 lists the eight bills that we included in our analysis. These bills represent major changes to U.S. immigration policy during the mid-20th century. Five of the bills restricted immigration, and three increased immigration or reduced restrictions.

The Immigration Act of 1917 was the first major bill designed to restrict European immigration into the United States that ultimately went into law. Passed by Congress over Woodrow Wilson's veto at the end of the 64th Congress, the act imposed a literacy test on European immigrants, and barred immigrants from Asian countries. The Immigration Quota Act (also called the Emergency Immigration Act of 1921 or Immigration Act of 1921) capped the number of immigrants and set quotas for immigration based on the number of people of each nationality already residing in the United States. The Immigration Act of 1924 (the Johnson-Reed Act) further lowered the number of immigrants allowed each year and heavily favored Northern European immigrants over those from Southern or Eastern Europe.<sup>12</sup> All three bills passed each chamber by large margins.

A second cluster of immigration acts followed World War II. The Displaced Persons Act of 1948 and Refugee Relief Act of 1953 temporarily increased the number of immigrants admitted due to the vast number of refugees in Europe after the war.<sup>13</sup> The McCarran-Walter Immigration and Nationality Act, passed by Congress in 1952 over the veto of Harry Truman, reorganized and consolidated immigration laws while preserving strict nationality quotas limiting immigration. Finally, the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 overhauled the immigration system once again, eliminating the nationality-based quota system and replacing it with a multi-category system that prioritized special skills or having relatives already residing in the United States. The long-term effect of the bill was to end the preference for Northern European immigrants and allow for increased immigration from the rest of the world. Abramitzky and Boustan (2017) suggest that the 1965 bill led to a new era of Mass Migration, albeit with very different source countries than the previous one.

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<sup>11</sup>Veto override votes occurred for the Immigration Act of 1917, the McCarran Internal Security Act and the McCarran-Walter Immigration and Nationality Act.

<sup>12</sup>For a detailed account of the politics of immigration reform, see Tichenor (2002).

<sup>13</sup>The House of Representatives did not hold a final roll-call vote on the Displace Persons Act of 1948; we only include the Senate vote in our analysis.

Table 1: Immigration Bills

Congress	Bill	Roll Call #	Pro Immigrant	Yea*	Nay*	
64	HR10384	Immigration Act of 1917				
		House	121	Nay	309	117
		Senate	324	Nay	65	22
67	HR4075	Immigration Quota Act				
		House	21	Nay	285	41
		Senate	21	Nay	90	2
68	HR7995	Immigration Act of 1924 (Johnson-Reed Act)				
		House	90	Nay	319	72
		Senate	126	Nay	72	11
80	S2242	Displaced Persons Act of 1948				
		House	N/A (no final roll-call vote)			
		Senate	198	Yea	75	17
81	HR9490 S4037	McCarran Internal Security Act				
		House	264	Nay	302	56
		Senate	444	Nay	77	12
82	HR5678	McCarran-Walter Immigration and Nationality Act				
		House	165	Nay	284	116
		Senate	298	Nay	60	31
83	HR6481	Refugee Relief Act of 1953				
		House	64	Yea	225	189
		Senate	82	Yea	63	30
89	HR2580	Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965				
		House	177	Yea	330	79
		Senate	232	Yea	80	20

\*Yeas and Nays include announced votes and paired votes.

Our second primary outcome is congressional speech for the 64th–91st Congresses. To measure speech on immigration, we drew upon speeches recorded in the *Congressional Record* and assembled in Gentzkow, Shapiro and Taddy (2019). These authors also construct keywords to identify speeches on 22 substantive topics, including immigration. We use these topics and also

construct an additional topic that we term “family” so that we can observe instances when MCs speak about immigration and family concurrently.<sup>14</sup> Gentzkow, Shapiro and Taddy (2019) report the full details on the processing and construction of the congressional speech data.

## Identifying Immigration Background

To estimate the effects of family immigration background on MC vote choice, we use individual-level data from the 1900 through 1940 U.S. Censuses. We begin by constructing a new linked sample, locating MCs in the 1900, 1910, 1920, 1930, and 1940 Federal censuses, based on the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) complete count censuses (Ruggles et al. 2010). In this section, we detail the complete count census data and the congressional data, we document the machine learning approach to census linking, and we summarize what the census data says about MCs.

To start, we identify all MCs, serving between 1915 and 1971 (the 64th through 91st Congresses). To link these MCs back to the census, we extract their full names, dates of birth, and states of birth from the *Biographical Directory of the United States Congress*.<sup>15</sup> For members who were born abroad (and are consequently very difficult to match to census records), we search for their family backgrounds manually and record the citizenship status of their parents (and grandparents when possible) directly. Members born abroad to at least one U.S. citizen parent are not considered immigrants, as they are citizens from birth.

Our choice of sample is driven partially by data constraints — which MCs are in the right cohorts to link to the available complete count censuses — but we also cover a period well-suited to study how immigrant background might affect political representation. During the Age of Mass Migration, the ancestral stock of the US changed dramatically and Congress considered a number of severe immigration restrictions in the 1910s and 1920s, as well as in the mid-century when concerns about Communism led to a reshaping of the nation’s immigration policy.

The complete 1900, 1910, 1920, 1930, and 1940 Federal Censuses have recently been digitized by a joint effort of Ancestry.com and the Minnesota Population Center. The restricted-access ver-

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<sup>14</sup>Keywords to identify speech about immigration and family are listed in Appendix A.5.

<sup>15</sup><http://bioguide.congress.gov/biosearch/biosearch.asp>

sion of the data, managed by IPUMS (Ruggles et al. 2010) and housed at the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), includes transcribed names that enable us to link to external data sources at the individual-level. We search for each member in each of the decennial Federal Censuses from 1900 to 1940.

Though census questions vary a bit year to year, they nonetheless provide a wealth of information for each person we can link. For studying family immigration history, we focus on two questions asked. First, all people enumerated in 1900, 1910, 1920, and 1930 were asked their place of birth and their mother's and father's places of birth.<sup>16</sup> Because members of the same households are linked in the enumeration, when we observe MCs as children, we can also observe the place of birth of all their grandparents, using their mothers' and fathers' answers to their own parents' places of birth question.

We link all members to themselves in 1900, 1910, 1920, 1930, or 1940 with the linking method described in Feigenbaum (2016).<sup>17</sup> Linking historical records is complicated by the lack of a unique identifier. Instead, we rely on variables like name, place of birth, and date of birth, which should not change over time.<sup>18</sup> Still, noise in our data makes exact matching — requiring an MC to report his or her first and last name, year of birth, and state of birth exactly the same in the census as in our congressional data — impractical and potentially biased.<sup>19</sup> Hand linking records is likely the method most able to distinguish between subtle errors in two records identifying the same person or distinguishing two different people. But it is not practical to apply hand linking to large samples and — even with clear instructions on how to make links — not replicable. Instead, we

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<sup>16</sup>In 1940, the mother's and father's places of birth question was only a sample line question, asked only of 2 people on each 40 person census page.

<sup>17</sup>In a recent review of historical census linking methods, Abramitzky et al. (2019) finds that the most commonly used methods trace out a frontier, trading off false positives and false negatives in linking. The Feigenbaum method, by replicating the hand links a trained researcher would make, does particularly well at minimizing false negatives or records for which a true match exists but is not recovered. Because we link from high quality source data (the Congressional Biographical Directories including middle names and exact dates of birth) and link into *five* censuses, we believe we are creating a linked sample that is unlikely to have many false positives as well. Abramitzky et al. (2019) also note that choice of exact historical linking method, among those commonly used by recent economic historians working with the complete count census, tends not to affect research conclusions.

<sup>18</sup>Our use of last names in the linking of course complicates matching women who might be expected — particularly in the early 20th century — to change names upon marriage. However, during this time period, very few women served in Congress. Only 2% of the MCs in our sample were women.

<sup>19</sup>The set of people who report all their information exactly the same census to census is *not* a random sample of the enumerated people or congress members.

apply a machine learning approach, training an algorithm to learn to make matches based on a smaller sample of carefully linked data. The algorithm learns from the human how to trade off errors in first names or last names or how large a penalty to apply to potential matches with one or two years off in the year of birth.<sup>20</sup> A priori, the costs of such errors are unknown, so the approach makes the implicit rules used by a human linker explicit. The algorithm makes use of a wide range of record linkage features to build predictions for matches including Jaro-Winkler string distance in first and last name, absolute difference in year of birth, Soundex agreement on first and last name, agreement on first and last characters of first and last names, as well as name commonness and state of birth.

Overall, we link 96% of the MCs in our study sample to at least one of the four decennial censuses. Our match rates into each of the four censuses are all above 66%, peaking at 75% matching into the 1910 census.<sup>21</sup> The true positive rate is 91% in cross-validation: this suggests that the linking algorithm is very efficient, able to identify nearly all of the matches that a human trainer would have made, but doing so at scale and with clearly defined linking rules. In addition, our cross-validation implies that the linking algorithm makes the same choice as a careful and well-trained hand linker more than 85% of the time, as our precision or positive predictive value is 85.2%.

We present three examples of MCs from the linked data in Table 2. Former Speaker of the House Carl Albert was born in Oklahoma in 1908, to a mother from Texas and a father from Missouri. All four of his grandparents were born in the United States as well. Clinton Anderson, a former MC, Senator, and Secretary of Agriculture, was born in 1895 in South Dakota, to a mother from South Dakota and a father who immigrated from Sweden. Using the census linkage we find that his maternal grandmother was born in Illinois, while his maternal grandfather was a Swedish

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<sup>20</sup>Errors in years of birth may be surprising, but they are very common. For one, censuses record age, not date or even year of birth. Because censuses are taken on different days in each wave (June 1 in 1900, April 15 in 1910, January 1 in 1920, and April 1 in 1930 and 1940), these ages are noisy. With our data on MCs, we observe birthdate exactly, so we can calculate expected age as of the census. However, censuses were taken by enumerators asking questions of one respondent per household, and ages were often estimated or heaped on the nearest round number or simply misstated. In addition, the transcription process for age may be especially noisy because, unlike names or places of birth, there are no context clues to help a transcriber determine between a poorly written 2 or 3, for example.

<sup>21</sup>Consistent with the machine learning procedure, these match rates also replicate the match rates of our human trainer in each census.

immigrant. Since his father was an immigrant, we cannot find his paternal grandparents in the census data, but we assume that they were born in Sweden as well. Finally, former Speaker of the House Joseph Martin, Jr. was born in Massachusetts in 1884 to Irish immigrant parents. We cannot find his grandparents in the census data because his parents were immigrants, so we assume that they were born in Ireland as well. These examples highlight the important demographic diversity contained in immigration backgrounds. While all three are white men who served in Congress at the same time, their immigration backgrounds are very different.

Table 2: Examples of Family Background from Census Data

	Carl Albert	Clinton Anderson	Joseph Martin, Jr.
Birthplace	Oklahoma	South Dakota	Massachusetts
Mother	Texas	South Dakota	Ireland
Father	Missouri	Sweden	Ireland
Maternal Grandparents	Missouri Kansas	Illinois Sweden	Ireland Ireland
Paternal Grandparents	Missouri Texas	Sweden Sweden	Ireland Ireland

We take several approaches to measuring immigration history, our key variable of interest. In addition to measuring an MC's own place of birth, we also examine the number of foreign-born parents an MC has, ranging from 0 to 2. As Table 3 reports, the average MC in our sample had 0.38 parents born abroad. We also measure the number of foreign-born grandparents (ranging from 0 to 4). On average, an MC in our sample had 1.7 foreign-born grandparents. By necessity, any empirical analysis we run that includes foreign-born grandparents will have a smaller sample because we could only successfully count nativity of grandparents when we observed an MC residing in the home of his or her parents.<sup>22</sup> This form of missingness occurs most frequently in the early years of our sample, particularly among older MCs who were not living with their parents during the 1900 or 1910 censuses. Looking across the sample of voting MCs as a whole, 15

<sup>22</sup>This is because the nativity of grandparents is recovered from questions about mother and father's place of birth asked of the MCs mother and father. Also, if the nativity of one grandparent was missing, we made the assumption that the missing grandparent had the same odds as the non-missing grandparents of being foreign born.

percent of MCs had both parents foreign born and 34 percent of MCs had all grandparents foreign born.

Perhaps surprisingly, we observe little difference in immigration histories across party in our sample of votes. Table 3 shows that in the House slightly more Republicans than Democrats had foreign-born parents and grandparents. The differences across party are equally small in the Senate. On the other hand, we do observe notable differences across region: Southern MCs from both parties had by far the lowest rates of foreign-born parents and grandparents, and Democrats from the Northeast exhibited greater numbers of foreign-born parents and grandparents than Republicans from the Northeast. We have also checked whether over-time variation masks broader differences in immigration histories between the parties. When examining the House on its own there does appear to be some imbalance over time, with more Republican MCs having family histories of immigration in the early years of our sample and the trend reversing in the later years of our sample.

Table 3: Family Immigration History for MCs by Party and Chamber

Chamber	Party	N	MC	Parents	Grand- parents	At Least One Parent	At Least One Grand- parent	All Parents	All Grand- parents
Both	All	852	0.03	0.38	1.70	0.23	0.55	0.15	0.34
House	Dem	234	0.03	0.39	1.51	0.23	0.48	0.16	0.30
House	Rep	343	0.04	0.44	1.85	0.27	0.60	0.18	0.36
Senate	Dem	149	0.01	0.27	1.59	0.17	0.51	0.10	0.32
Senate	Rep	122	0.04	0.31	1.75	0.20	0.57	0.11	0.37

Overall, we have the measure of foreign-born grandparents for slightly under 60% of the sample of voting members, and we have the measure of foreign-born parents for 93% of voting members.<sup>23</sup> For those MCs without any missing data on parents or grandparents, we constructed an “Immigration Index,” designed to summarize the immigration history of an MC with one number. This index consists of a weighted average across place of own birth, parents’ birth and grandpar-

<sup>23</sup>Appendix Table A1 displays summary statistics for variables based on census linkages for former MCs who cast a key immigration vote. Appendix Table A2 reports a similar summary for *all* MCs matched to census records in the 64th to 91st Congresses. For these tables and all other analyses, we have included MCs who were foreign-born non-citizens but excluded MCs who were themselves foreign born as citizens (such as those born to Ambassadors or military personnel abroad). We code foreign-born non-citizen MCs as having foreign-born parents and grandparents. These comprise only 3% of the sample.



ents' birth.<sup>24</sup>

We also make use of surnames as a proxy for family immigration history. To translate names into quantitative variables, we take the 90 to 140 million people enumerated in each decennial census and calculate — for each surname — the share foreign born, the mean number of foreign-born parents, the mean number of foreign-born grandparents and the average Immigration Index. We will refer to these surname-based measures of immigration history as *Surname Scores*. We performed each surname calculation by census region (i.e., Northeast, Midwest, South and West) since the same surname can denote meaningfully different immigration histories depending on region of the country. We then matched an individual's surname to the Surname Scores calculated for the census preceding their election to Congress and the relevant region.

Surname-based measures are useful for individuals for whom we have less available information. This includes older MCs who we are unlikely to find residing at home with their parents. In addition, it is extremely difficult to census link failed candidates for Congress: for these challengers, we rarely observe either year of birth or place of birth, two variables key to census linking. Surname scores allow us to proxy for immigration histories of these challengers. And, in subsequent analyses, they provide a measure for public perceptions or visibility of immigrant background since they report the average immigration background for an individual based on surname alone.

## Roll-Call Vote Analysis

We have hypothesized that personal immigration experiences influence roll-call votes for MCs. To test this, we evaluate the relationship between an MC's immigration history and vote choice on several key 20th Century immigration votes. Specifically, we employ a model of the form

$$y_{ib} = \alpha + \delta \cdot \text{Immigration History}_i + X \cdot \beta + \gamma_b + \epsilon_{ib} \quad (1)$$

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<sup>24</sup>Immigration Index =  $\mathbb{1}(\text{MC Foreign Born}) + \frac{1}{2} \cdot (\# \text{ Parents Foreign Born}) + \frac{1}{4} \cdot (\# \text{ Grandparents Foreign Born})$ , and ranges from 0 (all grandparents, parents, and MC born in the United States) to 3 (MC foreign born).

where  $i$  indexes individual MCs and  $b$  indexes bills.  $X$  is a matrix of covariates including a measure of foreign-born population in a state/district, indicators for chamber, party, region, age and tenure. Our main specification pools across bills and therefore also includes  $\gamma_b$ , a bill fixed effect. Further, this approach allows us to take subsamples of the data by bill, chamber and expected vote choice to evaluate heterogeneity in the effects of immigration experience on vote choice.

For each of the bills listed in Table 1, we determined whether a “yea” or “nay” vote best aligned with a political position generally favoring a less restrictive immigration policy.<sup>25</sup> We coded MCs who cast pro immigrant votes in this direction with a 1 and those who did not with a 0. We excluded MCs who abstained from voting from the sample.<sup>26</sup>

We find a strong relationship between immigration history — measured by foreign-born MCs, number of foreign-born parents and number of foreign-born grandparents — and pro-immigration votes, as we report in Table 4. We use Equation 1 to estimate the relationship between immigration history and vote choices on immigration policy across our range of congressional immigration votes. Each model uses a different measure of family immigration status. Model 1 reports the effect of the MC being an immigrant (foreign born) themselves; model 3 reports effect of the MC having a foreign both parent, model 5 reports the effect of the MC having a foreign-born grandparent, and model 7 uses our immigration index.

With no controls other than a bill fixed effect, we find that a foreign-born MC has a more than 25 percentage point higher rate of casting a pro vote; having one foreign-born parent is associated with a more than 16 percentage point increase; and having one foreign-born grandparent is associated with a more than 8 percentage point increase. In each case, we can reject the null hypothesis of no effect at standard levels of statistical significance ( $p < 0.01$ ). The advantage of such a sparse specification is that we do not have to worry about bias induced by controlling for post-treatment variables. We next include a host of control variables known to be associated with roll-call vote choice including foreign-born population, party, age, tenure and region. Including controls for party and foreign-born population deserves particular attention. One concern that

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<sup>25</sup>Yeas and Nays in the regression analyses include announced votes and paired votes.

<sup>26</sup>Especially in this era missed votes occurred frequently and were due more to travel and scheduling limitations than strategic absences.

Table 4: Immigration History and MC Vote Choice: All Bills Pooled

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
MC Foreign Born	0.256*** (0.062)	0.120** (0.056)						
Parents Foreign Born			0.165*** (0.013)	0.078*** (0.011)				
Grandparents Foreign Born					0.085*** (0.006)	0.031*** (0.006)		
Immigration Index							0.169*** (0.013)	0.067*** (0.013)
log(CD Pop. Foreign)		0.044*** (0.006)		0.041*** (0.006)		0.043*** (0.008)		0.042*** (0.008)
Republican		-0.226*** (0.019)		-0.207*** (0.020)		-0.226*** (0.025)		-0.225*** (0.025)
Other Party		0.116 (0.121)		0.111 (0.120)		0.119 (0.133)		0.093 (0.129)
Northeast		0.148*** (0.020)		0.136*** (0.021)		0.145*** (0.026)		0.143*** (0.026)
South		-0.264*** (0.026)		-0.233*** (0.027)		-0.274*** (0.038)		-0.279*** (0.037)
West		-0.023 (0.024)		-0.015 (0.026)		0.031 (0.033)		0.031 (0.033)
Age		-0.011* (0.006)		-0.012* (0.007)		-0.004 (0.009)		-0.002 (0.009)
Age Sq.		0.0001 (0.0001)		0.0001 (0.0001)		0.00003 (0.0001)		0.00001 (0.0001)
Tenure		-0.003 (0.002)		-0.005* (0.002)		-0.007* (0.003)		-0.006* (0.003)
Tenure Sq.		0.00003 (0.0001)		0.0001 (0.0001)		0.0001 (0.0001)		0.0001 (0.0001)
Bill FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Chamber FE	no	yes	no	yes	no	yes	no	yes
N	3,448	3,384	3,203	3,141	2,037	1,994	2,037	1,994
R <sup>2</sup>	0.270	0.444	0.319	0.445	0.319	0.455	0.313	0.457

\* p < .1; \*\* p < .05; \*\*\* p < .01  
SEs clustered at MC level.

arises is that an individual MC's immigration history influences choice of party, and conditioning on this choice induces bias. While we cannot discount that possibility entirely, we think the effect of a marginal immigrant/non-immigrant grandparent likely does not strongly influence such a choice given that we have shown that the parties have roughly even rates of parent and grandparent foreign birth. With regard to a state or district's foreign-born population, one might worry that districts with a large share of foreign born residents both select representatives with immigrant backgrounds and select representatives that vote for expansive immigration policies. As a result, state or district composition might drive the positive correlations observed in Table 4. As one attempt to check for this possibility, we determined the number of foreign born residents of each MC's constituency (congressional districts for the House and states for the Senate).<sup>27</sup>

Columns 2, 4, 6 and 8 in Table 4 present the results with covariates. We continue to find a strong relationship between immigration history and pro-immigration votes. Controlling for other factors, we find that MCs with one foreign-born parent cast pro-immigration votes at a rate 8 percentage points higher than those with none. Similarly, an additional foreign-born grandparent increased pro-immigration voting rates by 3.1 percentage points. Importantly, these effect sizes obtain even when controlling for political party and foreign-born population. Thus, we observe these findings over and above whatever extent party identification determined one's position on immigration.

Across all models in Table 4, we find a positive and statistically significant effect of immigration experience on voting in favor of immigration in Congress. Furthermore, when we exclude foreign born MCs from the sample, and re-estimate the effect (for native-born MCs) of having a foreign-born parent or a foreign-born grandparent, we find essentially identical results to those in Table 4. This suggests that, because the coefficients decline by roughly half with each preceding generation's immigration history, the effect of immigration background on voting is similar for a foreign born MC, a US-born MC with two immigrant parents, and a US-born MC with four immigrant parents.

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<sup>27</sup>Note that the foreign-born residents variable correlates very highly with the number of native-born residents with foreign-born parents in a district as well. We include this covariate as a general proxy for constituencies with an immigrant background in the district.

Family history of immigration also helps us explain ideologically-surprising or “miscast” votes on immigration issues. Specifically, we examine bills where (1) an MC was predicted to vote pro immigration based on their ideological position (as measured by both dimensions of DW-NOMINATE) but instead voted anti immigration; and, (2) an MC was predicted to vote anti immigration but instead voted pro immigration. These “miscast” votes allow us to examine instances where immigration history led MCs to depart from what would be predicted by their overall political ideology. This approach moves beyond simply controlling for party, as in Table 4, which is useful because restrictionist ideologies cut across both parties, for example by bringing together Southern Democrats and some Western Republicans.

To implement this test, we divided our data into sub-samples: (1) Individuals predicted to cast a “pro” immigration vote; and, (2) individuals predicted to cast an “anti” immigration vote. Within each subsample, we then coded all individuals with a “miscast” vote with a 1 and those who voted according to expectations with a 0. Appendix Table A3 reports the results. In all cases, the direction of the effects accords with our expectations. First, immigration history predicts a reduced rate of diverging from pre-existing ideology when an MC is predicted to vote in favor of immigration. We estimate that being foreign born is associated with a reduction of 11 percentage points in the rates of casting an anti-immigration vote that departs from existing ideology; an additional foreign-born parent is associated with a reduction of 4 percentage points; and a one percentage point effect for additional foreign-born grandparents. We also observe a positive relationship between immigration history and casting a pro vote despite having an overall political ideology that would predict casting an anti vote, with effect sizes similar to the prior case, but in the opposite direction.

We interpret these findings to suggest that immigration history, even two generations back, is highly predictive of pro-immigration vote choices; and this pattern holds even when accounting for one’s party and, as our analysis of miscast votes shows, underlying political ideology. Furthermore, the evidence suggests that these findings do not hinge on the composition of the district electing MCs.<sup>28</sup>

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<sup>28</sup>Another possibility is that the pattern of missing data — particularly for foreign-born grandparents — might somehow bias our results. In particular, missingness for this measure occurs in our earliest sample years. As one check

To put these results in context, we compare the predictive power of immigrant family history on vote choices to the predictive power for votes occurring in other policy areas. Specifically, we classify all remaining bills in the same Congresses as our landmark immigration votes by topic codings due to Peltzman (1984). These relatively broad topics include issues such as the Budget, Defense, Indian Affairs and others. Then, following an approach outlined by Washington (2009), we identified votes where the majority of one party favored legislation and the majority of the opposing party did not (i.e., conflict existed over the vote) and coded these votes based on whether an MC supported the ideologically left position when voting (again, based on which party supported the legislation). As an additional check, we also chose two narrower topics that we viewed as orthogonal to immigrant background (transportation and environment) and we selected landmark votes in these areas using the same procedure as for the landmark immigration votes (i.e., consulting Stathis (2014) to identify landmark legislation in an area and then identifying the vote for final passage).

Figure 2 reports the share of votes for each topic where we found a statistically significant result of foreign-born parents on MC vote choice, controlling for other factors. By chance, we should expect 5 percent of individual votes to have a statistically significant relationship at  $p = 0.05$  (demarcated by the dotted vertical line in the figure). As the figure makes apparent, immigration legislation registers by far the greatest share of roll-call votes where an MC's immigration history mattered. While immigrant background and identity should matter for some other policy topics, if descriptive representation on immigration operates as we have proposed, then it should matter most for legislation on immigration. Other policy topics where immigrant background appears to have some explanatory power (controlling for other factors) include the Budget and Regulation categories.

We also display the coefficients estimated for each major immigration vote by chamber. Appendix A.4 reports the bill by bill results in detail. When estimated individually, the sign on the coefficients for immigrant parents and grandparents is in the right direction for each vote with the

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against this possibility, we re-estimate our core results using estimated immigration histories based on surname, which has the advantage of no missingness (though measures everyone's immigration history with some error). Table A5 in the Appendix replicates the results from Table 4 using only foreign-born scores derived from an MCs surname and finds similar results as to when we measured immigration history using individual level census data.




Figure 2: Effect of Foreign-Born Parents on Permissive/Liberal Vote for Placebo Topics (ML denotes Major Legislation)

exception of one vote in the Senate. Overall, the results appear stronger for individual bills in the House as compared to the Senate.

Overall, we have shown that an MC places considerable weight on his or her immigrant background when casting roll-call votes on immigration. To what extent does the tendency to draw upon own immigrant background enhance representation of immigrant groups in the district? First, previous research has suggested that people who are first or second generation immigrants themselves express more permissive attitudes on immigration overall.<sup>29</sup> So, legislator actions in

<sup>29</sup>See Mayda (2006); O'Rourke and Sinnott (2006); Schildkraut (2013a) as just two examples of this empirical regularity.

favor of permissive immigration policy accords with the views of immigrant groups in an MC's district more often than not. Second, we know that congressional districts with higher numbers of foreign-born constituents tended to elect candidates with immigrant family histories. Figure 3 displays a binned scatter plot that shows the strong, positive relationship between foreign-born population in a district and the Immigration Index for the MC elected. Table A4 in the Appendix reports similar results from regressions that also control for the urban population in the district and region. Congressional districts containing constituencies with immigrant populations systematically selected candidates with immigrant backgrounds at higher rates than districts without these constituencies. Demand for descriptive representatives at the district level translated into the selection of MCs with immigrant backgrounds to draw upon when deciding how to vote in key immigration votes.






Figure 3: Relationship between CD Foreign-Born Pop. and Immigration Index of Elected MCs

## Regression Discontinuity Analysis

In the previous section, we demonstrated the strong correlation between an MC's immigration background (in terms of own, parent, and grandparent place of birth as well as in terms of an Immigration Index) and vote choices on immigration policy. One critique of this approach is that immigration background might correlate strongly with unobserved variables, such as district characteristics, that also correlate with vote choice. For instance, perhaps districts with a preference for inclusive immigration policies elect candidates with immigrant backgrounds who favor permissive immigration policies. District preferences rather than an MC's personal immigration background might drive the observed votes for more permissive immigration policies.

As an additional check against such an issue, we use an approach that yields as good as random variation in the immigration background of an elected official at the district level. Specifically, we implement a regression discontinuity design (RDD) in which we compare the voting records for officials from districts who narrowly elected a candidate with an immigrant background to districts who narrowly did not elect a candidate with an immigrant background.

The approach we take here follows the standards for employing a regression discontinuity design in an electoral setting (Lee 2008). The key assumption hinges on the notion that winning a very close election occurs largely due to random factors. As an election grows closer, a candidate's chance of landing narrowly on one side or the other of the 50% vote threshold, which determines the winner, begins to resemble a coin flip. By comparing the gap in vote choices between winners and losers at the 50% threshold we obtain an estimate of the effect of immigration background on vote choice.

To implement this research design, we supplemented the data we gathered on MCs with additional election data, including gathering the names and vote shares for individuals who ran for office and lost.<sup>30</sup>

For House general elections, we identified the top two vote getters and determined the vote shares for these top two candidates. We excluded House districts that were at-large for states that had multiple congressional districts; often these districts attracted many candidates from the same

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<sup>30</sup>Data for the House elections comes from ICPSR.

party and, in some instances, had multiple winners.


When determining the immigration backgrounds for losing election candidates, it was not possible to match to census data because we lacked even the most basic information on losing candidates' ages and places of birth. Instead, for this regression discontinuity design, we impute all candidates' immigration histories based on surname. That is, based on surname and region for each candidate we impute immigration history based on the average number of foreign-born individuals, parents and grandparents for everyone recorded in the Census with that surname. For the sake of consistency, we use this surname-based approach for election winners as well.

While not a one to one correspondence, the correlation between actual immigration family history and surname score is very high. We view immigration history based on surname as measuring the variable of interest, Immigration History<sub>*i*</sub>, but with some error — that is, Immigration History<sub>*i*</sub> = Surname Score<sub>*i*</sub> + ε<sub>*i*</sub>. The error term can be thought of as the difference for each individual between the average immigration background of someone with that surname and the actual immigration background of the individual under study. Figure 4 illustrates the correspondence between Immigration History<sub>*i*</sub> and Surname Score<sub>*i*</sub> for House members. Each dot in a figure represents the average outcomes for all MCs in the sample *by state*.


For each of our key immigration votes, we identify the electoral contest preceding the term in which the vote was cast. In an experimental setting, we might flip a coin to determine the family immigration history of the person casting a vote; in our case, we have instead identified close elections where one candidate has a Surname Score that denotes an immigrant background and where one candidate does not. Specifically, we coarsen the key measure of immigration history into a binary variable that denotes whether or not a candidate is considered to have a family history of immigration based on their surname.

To determine the threshold for whether an MC's surname indicates a family immigration history or not, we examined the distribution of Surname Scores for each of our measures. Determining the threshold for a surname to denote a foreign-born candidate, or a candidate with foreign-born parents or grandparents, is somewhat arbitrary. We chose a simple rule of thumb and set the binary indicator for a family immigration history equal to one for MCs with a Surname Score


**Foreign Born (Self)**



**Foreign-Born Parents**



**Foreign-Born Grandparents**



**Immigration Index**




Figure 4: Comparison of Actual Foreign-Born Status to Imputed Foreign-Born Status (Surname Scores) by State, House Members

in the top third of the distribution for their region. We set the indicator to zero for MCs with a Surname Score in the bottom third of the distribution for their region.<sup>31</sup> This approach restricts the sample to elections with one candidate with an immigrant background and one without such a background based on these thresholds for the Surname Score. As a robustness check, we also report results for all other possible thresholds: the specific cutoff chosen is not particularly consequential for our main results.<sup>32</sup>

For example, in the 1910 Census someone with the surname “FEIGENBAUM” residing in the northeast averaged 3.978 foreign-born grandparents. This ranked in the top third of surnames in terms of foreign-born grandparents. Conversely, someone with the surname “PALMER,” which averaged 1.2 foreign-born grandparents in 1910, ranked in the bottom third of surnames in terms of foreign-born grandparents.

We estimate an equation of the form

$$y_i = \alpha + \theta \cdot \mathbb{1}(\text{Immigration History Winner}_i) + f(V_i) + \epsilon_i \quad (2)$$

where  $\mathbb{1}(\text{Immigration History Winner}_i)$  denotes that the *winner* of the election has a Surname Score in the top third of the distribution for the relevant measure of immigration history (i.e., foreign born, foreign-born parents, foreign-born grandparents, or Immigration Index depending on the specification).  $\theta$ , the parameter of primary interest, provides an estimate of the effect on vote choice of the as-if random assignment of an MC classified as having an Immigration History as compared to the vote choice by an MC classified as not having an Immigration History. The outcome variable  $y_i$  denotes whether or not an MC cast a “pro” immigration vote, just as in the previous section. The term  $f(V_i)$  is a flexible function of the winning candidate’s vote margin, which determines who wins the election and therefore treatment status.

To estimate the RDD, we calculate optimal bandwidths and also use bandwidths of  $\pm 20$  and  $\pm 10$  for each regression. We estimate treatment effects using a local linear specification estimated

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<sup>31</sup>So, we have:  $\mathbb{1}(\text{Immigration History}_i)$  equals one when  $F_{SS}(\text{Surname Score}_i) > 0.5 + x$ , where  $x = 0.17$ ; and,  $\mathbb{1}(\text{Immigration History}_i)$  equals zero when  $F_{SS}(\text{Surname Score}_i) \leq 0.5 - x$ , where again  $x = 0.17$ . All observations in  $(0.5 - x, 0.5 + x]$  are excluded from the sample.

<sup>32</sup>To be clear, we are allowing  $x$  to take on all possible values in  $[0, 0.49]$  whenever we have enough observations to perform the estimation.

separately on each side of the threshold. These methods follow best practices outlined in Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014).

One departure from the results presented in the previous section of this paper is that we must restrict our estimates here only to include House members because we did not have enough observations in the Senate to perform the estimation and draw any conclusions — given the requirement of including only elections with one candidate in the top third of the Surname Score distribution and one candidate in the bottom third of the Surname Score distribution.<sup>33</sup> Furthermore, we elected not to pool across chambers given the substantially different electoral dynamics for House and Senate races.

Estimating the effects separately using our four different measures of immigration history — self, parents, grandparents and Immigration Index — we find a positive effect of having an immigration history on the probability of casting pro-immigration votes across all four measures. Figure 5 illustrates the main findings using a linear functional form. The figures model the discontinuity between a narrow loss and a narrow win for a candidate with an immigration history (based on Surname Scores for each of our four measures) as compared to a candidate without such a history. The estimates range from a 42.1 percentage point increase (Foreign Born (Self)) in the rate of casting a pro-immigration vote on the high end to a 20.6 percentage point increase on the low end (Foreign-Born Grandparents).

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<sup>33</sup>For example, attempting to estimate the effects in the Senate using an optimal bandwidth yielded the following number of effective observations for each possible measure of immigration history:  $N = 25$  (MC Birthplace),  $N = 33$  (Parents' Birthplace),  $N = 30$  (Grandparents' Birthplace), and  $N = 28$  (Immigration Index). More generally, this criterion greatly reduces the number of elections that make it into the sample in the House as well. For example, restricting to House elections with one candidate in the bottom third of the distribution and one candidate in the top third left us with somewhere between 6% and 9% of all elections depending on the measure of immigration history used.




Figure 5: RDD: Effect of MC Immigration History (Surname Score) on probability of casting Pro Immigration Vote,  $BW = \pm 10$

Table 5: Regression Discontinuity: Imputed Immigration History (Surname Score) and Vote Choice, All Bills Pooled

	MC		Parents			Grandparents			Immigration Index			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Estimate	0.419** (0.187)	0.421** (0.188)	0.404*** (0.151)	0.355* (0.188)	0.319* (0.179)	0.382*** (0.135)	0.421* (0.244)	0.206 (0.207)	0.259* (0.149)	0.264 (0.195)	0.256 (0.194)	0.278* (0.144)
N	183	183	183	252	252	252	243	243	243	244	244	244
N (Effective)	91	91	152	113	125	206	91	121	203	119	122	200
BW	±10.073	±10	±20	±8.641	±10	±20	±7.039	±10	±20	±9.559	±10	±20

\* p < .1; \*\* p < .05; \*\*\* p < .01  
SEs clustered at MC level.



The size of the point estimates varies only slightly depending on the bandwidths that we employ. Table 5 reports full results for the calculated optimal bandwidths along with bandwidths of  $\pm 10$  and  $\pm 20$ . When attempting to measure the effect of an MC's own foreign-born status on pro-immigration votes, our estimates hover around an increase of 40 percentage points in the rate of casting a pro-immigration vote, no matter the bandwidth (and none of the 95% confidence intervals overlap with zero). When measuring the effect of foreign-born status of an MC's parents on vote choice, our estimates are slightly over 30 percentage points (and two of three of the 95% confidence intervals do not overlap with zero). For grandparents, the estimates vary more widely, ranging between 20.6 percentage points and 42 percentage points (here two of three 90% confidence intervals do not overlap with zero, but all three 95% confidence intervals overlap). Finally, when determining immigration status using the Immigration Index, which averages across self, parents and grandparents, our estimates all suggest a slightly more than 25 percentage point increase in pro-immigration voting rates when a candidate with a high immigration index holds the seat as compared to when someone with a low immigration index holds the seat (one of three estimates has 90% confidence intervals that do not overlap with zero).

These results help confirm the patterns observed in the previous section, and they suggest that immigration history causes an MC to cast votes in favor of more permissive immigration policy. We observe the strongest effects when the surname indicates the MC himself or herself likely had an immigrant background, but the effects are also positive and of a notable magnitude when focusing only on whether an MC had foreign-born parents or grandparents. When we vary the criterion that MCs with Surname Scores in the top third of the distribution should be considered to have an immigration history, the results remain similar. See Section A.2 in the Appendix for details. We also confirm our findings with a battery of robustness checks. See Appendix A.3 for additional details.<sup>34</sup>

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<sup>34</sup>As compared to the RDD for immigration voting, the results of the RDD for immigration speech as the outcome appear weaker. Table A12 in the Appendix shows that the results for speech are not robustly distinguishable from zero and fluctuate depending on specification and bandwidth. We view these results as consistent with our finding, discussed in the next section, that district composition more strongly influences position taking through speech.

## Unbundling MC Immigrant Background

Having established that more recent familial immigration history leads MCs to cast roll-call votes in support of more permissive immigration policies, we now turn to examining the conditions under which legislators' immigrant identities are more or less salient — when immigrant background matters for representation and when it does not.

### Congressional Speech and Immigrant Background

We first evaluate how an immigrant family history relates to an MC's presentation of self through floor speech. Floor speeches "increase members' visibility and voice in the legislative process" and provide chances for MCs to emphasize a policy area to their colleagues, constituents and the press (Pearson and Dancey 2011). At the same time, speech serves as a less costly signal than a vote on a key policy issue. Speech is not binding; listeners interpret a speech's meaning, which can be revised and reinterpreted in ways that a roll-call vote cannot. However, congressional speech is not entirely cheap talk; by taking a position on the record, MCs signal their views and priorities, and they may face consequences later for taking votes contrary to their speeches.

For each Congress (64th–91st), we count the distinct number of times each MC used a phrase related to the topic of immigration as well as the number of distinct speeches that include phrases related to the topic of immigration. We estimate the same model as described in Equation 1, but now replace the outcome measuring roll-call votes with a measure of floor speech,  $\log(1 + FloorSpeech_{it})$  where  $i$  indexes MCs and  $t$  indexes congresses. We also include Congress and chamber fixed effects.

Table 6 presents the results.<sup>35</sup> When we do not include covariates, we observe a statistically significant and positive relationship between familial immigration history and floor speeches on immigration, with the one exception of whether an MC herself or himself was foreign born. We estimate that having a foreign-born parent increases the number of speeches including mentions of immigration by roughly 7.4 percent; a foreign-born grandparent registers a 4.6 percent increase.

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<sup>35</sup>In the Appendix, we include tables reporting identical results but using a count of phrases rather than speeches as the outcome. See Tables A6 and A7.

MCs with an immigrant background also speak about immigration in more personal terms.<sup>36</sup>

When we include covariates, the coefficients on our measures of family immigration history remain positive and distinguishable from zero. However, the strength of the result for family immigration history appears weaker for speech than for roll-call voting. First, for specifications with covariates in Table 6, the null hypothesis of no effect either cannot be rejected or can only be rejected at  $p < 0.05$  instead of  $p < 0.01$ . Second, immigrant population in the congressional district emerges as a particularly important predictor for engaging in immigration-related speech. When we use standardized coefficients to evaluate the explanatory power of family immigration history versus district composition, foreign-born population in the congressional district has a relative importance 3 times that of immigration history. A one standard deviation change in district foreign-born population yields a 0.118 change in speech on immigration; for foreign-born parents, there is a 0.039 change.<sup>37</sup> When the outcome is immigration roll-call votes, the relative importance of these covariates registers as roughly equal (0.15 versus 0.12).

This pattern of results suggests that MCs who represent districts with substantial foreign-born populations weight district composition more heavily than their own family histories when choosing whether to speak on immigration. Such floor speeches allow MCs to engage in position taking, essentially responding to the incentives in place for their district. Local press often reported directly on speeches given by a district's representatives.<sup>38</sup> As a result, composition of the district appears to have been a key factor driving this form of behavior. On the other hand, MCs weighted family immigration history and district composition roughly equally for roll-call votes. Diverging from district expectations on a roll-call vote was costly, and only deeply-held preferences, such as those explained by a family history of immigration, appear to have contributed to making such choices. Family immigration history's centrality to an MC's identity seems a reasonable explana-

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<sup>36</sup>We identified speeches where MCs referred to both immigration and family concurrently (see Tables A8 and A9 in the Appendix). MCs with family histories of immigration exhibit an uptick in engaging in speech this form of speech on the floor.

<sup>37</sup>Other measures of relative importance, such as the contribution to  $R^2$  when adding the variable studied to a specification last, yield similar findings.

<sup>38</sup>See *Schlagend, Argumente gegen Einwanderungsbill, In der Haus-Debatte vorgebracht* (1914) as an example of a German-language newspaper reporting at length on speeches by representatives in the congressional debates on literacy test legislation. An English-language translation of article's sub-header reads: "The battle of speeches raged for several hours. [...] Friends of immigrants fought their hardest against literacy test clause. – Key speeches."

Table 6: Immigration History and Immigration Speeches

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
MC Foreign Born	0.168 (0.110)	0.060 (0.106)						
Parents Foreign Born			0.074*** (0.020)	0.041** (0.021)				
Grandparents Foreign Born					0.046*** (0.009)	0.026** (0.010)	0.095*** (0.021)	0.058** (0.023)
Immigration Index								0.045*** (0.013)
log(CD Pop. Foreign)		0.055*** (0.010)		0.050*** (0.010)		0.045*** (0.013)		0.045*** (0.013)
Republican		-0.033 (0.028)		-0.034 (0.030)		-0.016 (0.036)		-0.015 (0.035)
Other Party		0.100 (0.115)		0.087 (0.114)		0.108 (0.136)		0.097 (0.136)
Northeast		-0.061* (0.033)		-0.068* (0.035)		-0.068 (0.044)		-0.071 (0.044)
South		-0.039 (0.038)		-0.036 (0.039)		-0.069 (0.048)		-0.072 (0.047)
West		0.055 (0.041)		0.032 (0.041)		-0.005 (0.050)		-0.005 (0.050)
Age		0.015** (0.007)		0.014* (0.008)		0.001 (0.010)		0.002 (0.010)
Age Sq.		-0.0002*** (0.0001)		-0.0002*** (0.0001)		-0.0001 (0.0001)		-0.0001 (0.0001)
Tenure		0.041*** (0.004)		0.040*** (0.004)		0.037*** (0.005)		0.037*** (0.005)
Tenure Sq.		-0.001*** (0.0001)		-0.001*** (0.0001)		-0.001*** (0.0002)		-0.001*** (0.0002)
Congress FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Chamber FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
N	14,760	14,282	13,646	13,188	8,959	8,651	8,959	8,651
R <sup>2</sup>	0.187	0.227	0.193	0.228	0.231	0.260	0.231	0.260

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01  
SEs clustered at MC level.

tion for this phenomenon.

## Visible Indicators of Immigrant Background

Impressions held by others also influence lawmaker behavior. We examine how visible indicators of an immigrant background influence an MC's decision-making on key immigration roll-call votes, holding *actual* immigration history constant.

Table 7 reports the results of regressions where we include the measures of family immigration history (MC Foreign Born, Parents Foreign Born, Grandparents Foreign Born) as well as the Surname Scores (Surname MC Foreign Born, Surname Parents Foreign Born, Surname Grandparents Foreign Born) for each MC. The Surname variables report the average foreign-born status (i.e., foreign-born self, number of foreign-born parents, and number of foreign-born grandparents) for individuals with the same surname and region as an MC. For example, the variable "Surname Parents Foreign Born" records the average number of foreign-born parents for people with the same surname and in the same region as the MC.<sup>39</sup>

This approach decomposes family immigration history into an MC's actual family history and the public perception of family immigration history based on population-level statistics. Consider an MC who has one foreign-born parent but a surname that does not indicate a recent family history of immigration (for example, "Smith" averaged 0.03 foreign-born parents among people in the South in 1930). Now compare this to someone who also has one foreign-born parent but who possesses a surname suggesting a high probability of an immigrant background (for example, "Sundstrom" indicated on average 1.56 foreign-born parents for someone born at the turn of the century in the Northeast). This estimation procedure identifies whether this type of variation leads to meaningfully different behavior on immigration roll-call votes. We have hypothesized that visible indicators of an immigrant background do in fact lead to adopting more permissive attitudes on immigration.

Our estimates appear to bear out this hypothesis. Across all four specifications, the coefficient on the surname score variable registers as equal to or bigger than the magnitude of the coefficient

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<sup>39</sup>We determine year of census by matching to the census year directly preceding the year an MC first won election to Congress.

Table 7: Immigration History and MC Vote Choice: All Bills Pooled with Foreign Surnames

	Pro Immigration Vote			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
MC Foreign Born	0.088 (0.057)			
Surname MC Foreign Born	0.341*** (0.082)			
Parents Foreign Born		0.059*** (0.013)		
Surname Parents Foreign Born		0.072*** (0.024)		
Grandparents Foreign Born			0.021*** (0.008)	
Surname Grandparents Foreign Born			0.031** (0.013)	
Immigration Index				0.046*** (0.015)
Surname Immigration Index				0.059*** (0.022)
log(CD Pop. Foreign)	0.042*** (0.006)	0.039*** (0.006)	0.041*** (0.008)	0.043*** (0.008)
Controls	yes	yes	yes	yes
Bill FE	yes	yes	yes	yes
Chamber FE	yes	yes	yes	yes
N	3,367	3,126	1,976	1,968
R <sup>2</sup>	0.446	0.445	0.455	0.459

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01  
SEs clustered at MC level.

on actual immigration history. The difference appears most extreme for an MC's own foreign-born status; this result likely occurs because while few MCs were themselves born abroad, a surname indicating a significant probability of foreign birth also suggests a likelihood of foreign-born parents and grandparents, which we know also influences vote choice. For our other measures (parents, grandparents and Immigration Index), the size of the coefficients are roughly equal and we cannot reject the null hypothesis of equality between the coefficients for any of these specifications.

There are several possible mechanisms that could cause an MC with an immigrant surname to vote differently than an MC whose surname does not indicate recent immigration history. For example, when MCs have surnames visibly identifying their family histories of immigration, their constituents might view them as "descriptive representatives" and expect them to take pro-immigrant positions on legislation. For that matter, an immigrant surname might boost the election chances of an MC in a district with immigrant constituents, in turn reinforcing a role as a descriptive representative. A second possibility is that life (before Congress) with an immigrant surname leads to different treatment by others, regardless of actual immigration background, and this treatment alters the MC's identity and leads them to represent their districts differently. While we cannot distinguish between these potential mechanisms, the effect remains the same: being easily identifiable as having an immigrant background (holding actual background constant) changes how MCs represent their districts on immigration.

Unbundling immigrant history into the distinct backgrounds of specific family members highlights another aspect of immigrant background. In Table 8, we split out the foreign-born status of each parent and grandparent separately. These results reveal a striking pattern: in the era we study, paternal ancestry significantly affects vote choice, but maternal ancestry does not. In Models 1 and 2, we find a positive and significant effect of having a foreign-born father on taking the pro-immigration position on key bills, but we do not find a significant effect on having a foreign-born mother. Similarly, in Models 3 and 4, we find a positive effect from having a foreign-born paternal grandfather, but no effect of foreign-born status on the part of the other three grandparents. These results remain robust when including surname variables as well (Models 2 and 4). The results in Model 2 shed particular light on the formation of pro-immigrant views: a foreign-born

father (or father's father) significantly increases pro-immigration voting, even *after* controlling for the effect of a foreign surname. This suggests that fathers in particular had a substantial effect on their child's conception of immigrant identity beyond just passing down surnames. Notably, almost every MC in our sample is male. While we cannot identify the effect of an MC's gender on which parents' background is most important, in this period the father's background appears more important than the mother's.

Table 8: Immigration History by Parent/Grandparent and MC Vote Choice: All Bills Pooled

	Pro Immigration Vote			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Foreign Born Father	0.075** (0.031)	0.049 (0.033)		
Foreign Born Mother	0.081*** (0.031)	0.069** (0.031)		
Foreign Born Father's Father			0.096** (0.044)	0.073 (0.046)
Foreign Born Father's Mother			-0.030 (0.046)	-0.038 (0.047)
Foreign Born Mother's Father			0.004 (0.040)	0.009 (0.041)
Foreign Born Mother's Mother			0.055 (0.041)	0.042 (0.041)
Surname Parents Foreign Born		0.072*** (0.024)		
Surname Grandparents Foreign Born				0.030** (0.014)
log(CD Pop. Foreign)	0.041*** (0.006)	0.039*** (0.006)	0.042*** (0.008)	0.041*** (0.008)
Controls	yes	yes	yes	yes
Bill Dummy	yes	yes	yes	yes
Chamber Dummy	yes	yes	yes	yes
N	3,141	3,126	1,994	1,976
R <sup>2</sup>	0.445	0.445	0.456	0.455

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01  
SEs clustered at MC level.



## Nation of Origin

We have shown that an MC's general family immigration history affected their voting patterns on immigration restrictions. But while "immigrant" or "descendant of immigrants" is one salient dimension of MC background, it elides variation in immigrant experience by country or continent of origin. In addition, while immigration restriction bills can be simply coded as pro or anti immigration, the legislation is often more complex: as an example, while the Johnson-Reed Act in 1924 severely curtailed immigration from Italy, the quotas were non-binding on Irish immigrants.

In this section, we show that region of origin mattered for immigration votes. Before World War II, MCs with family trees rooted in southern and eastern Europe (the "New European" source countries during the Age of Mass Migration), were more likely to vote against immigration restriction bills than MCs of "Old European" stock, and subtleties about the exact restrictions mattered as well.<sup>40</sup> After WWII, for votes on the bills that reshaped American immigration policy — in particular the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 — the effects of MC immigrant backgrounds were similar, whether the MCs' parents or grandparents came from New or Old Europe or the rest of the world.

We start by examining the three immigration restriction bills of the interwar era (Table 9). We regress a dummy for pro-immigration votes on MC immigrant family history, dividing origins by region: New Europe, Old Europe, and Non Europe. Specifically, we count the number of parents (0, 1, or 2) and number of grandparents (0 to 4) who are born in each region, with American-born parents and grandparents as the reference group. Though MCs with any (recent) European family immigration history are more likely to vote against the three immigration restriction bills, the effects are much larger for MCs with more parents or grandparents from New Europe.<sup>41</sup> Each of these bills symbolically and practically targeted immigrant populations other than those from Old Europe. The Immigration Act (1917) primarily implemented a literacy test (and also included exemptions for close family members of current immigrants). The Immigration Quota Act (1921)

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<sup>40</sup>We base these codings on Goldin (1994). Section A.6 in the Appendix lists the countries that comprise Old Europe and New Europe.

<sup>41</sup>The effects of Non-European immigration history is a bit noisier and harder to interpret, but in these Congresses, this group is much smaller.

was projected to alter the distribution of immigrants such that Old Europe source countries would comprise 55% of immigrants and New Europe countries would comprise 45%; the Reed-Johnson Act aimed to further tip the balance to 84% Old Europe and 16% New Europe (Tichenor 2002, p. 145). In sum, in the moments leading up to final passage, each of these bills appeared to target immigrants from places other than New Europe most harshly, though to varying degrees.

Strikingly, the results in Table 9 identify conditions under which the general tendency towards permissive immigration legislation held by those with immigrant backgrounds may break down somewhat. When restrictive immigration policies targeted specific immigrant sub-groups (i.e., New Europe immigrants), country of origin operates as a key predictor of MC roll-call voting. We implement hypothesis tests with the null that the coefficient on New Europe Parents (Grandparents) equals the coefficient on Old Europe Parents (Grandparents). For the Immigration Act (1917), which implemented a literacy test but did not drastically alter the balance of New Europe immigrants, the difference in coefficients is relatively fuzzy. We can not reject the null of no difference at  $p = 0.10$  for Old Europe versus New Europe parents or grandparents. On the other hand, for the Immigration Quota Act and Johnson-Reed Act, both of which placed stricter quotas on New Europe immigrants, we can reject the null of no difference for parents and grandparents at  $p < 0.01$  (specifications 3, 4 and 6) and  $p < 0.05$  (specification 5).

Did the patterns change after WWII? Here we focus on four bills from the House of Representatives: the McCarran Internal Security Act, the McCarran-Walter Immigration and Nationality Act, the Refugee Relief Act of 1953, and the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 (Table 10). The McCarran Internal Security Act, enacted over Truman's veto, targeted Communists early in the Cold War. One provision relevant for our study: immigrants could have citizenship revoked if found in violation of the law within five years of naturalization. Old European heritage led to voting pro immigrant (against the act); New European heritage (columns 1 and 2) did as well, though with an effect of a smaller magnitude. Enacted two years later, the McCarran-Walter Immigration and Nationality Act resembled in some ways the pre-WWII immigration restriction bills, retaining a quota system. MCs with New Europe immigration history were much more likely to oppose it than those from Old Europe (columns 3 and 4).

Table 9: Country of Origin and MC Vote Choice, Pre-WWII Immigration Votes

	Immigration Act (1917)		Immigration Quota Act (1921)		Johnson-Reed Act (1924)	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Old Europe Parents	0.164*** (0.025)		0.099*** (0.021)		0.159*** (0.024)	
New Europe Parents	0.404* (0.211)		0.353*** (0.080)		0.450*** (0.078)	
Non Europe Non Native Parents	0.078 (0.085)		0.040 (0.061)		0.319*** (0.073)	
Old Europe Grandparents		0.099*** (0.023)		0.058*** (0.018)		0.090*** (0.018)
New Europe Grandparents		0.214* (0.118)		0.183*** (0.052)		0.233*** (0.046)
Non Europe Non Native Grandparents		0.037 (0.053)		0.011 (0.044)		0.172*** (0.056)
Constant	0.193*** (0.022)	0.146* (0.075)	0.059*** (0.016)	0.034 (0.053)	0.101*** (0.018)	0.068 (0.049)
N	486	135	403	118	459	151
R <sup>2</sup>	0.086	0.135	0.092	0.146	0.165	0.246

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

Table 10

	McCarran Internal Security Act (1950)	McCarran-Walter Immigration and Nationality Act (1952)	Refugee Relief Act (1953)	Immigration and Nationality Act (1965)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Old Europe Parents	0.138*** (0.028)	0.139*** (0.033)	0.193*** (0.036)	0.144*** (0.038)				
New Europe Parents	0.097** (0.049)	0.368*** (0.051)	0.230*** (0.054)	0.142*** (0.042)				
Non Europe Non Native Parents	0.279*** (0.084)	0.137* (0.082)	0.313*** (0.094)	0.122* (0.065)				
Old Europe Grandparents		0.047*** (0.012)		0.108*** (0.014)				0.086*** (0.013)
New Europe Grandparents		0.053** (0.024)		0.131*** (0.025)				0.087*** (0.019)
Non Europe Non Native Grandparents		0.118*** (0.036)		0.153*** (0.046)				0.077*** (0.030)
Constant	0.102*** (0.019)	0.075*** (0.024)	0.224*** (0.023)	0.189*** (0.028)	0.482*** (0.025)	0.415*** (0.029)	0.739*** (0.021)	0.664*** (0.025)
N	414	354	451	394	465	404	436	387
R <sup>2</sup>	0.082	0.074	0.131	0.161	0.100	0.168	0.058	0.136

\*p &lt; .1; \*\*p &lt; .05; \*\*\*p &lt; .01

But while the McCarran-Walter bill activated identity based on national origins just as pre-WWII restriction bills had, the Refugee Relief Act of 1953 and the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 appear different. The effects of MC immigrant background had similar (positive) effects on casting a permissive vote, regardless of where those MCs' families came from originally. None of the effects estimated in columns 5, 6, 7, or 8 of Table 10 allow us to reject the null of no difference between Old Europe and New Europe coefficients.

These results suggest that when MCs faced a vote on legislation restricting immigration of people with similar family backgrounds to themselves, they were more likely to oppose the bill. While immigrants of all backgrounds had higher probabilities of opposing immigration restrictions, legislation targeting people of different backgrounds produced different levels of opposition. This result suggests one potential reason why recent congresses have struggled with immigration policy: while many current MCs are not far from the immigrant experience, relatively few share an immigrant background with the groups currently seeking to immigrate at the highest rates.

## **Immigrant Background and the 115th Congress**

Do MCs with immigrant backgrounds have a common tendency towards permissive immigration legislation in the contemporary Congress, and, if so, precisely how much of a role does it play in influencing legislative behavior on immigration policy?

To test this, we gathered additional data on the family histories of MCs in the 115th Congress and repeated our analysis on immigration roll-call voting.<sup>42</sup> We identified four key pieces of immigration legislation — two in the House and two in the Senate — and studied the relationship between permissive immigration votes and family immigration history. In the House we chose HR 4760 and HR 3004: the “Securing America’s Future Act of 2018” and “Kate’s Law.” In the Senate we chose Senate Amendment 1948 to Senate Amendment 1959 as well as Senate Amendment 1959 to HR 2579: an amendment to the “Stop Dangerous Sanctuary Cities Act” and an amendment to the “Broader Options for Americans Act.” The House votes occurred on legislation that (1) proposed funding for a border wall as well as limits on legal immigration among other things; and (2)

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<sup>42</sup>To gather this additional data, we referred to official biographies, newspaper articles and other sources and we then cross-referenced the data we compiled with a list provided by Geiger (2019), who focuses on the 116th Congress. Overall, we found close agreement between both of these efforts.

increased the penalties for undocumented immigrants who re-entered the country after already being convicted of crimes and deported. The Senate votes sought cloture on debate over legislation (1) withholding funding from “sanctuary cities”; and (2) allocating funds for border security, placing limits on family-based immigration and eliminating the visa lottery while also providing a path to citizenship for “Dreamers”.<sup>43</sup> For these bills, we coded a “Nay” as a permissive vote.<sup>44</sup>

An inspection of the voting by party and family history illustrates that this feature still matters in the contemporary Congress. Republicans who cast “Nay” votes averaged 0.193 foreign-born parents and 1.3 foreign-born grandparents; Republicans casting “Yea” (i.e., restrictive) votes averaged just 0.035 foreign-born parents and 0.514 foreign-born grandparents. We observe a similar pattern but with a slightly smaller gap for Democrats. Of the 86 Democratic MCs who cast at least one vote coded as permissive, at least 64 had a foreign-born parent or grandparent.

Turning to formal regressions, we estimate that immigrant background operates quite similarly to what we have found for historical congresses. Table 11 presents the results of our model of immigration history and MC vote choice for the 115th Congress. We also observe several notable points of departure from our past results. First, MC Foreign-Born status no longer appears statistically distinguishable from zero in the contemporary Congress as compared to historical congresses; on the other hand, the effect sizes we estimate for foreign-born parents and grandparents generally appear similar. Second, party plays a much larger role in the contemporary Congress. Republican party membership was associated with casting permissive immigration votes at a roughly 22 percentage point lower rate in historical congresses; in the contemporary Congress we estimate an effect that is double that magnitude. Investigating the relative importance of key variables, we see the average contribution of party to  $R^2$  across orderings of regressors (Lindeman, Merenda and Gold 1980; Grömping 2007) increases ten-fold from historical congresses to the contemporary Congress (0.022 to 0.22) and the standardized coefficient on party more than doubles (0.21 to 0.47); on the other hand, the Parents Foreign Born variable retains roughly the

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<sup>43</sup>We drew these descriptions from [https://ballotpedia.org/115th\\_Congress\\_on\\_immigration,\\_2017-2018](https://ballotpedia.org/115th_Congress_on_immigration,_2017-2018); see this page for additional details on these bills and other major immigration in the 115th Congress.

<sup>44</sup>While the path to citizenship for “Dreamers” in the last Senate bill complicates the coding somewhat, our best interpretation is that other restrictive aspects of the legislation were seen as unacceptable encroachments by many pro-immigration groups and policy-makers.

same importance in both time periods.

Table 11: Immigration History and MC Vote Choice: 115th Congress

	Pro Immigration Vote			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
MC Foreign Born	0.101 (0.086)			
Parents Foreign Born		0.059* (0.033)		
Grandparents Foreign Born			0.041** (0.020)	
Immigration Index				0.105** (0.044)
log(CD Pop. Foreign)	0.024 (0.022)	0.015 (0.023)	0.040 (0.037)	0.035 (0.037)
Republican	-0.478*** (0.039)	-0.474*** (0.040)	-0.314*** (0.065)	-0.318*** (0.064)
Other Party	-0.269*** (0.089)	-0.326*** (0.099)	-0.197 (0.171)	-0.229 (0.174)
Northeast	0.089* (0.053)	0.098* (0.054)	0.151 (0.094)	0.161* (0.094)
South	-0.028 (0.045)	-0.029 (0.045)	-0.107 (0.082)	-0.109 (0.081)
West	0.117** (0.053)	0.112** (0.054)	0.071 (0.092)	0.075 (0.092)
Age	-0.019 (0.015)	-0.020 (0.015)	0.012 (0.025)	0.011 (0.024)
Age Sq.	0.0001 (0.0001)	0.0002 (0.0001)	-0.0001 (0.0002)	-0.0001 (0.0002)
Tenure	0.006 (0.006)	0.006 (0.006)	0.011 (0.010)	0.013 (0.010)
Tenure Sq.	-0.00005 (0.0002)	-0.0001 (0.0002)	-0.0001 (0.0002)	-0.0001 (0.0002)
Bill FE	yes	yes	yes	yes
Chamber FE	yes	yes	yes	yes
N	616	602	214	214
R <sup>2</sup>	0.325	0.330	0.288	0.290

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01  
SEs clustered at MC level.


Comparing the current to the past composition of Congress in terms of family histories also

helps shed some light on the shifting dynamics surrounding immigrant background. In the House, the average MC has fewer foreign-born parents in the 115th Congress than in the era studied in this paper, regardless of party (0.09 foreign-born parents in the 115th Congress for Republicans versus an average of 0.42 in the 64th – 91st; 0.33 versus 0.4 for Democrats). But the drop off for Republican MCs is particularly large, and this decline began even during the last part of our sample period. In the Senate, the partisan differences appear even sharper. For Senate Democrats, the mean foreign-born parents in the 115th Congress (0.31) roughly equals the mean from the past (0.30); for Republicans in the Senate, the drop off is steep (0.33 to 0.075). Figure 6 displays the trends over time.


Scholars have noted that immigration policy has grown increasingly structured by party (Gimpel and Edwards 1999; Abrajano and Hajnal 2017), a phenomenon in line with many other issues as Congress has grown increasingly polarized. Our estimates confirm that MCs place increased weight on party when deciding how to vote on immigration policy in the contemporary Congress. But, the empirical regularities described in this paper, in conjunction with the shifting composition of parties in terms of MC familial immigration histories, also provide a partial explanation for the change in the dynamics surrounding immigration. In the past, even though white males comprised the majority of both parties, many MCs had family histories that helped shape permissive views on immigration legislation. We have shown that foreign-born parents and grandparents increased an MC's tendency to cast permissive immigration votes, independent of party. Republican MCs still have immigrant family histories, but increasingly these family stories of immigration are in the distant past. Our results illustrate the almost linear decrease in the effect of immigrant history over generations; a reasonable extrapolation suggests that 3rd, 4th or 5th generation MCs do not meaningfully draw upon immigrant background when casting votes on immigration policy. Recent immigrant background, which might undergird a common tendency towards permissive immigration policy, no longer cuts across parties.




**House Ds Foreign-Born Parents**



**House Rs Foreign-Born Parents**



**Senate Ds Foreign-Born Parents**



**Senate Rs Foreign-Born Parents**




Figure 6: These figures illustrate mean foreign-born parents by party and chamber of congress. The gray bounds indicate the maximum and minimum mean foreign-born parents possible when accounting for missing data on foreign-born parents. To calculate the maximum we find the mean if all missing entries were foreign born. To calculate the minimum we find the mean if all missing entries were born in the U.S.

## Conclusion

This paper has focused on immigrant background and its effects on legislative behavior. Our results demonstrate a strong relationship between personal immigration history and MC vote choice on immigration in the early and mid-20th century. MCs born abroad or with parents or grandparents born abroad vote in favor of pro-immigration policies more than those whose families immigrated to the United States in earlier generations. This voting behavior is not just the result of pro-immigrant electorates selecting MCs with recent family immigration background, but occurs independently of district characteristics and selection. Recent immigration experiences serve as strong predictors of votes for permissive policies even when MC ideology would predict otherwise. All together, these findings suggest that in the first part of the 20th century some MCs drew upon a common immigrant identity when shaping immigration policy. While some landmark bills passed by Congress harshly restricted immigration, those MCs with familial histories of immigration were substantially less likely to support such policies, regardless of party.

While a Congress with MCs who have family histories of immigration may contribute to support for permissive immigration policies, this is contingent upon a variety of factors. Position taking through congressional speech appears to be a function of district composition rather than an MC's identity: district composition (i.e., foreign-born population) explains speech about immigration more so than an immigrant background. Visibility of immigrant identity plays an important role in legislative behavior too: holding actual immigration history constant, an immigrant surname increases the probability of casting permissive immigration votes. Our analysis also reveals the importance of nation or place of origin in the construction of identity: when faced with immigration restrictions based on nationality, MCs tended to give more support to the immigration of people with the same origins as themselves, though even here a common tendency to vote for permissive immigration persisted.

Finally, our results speak to legislative dynamics in the present-day Congress. As compared to the first part of the 20th century, the average immigration histories for the two parties have diverged considerably, with levels among Republicans at all-time lows. Given the empirical relationship we have identified between immigrant family history and permissive voting on legisla-

tion, this shift in the composition of the parties serves as one additional reason why immigration policy is no longer the cross-cutting issue that it once was.

More broadly, understanding a legislator's family history and its role in the construction of identity helps us understand legislative behavior. Fenno (1978) famously asked what elected representatives see when they look at their constituency, sparking a voluminous literature investigating legislator behavior in the district. Our paper has sought to turn a lens inward. We have tried to ask: What do legislators see when they look at themselves?

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## A Appendix

### A.1 Additional Tables

Table A1: Summary Statistics for Key Variables, Sample of Voting MCs Matched to Census Data

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Median
Foreign Born MC	852	0.03	0.18	0
Parents Foreign Born	783	0.38	0.73	0.00
Grandparents Foreign Born	505	1.70	1.81	1.00
Immigration Index	505	0.76	0.94	0.25
At Least One Foreign Born Parent	783	0.23	0.42	0.00
At Least One Foreign Born Grandparent	534	0.55	0.50	1.00
All Foreign Born Parents	783	0.15	0.36	0.00
All Foreign Born Grandparents	505	0.34	0.47	0.00
Surname Foreign Born MC	847	0.09	0.12	0.06
Surname Parents Foreign Born	847	0.48	0.46	0.35
Surname Grandparents Foreign Born	845	1.23	1.10	0.97
Democrat	852	0.45	0.50	0
Republican	852	0.55	0.50	1
Other Party	852	0.005	0.07	0
House	852	0.68	0.47	1
Nonwhite	769	0.00	0.00	0.00
Northeast	852	0.27	0.45	0
Midwest	852	0.30	0.46	0
West	852	0.16	0.37	0
South	852	0.27	0.45	0
CD Foreign Born Pop.	843	122,018.30	335,141.30	26,397.00
Age (Last Obs.)	852	56.24	10.84	56.5
Tenure (Last Obs.)	852	8.37	8.21	6



Table A2: Summary Statistics for Key Variables, Sample of MCs Matched to Census Data, 64th–91st Congress

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Median
Foreign Born MC	2,915	0.04	0.19	0.00
Parents Foreign Born	2,660	0.42	0.76	0.00
Grandparents Foreign Born	1,569	1.87	1.83	2.00
Immigration Index	1,569	0.87	0.98	0.50
At Least One Foreign Born Parent	2,661	0.26	0.44	0.00
At Least One Foreign Born Grandparent	1,694	0.60	0.49	1.00
All Foreign Born Parents	2,660	0.17	0.37	0.00
All Foreign Born Grandparents	1,569	0.38	0.49	0.00
Surname Foreign Born MC	2,909	0.09	0.11	0.06
Surname Parents Foreign Born	2,909	0.47	0.45	0.35
Surname Grandparents Foreign Born	2,906	1.23	1.10	0.98
Democrat	2,916	0.52	0.50	1
Republican	2,916	0.47	0.50	0
Other Party	2,916	0.01	0.10	0
House	2,916	0.82	0.38	1
Nonwhite	2,596	0.003	0.06	0.00
Northeast	2,916	0.28	0.45	0
Midwest	2,916	0.32	0.47	0
West	2,916	0.12	0.33	0
South	2,916	0.28	0.45	0
CD Foreign Born Pop.	2,813	98,982.31	294,168.90	24,631.83
Age (Last Obs.)	2,915	55.95	11.31	56.00
Tenure (Last Obs.)	2,916	9.39	7.67	6

Table A3: Miscast Votes

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Predicted Pro but Anti			Predicted Anti but Pro				
MC Foreign Born	-0.109 (0.068)				0.135** (0.067)			
Parents Foreign Born		-0.040*** (0.013)				0.050*** (0.014)		
Grandparents Foreign Born			-0.013* (0.007)				0.021*** (0.007)	
Immigration Index				-0.031** (0.014)				0.052*** (0.015)
log(CD Pop. Foreign)	-0.020* (0.010)	-0.022** (0.011)	-0.014 (0.010)	-0.014 (0.010)	0.021*** (0.005)	0.018*** (0.005)	0.018** (0.008)	0.016** (0.008)
Controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Bill Dummy	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Chamber Dummy	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
N	1,124	1,002	836	836	2,166	2,047	1,143	1,143
R <sup>2</sup>	0.112	0.126	0.103	0.104	0.094	0.096	0.101	0.106

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01  
SEs clustered at MC level.

Table A4: District Composition and MC Immigration History, 64th – 91st Congresses (House Only)

	MC Foreign Born (1)	Parents Foreign Born (2)	Grandparents Foreign Born (3)	Immigration Index (4)
log(CD Pop. Foreign)	0.012*** (0.003)	0.102*** (0.012)	0.370*** (0.034)	0.183*** (0.017)
log(CD Pop. Urban)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.002 (0.003)	-0.003 (0.007)	-0.005 (0.004)
Northeast	-0.016* (0.009)	0.073* (0.041)	0.059 (0.099)	0.069 (0.052)
South	-0.014** (0.007)	-0.228*** (0.036)	-0.903*** (0.112)	-0.343*** (0.053)
West	-0.030*** (0.009)	-0.182*** (0.046)	-0.358*** (0.138)	-0.197*** (0.066)
Congress FE	yes	yes	yes	yes
N	12,075	11,046	7,444	7,444
R <sup>2</sup>	0.024	0.131	0.296	0.276

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

SEs clustered at district level by redistricting cycle.

Table A5: Immigration History and MC Vote Choice: All Bills Pooled with Foreign Surnames

	Pro Immigration Vote			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Surname MC Foreign Born	0.361*** (0.083)			
Surname Parents Foreign Born		0.120*** (0.020)		
Surname Grandparents Foreign Born			0.055*** (0.009)	
Surname Immigration Index				0.103*** (0.016)
log(CD Pop. Foreign)	0.042*** (0.006)	0.039*** (0.006)	0.039*** (0.006)	0.040*** (0.006)
Republican	-0.216*** (0.019)	-0.209*** (0.020)	-0.207*** (0.020)	-0.209*** (0.019)
Other Party	0.117 (0.115)	0.134 (0.115)	0.146 (0.116)	0.131 (0.114)
Northeast	0.121*** (0.021)	0.121*** (0.020)	0.123*** (0.020)	0.117*** (0.020)
South	-0.241*** (0.028)	-0.213*** (0.029)	-0.198*** (0.029)	-0.201*** (0.029)
West	-0.033 (0.025)	-0.024 (0.025)	-0.021 (0.025)	-0.021 (0.025)
Age	-0.012* (0.006)	-0.012* (0.006)	-0.011* (0.007)	-0.011* (0.006)
Age Sq.	0.0001 (0.0001)	0.0001* (0.0001)	0.0001 (0.0001)	0.0001 (0.0001)
Tenure	-0.004 (0.002)	-0.004 (0.002)	-0.004 (0.002)	-0.004 (0.002)
Tenure Sq.	0.00003 (0.0001)	0.00003 (0.0001)	0.00004 (0.0001)	0.00003 (0.0001)
Bill FE	yes	yes	yes	yes
Chamber FE	yes	yes	yes	yes
N	3,367	3,367	3,362	3,352
R <sup>2</sup>	0.446	0.449	0.449	0.451

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01  
SEs clustered at MC level.

Table A6: Immigration History and Immigration Phrases (No Covariates)

	Immigration Phrases			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
MC Foreign Born	0.198 (0.135)			
Parents Foreign Born		0.091*** (0.024)		
Grandparents Foreign Born			0.055*** (0.011)	
Immigration Index				0.113*** (0.025)
Congress FE	yes	yes	yes	yes
Chamber FE	yes	yes	yes	yes
N	14,760	13,646	8,959	8,959
R <sup>2</sup>	0.171	0.177	0.209	0.210

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01  
SEs clustered at MC level.

Table A7: Immigration History and Immigration Phrases (with Covariates)

	Immigration Phrases			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
MC Foreign Born	0.071 (0.128)			
Parents Foreign Born		0.052** (0.024)		
Grandparents Foreign Born			0.031** (0.012)	
Immigration Index				0.070*** (0.027)
log(CD Pop. Foreign)	0.066*** (0.012)	0.061*** (0.012)	0.056*** (0.015)	0.055*** (0.016)
Republican	-0.049 (0.033)	-0.052 (0.035)	-0.027 (0.042)	-0.026 (0.041)
Other Party	0.093 (0.128)	0.074 (0.126)	0.101 (0.150)	0.088 (0.149)
Northeast	-0.064* (0.039)	-0.073* (0.040)	-0.071 (0.052)	-0.075 (0.052)
South	-0.037 (0.044)	-0.035 (0.045)	-0.072 (0.055)	-0.077 (0.055)
West	0.069 (0.047)	0.041 (0.047)	-0.003 (0.057)	-0.002 (0.057)
Age	0.017** (0.008)	0.016* (0.009)	0.003 (0.012)	0.004 (0.012)
Age Sq.	-0.0002*** (0.0001)	-0.0002*** (0.0001)	-0.0001 (0.0001)	-0.0001 (0.0001)
Tenure	0.045*** (0.005)	0.043*** (0.005)	0.039*** (0.006)	0.039*** (0.006)
Tenure Sq.	-0.001*** (0.0002)	-0.001*** (0.0002)	-0.001** (0.0002)	-0.001** (0.0002)
Congress FE	yes	yes	yes	yes
Chamber FE	yes	yes	yes	yes
N	14,282	13,188	8,651	8,651
R <sup>2</sup>	0.208	0.209	0.237	0.237

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01  
SEs clustered at MC level.

Table A8: Immigration History and Family & Immigration Speeches (No Covariates)

	Family & Immigration Speeches			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
MC Foreign Born	0.064 (0.049)			
Parents Foreign Born		0.024*** (0.007)		
Grandparents Foreign Born			0.012*** (0.003)	
Immigration Index				0.026*** (0.008)
Congress FE	yes	yes	yes	yes
Chamber FE	yes	yes	yes	yes
N	14,760	13,646	8,959	8,959
R <sup>2</sup>	0.052	0.054	0.067	0.068

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01  
SEs clustered at MC level.

Table A9: Immigration History and Family & Immigration Speeches (with Covariates)

	Family & Immigration Speeches			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
MC Foreign Born	0.035 (0.047)			
Parents Foreign Born		0.013** (0.007)		
Grandparents Foreign Born			0.007** (0.003)	
Immigration Index				0.016** (0.008)
log(CD Pop. Foreign)	0.010*** (0.003)	0.008*** (0.003)	0.007* (0.004)	0.006 (0.004)
Republican	-0.037*** (0.009)	-0.037*** (0.010)	-0.029** (0.012)	-0.029** (0.011)
Other Party	-0.007 (0.037)	-0.009 (0.037)	-0.015 (0.043)	-0.018 (0.043)
Northeast	0.012 (0.010)	0.011 (0.011)	0.016 (0.015)	0.015 (0.015)
South	-0.013 (0.011)	-0.014 (0.011)	-0.018 (0.015)	-0.019 (0.014)
West	0.004 (0.013)	-0.0002 (0.014)	-0.015 (0.017)	-0.015 (0.017)
Age	0.002 (0.003)	0.001 (0.003)	-0.002 (0.004)	-0.002 (0.004)
Age Sq.	-0.00003 (0.00002)	-0.00002 (0.00003)	0.00001 (0.00004)	0.00001 (0.00004)
Tenure	0.005*** (0.001)	0.005*** (0.001)	0.004*** (0.001)	0.004*** (0.001)
Tenure Sq.	-0.0001** (0.00004)	-0.0001** (0.00004)	-0.0001 (0.00005)	-0.0001 (0.00005)
Congress FE	yes	yes	yes	yes
Chamber FE	yes	yes	yes	yes
N	14,282	13,188	8,651	8,651
R <sup>2</sup>	0.062	0.061	0.074	0.074

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01  
SEs clustered at MC level.




## A.2 RDD Thresholds


The specific choice of threshold distinguishing “high” versus “low” probability of family immigration history based on surname does not appear to matter for the results. Figure A1 visually displays the RDD results for different threshold choices. Moving from left to right along the x-axis varies the threshold calculation used to determine when the binary variable indicating an immigrant family history takes a value equal to one. For example, when  $x = 0$  individuals with a Surname Score higher than the 50th percentile are classified as having a family immigration history and individuals whose Surname Score is below the 50th percentile are not. When  $x = 10$ , then individuals with a Surname Score higher than the 60th percentile are classified as having a family immigration history equal to one and individuals with a Surname Score less than or equal to the 40th percentile are assigned a zero. As we move to the right, we increasingly restrict the size of the sample until it is no longer reasonable to perform the estimation. We continued to estimate the RDD results as long as we retained at least 50 effective observations.

Across all measures and all Surname Score thresholds, the results remain positive. In general, as we grow more restrictive in terms of defining who does and does not have a surname that denotes a family immigration history the effect sizes increase. This makes intuitive sense: setting  $x = 0$  classifies some people as having an immigration history equal to one and others with an immigration history equal to zero when their Surname Scores are very similar (i.e., someone in the 49th percentile would have an indicator variable equal to zero and someone in the 51st percentile would have the indicator set to one). Such a coarse division likely adds considerable noise to our estimates. As the threshold grows more stringent, the distinction between a surname indicating an MC with a family history of immigration with an MC who does not have such a history grows sharper — until we no longer have enough observations to estimate the effects.


**Foreign Born (Self)**



**Foreign-Born Parents**



**Foreign-Born Grandparents**



**Immigration Index**




Figure A1: RDD Robustness Check: Sensitivity of Estimates to Surname Score Cutoff Donut for Treatment Assignment (Optimal BW). The figures illustrate the effect of MC Immigration History (Surname Score) on probability of casting Pro Immigration Vote

### A.3 RDD Robustness Checks

Table A10 reports the results of the same estimation procedure as in the main RDD, but using placebo outcomes as the dependent variable. We estimate the effects of quasi-random assignment of an MC with an immigrant history on pre-treatment covariates including age, party, and region. Across all of these placebo outcomes, we do not observe any meaningful relationship. Table A11 reports continuity checks for the RDD results. We reformulate our estimation as if the threshold between winning and losing an election was  $0.5 \pm c$  and re-estimate the results. Given that these thresholds are artificially constructed, we should observe no meaningful relationship between an MC's immigration history and the outcome; put differently, we should not observe a jump in the probability of casting a pro-immigration vote anywhere except the actual threshold between electing an MC with versus without an immigrant background. Again, we do not observe statistically significant results at any of the alternative thresholds.

Table A10: RDD Robustness Check with Placebo Outcome Variables: Imputed Immigration History (Surname Score) and Vote Choice, All Bills Pooled (House, Foreign Born Parents Determine Treatment Status)

	Age	Dem	Northeast	South	Midwest	West
Estimate	-1.192 (3.241)	0.17 (0.202)	0.101 (0.18)	-0.035 (0.1)	-0.194 (0.182)	0.134 (0.209)
N	278	278	278	278	278	278
N (Effective)	137	101	146	119	132	101
BW	$\pm 10.195$	$\pm 6.968$	$\pm 10.892$	$\pm 8.413$	$\pm 9.76$	$\pm 6.942$

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01  
SEs clustered at MC level.

Table A11: RDD Continuity Check: Imputed Immigration History (Surname Score) and Vote Choice, All Bills Pooled (House, Foreign Born Parents Determine Treatment Status)

	40	45	50	55	60
Estimate	-0.206 (0.208)	0.26 (0.182)	0.355* (0.188)	-0.155 (0.336)	0.117 (0.342)
N	252	252	252	252	252
N (Effective)	95	111	113	75	54
BW	±7.536	±7.66	±8.641	±6.785	±7.16

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01  
SEs clustered at MC level.

Table A12: Regression Discontinuity: Imputed Immigration History (Surname Score) and Vote Choice, All Bills Pooled

	MC		Parents			Grandparents			Immigration Index			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Estimate	-0.177 (0.46)	-0.393 (0.353)	0.102 (0.292)	0.571 (0.445)	0.026 (0.321)	0.024 (0.369)	0.668* (0.368)	0.174 (0.328)	0.114 (0.3)	0.556* (0.312)	0.28 (0.302)	0.364 (0.26)
N	195	195	195	269	269	269	264	264	264	262	262	262
N (Effective)	53	94	160	77	129	216	76	128	216	79	126	210
BW	±5.571	±10	±20	±5.324	±10	±20	±5.914	±10	±20	±5.898	±10	±20

\*p < .1, \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01  
SEs clustered at MC level.

#### A.4 Bill by Bill Results


We turn to examine vote by vote effects across chambers. Rather than pool all votes together and include bill fixed effects, we instead estimate the model specified in Equation 1 but with the sample restricted by vote and by chamber. Figure A2 reports the results for the House and the Senate. For the Senate, we had to omit several votes; in some cases, we had insufficient variation in the outcome variable (i.e., HR4075 was a 90-2 vote) or insufficient data on foreign-born grandparents.<sup>45</sup>

In the House, we observe consistently positive and significant effects; both foreign-born parents and foreign-born grandparents were strongly associated with casting pro-immigration votes. In the Senate, the bill by bill results appear more mixed. Looking at parental immigration history, the effects register as positive for six of seven bills, but in most cases we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no effect. A similar pattern persists when examining foreign-born grandparent effects in the Senate.


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<sup>45</sup>HR10384, the Immigration Act of 1917, lacked enough data on foreign-born grandparents. This was because most MCs voting were also adults in 1900 or 1910 and not living with their parents. This made it difficult to determine the immigration histories of their grandparents.


**Foreign-Born Parents, House**



**Foreign-Born Grandparents, House**



**Foreign-Born Parents, Senate**



**Foreign-Born Grandparents, Senate**




Figure A2: Effect of Foreign-Born Parents and Grandparents on Pro Immigration Vote on Individual Bills

## A.5 Key Terms for Identifying Topics of Speech

The key terms to identify immigration speech are: “across border”, “administr foreign”, “allow foreign”, “along border”, “american foreign”, “beyond border”, “billion foreign”, “border patrol”, “border protect”, “border region”, “border secur”, “border state”, “border unit”, “broken immigr”, “canadian border”, “citizenship immigr”, “come foreign”, “come illeg”, “comprehens immigr”, “control border”, “countri illeg”, “custom border”, “enforc immigr”, “feder immigr”, “flow illeg”, “foreign born”, “foreign languag”, “foreign student”, “foreign worker”, “illeg activ”, “illeg immigr”, “immigr act”, “immigr children”, “immigr come”, “immigr countri”, “immigr custom”, “immigr enforc”, “immigr issu”, “immigr natur”, “immigr polici”, “immigr problem”, “immigr reform”, “immigr refuge”, “immigr servic”, “immigr status”, “immigr subcommitte”, “immigr system”, “immigr unit”, “immigr visa”, “involv foreign”, “legal illeg”, “legal immigr”, “mani foreign”, “mexican border”, “million foreign”, “million illeg”, “nation border”, “nation immigr”, “need foreign”, “northern border”, “open border”, “peopl foreign”, “peopl illeg”, “percent foreign”, “protect border”, “reform immigr”, “report foreign”, “resid alien”, “restrict immigr”, “secur border”, “side border”, “southern border”, “southwest border”, “state border”, “state illeg”, “stop illeg”, “subcommitte immigr”, “undocu immigr”, “undocu worker”, “within border”.

The key terms to identify family speech are: “mother”, “father”, “grandmoth”, “grandfath”, “uncl”, “aunt”, “cousin”, “brother”, “sister”, “parent”, “grandpar”, “children”, “famili”, “relat”, “kin”, “clan”, “hous”, “household”, “home”, “sibl”, “lineag”, “blood”, “brood”, “descend”, “legaci”, “inherit”, “genealog”, “in-law”, “folk”, “ancestor”, “root”, “spous”, “wife”, “husband”, “marriag”, “wed”.

## A.6 Coding Places of Origin into Regions

We identify regions of origin based on the birth countries of parents and grandparents. Countries are grouped into regions as follows:

Old Europe includes people with census country codes for Denmark, Faroe Islands, Finland, Iceland, Lapland, Norway, Svalbard and Jan Meyen, Svalbard, Jan Meyen, Sweden, England, Channel Islands, Guernsey, Jersey, Isle of Man, Scotland, Wales, United Kingdom, Ireland, Northern Ireland, Northern Europe, Belgium, France, Alsace-Lorraine, Alsace, Lorraine, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Monaco, Netherlands, Switzerland, Western Europe, Austria, Austria-Hungary, Austria-Graz, Austria-Linz, Austria-Salzburg, Austria-Tyrol, Austria-Vienna, Austria-Kaernten, Austria-Neustadt, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Bohemia, Bohemia-Moravia, Slovakia, Czech Republic, Germany, Berlin, West Berlin, East Berlin, West Germany, Baden, Bavaria, Braunschweig, Bremen, Hamburg, Hanover, Hessen, Hesse-Nassau, Lippe, Lubeck, Oldenburg, Rheinland, Schaumburg-Lippe, Schleswig, Sigmaringen, Schwarzburg, Westphalia, Wurttemberg, Waldeck, Wittenberg, Frankfurt, Saarland, Nordrhein-Westfalen, East Germany, Anhalt, Brandenburg, Kingdom of Saxony, Mecklenburg, Saxony, Thuringian States, Sachsen-Meiningen, Sachsen-Weimar-Eisenach, Probable Saxony, Schwerin, Strelitz, Probably Thuringian States, Prussia, Hohenzollern, and Niedersachsen.

New Europe includes people with census country codes for Albania, Andorra, Gibraltar, Greece, Dodecanese Islands, Turkey Greece, Macedonia, Italy, Malta, Portugal, Azores, Madeira Islands, Cape Verde Islands, St. Miguel, San Marino, Spain, Vatican City, Southern Europe, Hungary, Poland, Austrian Poland, Galicia, German Poland, East Prussia, Pomerania, Posen, Prussian Poland, Silesia, West Prussia, Russian Poland, Romania, Transylvania, Yugoslavia, Croatia, Montenegro,



Serbia, Bosnia, Dalmatia, Slavonia, Carniola, Slovenia, Kosovo, Central Europe, Eastern Europe, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Baltic States, Other USSR/Russia; Byelorussia, Moldavia, Bessarabia, Ukraine, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Republic of Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kirghizia, Tadzhik, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Siberia, USSR, Europe.